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Soviet Union

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CONTENTS

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

NATO Draft Strategy Clings to 'Enemy Image' [PRAVDA 6 Nov]	1
IBEC Panel Views Market Ties, GDR Status [IZVESTIYA 3 Nov]	1
Spy Praises Gorbachev Role in Ending Cold War [PRAVDA 6 Nov]	2

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Near East & South Asia

Belousov Views Soviet Withdrawal From Iraq [Moscow TV]	3
Iraqi Spokesman Calls Kuwait 'Iraqi Province' [TASS]	3
'Top Priority' Views Gulf Prospects [Moscow International]	4
Commentaries Continue on Persian Gulf Crisis	6
'Myths' Surround Gulf Events [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 44]	6
'Zero-Hour' Seen as Imminent [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 2 Nov]	7
Crisis Enters 'New Stage' [Moscow International]	8
Palestinian Leader Holds News Conference on Gulf [Moscow International]	8
Afghanistan's Najibullah Meets With Journalists [Moscow TV]	8
Prospects for Afghan Peace, Bloodshed Viewed [TASS]	9
Afghan Envoy Speaks on Relations, POW's [TASS]	9
Envoy to Pakistan Discusses Afghan MIA's [PRAVDA 4 Nov]	10
Bhutto Defeat, New Pakistan Leadership Viewed [PRAVDA 1 Nov]	10
Gorbachev, Iranian Envoy Note Bilateral Ties [Tehran International]	11
Ryzhkov Meets Iranian Mining Minister [TASS]	11
TASS Urges U.S. 'Energetic Efforts' on Israel	11

East Europe

Polish, Soviet Economists Discuss Market Economy [IZVESTIYA 25 Oct]	12
---	----

West Europe

French Defense Minister Interviewed on Gulf [MOSCOW NEWS No 43]	13
Falin Holds News Conference, Details 'Putnik' Issue [IZVESTIYA 1 Nov]	14
Kolesnichenko Reviews Gorbachev European Tour [PRAVDA 5 Nov]	14
Presidential Adviser Writes on German Unification [IAN PRESS RELEASE 16 Oct]	16
Dzasokhov Meets FRG Ambassador on Ties [PRAVDA 3 Nov]	19
Soldiers To Help Load Potatoes at German Ports [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 6 Nov]	19
Austrian Envoy Visits Foreign Ministry [TASS]	20

Latin America & Caribbean

U.S. Military Aid Cuts to El Salvador Examined [Moscow International]	20
'Peaceful Settlement' Needed in El Salvador [TASS]	21
Argentine Intelligence Chief Meets KGB Chief [IZVESTIYA 28 Oct]	21

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Paper Defends Supreme Soviet Coverage [IZVESTIYA 2 Nov]	22
---	----

Political & Social

Shots Fired in Red Square During Celebration [TASS]	23
Shooting Incident Detailed [AFP]	23
Gorbachev, Yeltsin Both Attend GOSR Parade [TASS]	23
Parade Detailed [TASS]	23
SS-25 Missiles Included in Parade [TASS]	23
Leaders Attend GOSR Reception in Kremlin [TASS]	24
GOSR Celebrated Throughout Country [TASS]	24
Tashkent, Baltics Celebrate [PRAVDA 7 Nov]	25
Further on Baltic Activities [TASS]	25
Central Asia, Azerbaijan Celebrate [TASS]	26
Ashkhabad Parade Reported [Moscow Radio]	26
Nizhny Novgorod Celebrates [Moscow Radio]	26
TASS Notes Controversy Over Celebration [TASS]	27
Alternative Demonstrations Held in Moscow [TASS]	27
Yeltsin, Popov Attend Opposition Marches [Moscow Radio]	28
Demonstration Reportedly Calm [Moscow Radio]	28
Human Rights Demonstration Held in Moscow [TASS]	29
Democratic Groups Demonstrate Peacefully [Moscow Radio]	29
Events in Moscow, Leningrad Previewed [TASS]	29
Television Reports on Planned Demonstrations [Moscow TV]	30
Gorbachev Speaks at GOSR Awards Ceremony [Moscow TV]	31
Leaders Assemble for GOSR Formal Meeting [TASS]	32
Lukyanov Speech [Moscow TV]	32
Art Director on Cultural Threats [Moscow TV]	34
Leningrad Name Change Disputed [Moscow TV]	35
Speaker Criticizes Leader's Conflict [Moscow TV]	36
Gorbachev Meets Diplomatic Corps [PRAVDA 7 Nov]	36
Gorbachev Presents State Decorations [TASS]	37
Grigoriy Revenko Outlines New Union Treaty [TASS]	37
More on Revenko [Moscow TV]	38
Moscow Permit Refused to Politburo Member [Moscow Radio]	38
Conflicting Reports on Army Plans for Coup [London TV]	38
Housing Privileges for Officials Revealed [Moscow Radio]	38
Diplomat Deplores Foreign Ministry State [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Nov]	39
Government Studies Appeals on Legal Conflicts [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Nov]	41
Speakers at Federation Council Session Listed [PRAVDA 3 Nov]	42
Prisoner Freed; Others Stage Hunger Strike [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Nov]	42
Published Appeal to Youth Questioned [IZVESTIYA 6 Nov]	42
Jewish Magazine To Be Published in Russian [TASS]	43
New Independent Newspaper in Magnitogorsk [Moscow Radio]	43
RODINA Editor Describes Main Objectives [Moscow TV]	43
MOSCOW NEWS Profiles New Appointments [MOSCOW NEWS No 44]	43
MOSCOW NEWS on Newsprint Availability [MOSCOW NEWS No 44]	44
Internal Affairs Ministry Seeks Budget Increase [Moscow Radio]	44
Komsomol Leader Zyukin Interviewed [PRAVDA 29 Oct]	45
Editor Explains Znaniye-Paper 'Separation' [IZVESTIYA 2 Nov]	46
Sociopolitical Commission's Tasks Viewed [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 30 Oct]	47
CPSU Proposes Draft Regulations on Referendums [PRAVDA 29 Oct]	48
Draft CPSU Instructions on Dues, Spending [PRAVDA 30 Oct]	51

Economic

Gorbachev Decree on Foreign Currency Published [PRAVDA 3 Nov]	54
Bank Deputy Chief Explains New Interest Rates [IZVESTIYA 2 Nov]	55

Foreign Trade Bank Chief Urges Caution	[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Nov]	56
Moscow Gasoline Situation Termed 'Critical'	[Moscow Radio]	57
'Shadow Economy' Size, Scale Examined	[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 2 Nov]	57
Inflation Levels, Solutions Analyzed	[IZVESTIYA 5 Nov]	57

Agricultural

Grain Crisis Blamed on Contract Noncompliance	[IZVESTIYA 6 Nov]	59
---	-------------------	----

Scientific

Problems Seen in U.S. Scientific Cooperation	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Nov]	59
--	-------------------------	----

Military

Yazov 'Order of the Day' on GOSR Anniversary	[PRAVDA 7 Nov]	60
Military Commander Views Military Reform Impact	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Nov]	61
Moiseyev Interviewed on NATO Visit	[Moscow International]	61
Concern Voiced Over Chemical Weapons' Incineration	[IZVESTIYA 3 Nov]	62
Tortuous Path to Arms Spending Glasnost Eyed	[IZVESTIYA 3 Nov]	63
Chernov's Komsomolets Enquiry Questioned	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Nov]	65

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Coverage of Lithuanian 7 November Celebration		66
Landsbergis Appeals To Ignore Parade	[Vilnius International]	66
Vilnius Militiamen To Be Unarmed	[Vilnius International]	66
Majority Greet Parade With Whistles	[Vilnius Radio]	66
Troops Clash With Students	[Vilnius Radio]	66
Parade Curtailed Due to Protests	[Hamburg DPA]	68
Coverage of Estonian 7 November Celebration		68
Controversy Over Parade Viewed	[TASS]	68
'At Most 5,000' Participate	[Tallinn Radio]	68
Russian Democrats Hoist Tsarist Flag	[Tallinn Radio]	69
Anniversary Deemed Working Day	[Moscow Radio]	69
Latvian 7 November Celebrations Reported		69
Interior Minister Appeals for Calm	[Riga International]	69
Interfront Leader Views Plans	[Riga International]	70
Latvian People's Front Protests	[Riga Radio]	70
Controversy Over Parade Noted	[TASS]	70
Soviet Army Guard Lenin Monument	[Riga Radio]	71
Soldiers Hoist Flag at Press House	[Riga Radio]	71
Prunskiene Discusses Negotiations With Kremlin	[Vilnius International]	71

RSFSR

Yeltsin Invited to Japan To Discuss Kurils	[Moscow TV]	72
Silayev Meeting With Military Deputies Viewed	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Nov]	73
Polozkov Refused Residence Permit for Moscow	[IZVESTIYA 7 Nov]	73
Yazov Meets With RSFSR Military Deputies	[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Nov]	74
Filshin Demands Union Government Resignation	[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 5 Nov]	75
Abdulatipov Discusses New Federal Treaty Draft	[Moscow Radio]	77
Popov Interviewed Concerning Moscow Politics	[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA 15 Oct]	77
Moscow Street Name Changes Further Detailed	[PRAVDA 6 Nov]	85
Autonomous Republic's Rights Proposed for Moscow	[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA 22 Oct]	85
Journalist Examines Coup Rumors in Leningrad	[Vilnius Radio]	86
Chelyabinsk Demonstration Opposes Nationalism	[Moscow Radio]	86
Komi Wants MVD Troops' Return From Azerbaijan	[PRAVDA 7 Nov]	86

Vladimir Obkom Elects New First Secretary [Moscow Radio]	86
Rayon Party Chief Dismissed in Penza Oblast [IZVESTIYA 23 Oct]	86

Western Republics

Crisis Situation in Dnestr Republic Continues	87
Left Bank Remains 'Tense' [TASS]	87
Dnestr Leader Comments [Moscow Radio]	87
Snegur Issues Appeal to Gagauz Citizens [SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 23 Oct]	88
No 7 November Celebrations Held in Kishinev [TASS]	88
Situation Throughout Moldavia Detailed [TASS]	89
Moldavia Makes Move Toward 'Reconciliation' [IZVESTIYA 6 Nov]	89
Snegur Proposes Better Moldavian-Romanian Ties [Bucharest ROMPRES]	90
Anti-Army Campaign in Moldavia Condemned [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Nov]	91
Anti-Semitism in Moldavia Examined [SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA 16 Oct]	91
Military Parade, Alternative Meeting in Kiev [Moscow Radio]	93
'Mass Participation' in Nikolayev Celebration [Moscow Radio]	93
Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Elects First Secretary [PRAVDA 5 Nov]	93
Belorussia Schedules Supreme Soviet Session [Minsk Radio]	93

Caucasus

New Site Chosen for Tbilisi Military Parade [TASS]	94
Residents Reject Parade [Moscow TV]	94
No Celebration Reported [Moscow Radio]	94
Georgia Supreme Soviet Election Results Examined [Moscow Radio]	94
Gamsakhurdia Discusses Soviet Army, KGB [IZVESTIYA 7 Nov]	94
Georgian Party Views 'Anti-Constitutional' Acts [ZARYA VOSTOKA 25 Oct]	95
Armenia Not Celebrating 7 November Anniversary [Yerevan Radio]	95
Armenia Supreme Soviet Depoliticizes State Bodies [Moscow Radio]	95
Yeltsin Sends Message to Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan [Yerevan Radio]	95
Armenia Abolishes People's Control Committee [Yerevan Radio]	95
Case Against Armenian KGB Officer Detailed [EPOKHA No 8]	96
Yerevan Reports Flight Restrictions to NKAO [ARMENPRES]	101

Central Asia

Tukrmenistan Signs Economic Protocol With Turkey [Ankara Radio]	102
Kazakhstan Restricts Commercial Goods Movements [Moscow Radio]	102
Civil Accord Council Established in Kazakhstan [TASS]	102
Kazakh Soldiers' Mothers Found Congress [SELSKAYA ZHIZN 31 Oct]	102
Tajikistan Schedules Supreme Soviet Session [Dushanbe Radio]	103
Kirghizia's Akayev Forms Economic Reform Body [IZVESTIYA 4 Nov]	103

NATO Draft Strategy Clings to 'Enemy Image'

PM0611165590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Second Edition p 4

[Vladislav Drobkov "Viewpoint": "Tell Me Who Your Enemy Is..."]

[Text] The old truism—tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are—can also be put in a different form. Namely: Tell me who your enemy is... It looks as though the North Atlantic alliance, which is now formulating a new strategy for the future, is prepared to initiate such an alteration.

I would remind you that talks on creating a new strategic doctrine for NATO, to replace the obsolete theory of "flexible response," have been under way for a long time now. They were prompted by the dramatic changes in Europe, which marked the conclusion of the evil "cold war" time and the start of a transition to new, more constructive and good-neighborly relations between states.

Now all sober-minded politicians, including many figures in the North Atlantic bloc itself, deem the preservation of the old division of Europe into opposing military-political groupings to be pointless and impossible. Moreover, the dismantling of one of those groupings has essentially begun. Substantial efforts are being made on both sides to reduce both armed forces and armaments, including the destruction of the most dangerous, destabilizing types, which were intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The heads of state and government of the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are shortly to meet in Paris and, so I would like to believe, will be able to reach agreement on a still more significant reduction in military might, on new measures to strengthen confidence, and on a final move away from confrontation toward cooperation.

In this situation the abandonment of decrepit dogmas and strategies is becoming a clear necessity. One might only rejoice over NATO, where, according to reports from the bloc's Brussels headquarters, the first draft of a new doctrine has been drawn up at long last. Were it not for one essential detail. The new NATO doctrine, if the REUTER report is to be believed, continues to name as the source of the threat to the bloc countries... the Soviet Union. This creates a certain political "awkwardness," the REUTER correspondent notes. Its essence was neatly expressed by a "diplomat from one of the bloc countries" cited by the agency as stating that "a situation where a hand of friendship is held out while the other hand, holding a big stick, is kept behind your back may seem rather inconsistent."

In my view, "inconsistency" is too mild a word to define the first outline of the new doctrine. The desire of very definite forces in NATO to continue to make an "enemy image" of the USSR, thereby justifying the continued functioning of obsolete militarist structures, cannot be

regarded other than as undermining of the changes taking place in Europe. But that is not all. The proclamation of the Soviet Union, which pioneered the improvement of the entire international climate and advocated an emphatic lowering of the level of military confrontation, as the "number one enemy"—and that is precisely how certain observers have characterized the NATO draft—is not only unjustified, but may also have a pernicious effect on the building of new relations in Europe. For trust among all parties has been and remains a necessary condition for that building.

Finally, by portraying our country as the source of a threat to the West, NATO is essentially repudiating the statements of the bloc's heads of state and government, who at their meeting in London in July of this year called for the start of a new chapter in relations with the USSR, for it to be regarded not as an enemy but as a partner, and for a "hand of friendship and cooperation" to be held out to us. The question is: Does NATO's left hand know what its right is doing?

True, people in Brussels hasten to offer assurances that their fears are prompted not by the USSR's aggressiveness but by the unpredictability of the development of the situation. But in that case, it seems to me, it is particularly important to display restraint and goodwill.

There is no denying that the complex and painful processes taking place in our country are bound to worry our close and distant neighbors on the continent and throughout the planet. But it is hard to describe as anything but shortsighted the attempts to exploit them in order to revive the "enemy image," to question in advance the success of the policy of perestroika, and to attempt to use this to justify the preservation of confrontational dogmas and cliches.

IBEC Panel Views Market Ties, GDR Status

PM0611165790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 90 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "IBEC Council Session"]

[Text] The 73d session of the IBEC [International Bank for Economic Cooperation] Council has been held in Ho Chi Minh City (SRV).

Also participating in its work were representatives of the CEMA Secretariat and the International Investment Bank invited by the IBEC Council in accordance with existing cooperation agreements, as well as an FRG delegation with observer status.

The Bank Council examined a wide range of questions connected with the IBEC's practical involvement in the currency and financial mechanism of the bank's member countries, which is being renewed under conditions of their cooperation's switch to a market basis involving the use of freely convertible currency in transactions.

The council took note of an FRG Government statement that in connection with the GDR's ceasing to exist as a

subject of international law German membership of the IBEC lapses as of 3 October 1990. An accord was reached to the effect that questions connected with this will be settled in a spirit of mutual understanding.

Spy Praises Gorbachev Role in Ending Cold War

*PM0611144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Second Edition p 1*

[Letter from George Blake "To PRAVDA's Readers" under the general heading: "Faithful to His Ideals; Meeting With Intelligence Agent George Blake"]

[Text] To PRAVDA's Readers

As in October 1917, the country is now again experiencing great, historic changes. I am happy to have linked my fate forever with the Russian people and to be able today to be a witness of and participant in these changes.

They have brought us, together with many difficulties, one indisputably tremendous achievement: That is the end of the "Cold War," the war in which I took a direct part as an intelligence agent. This is grounds for sincere joy so far as I am concerned, for the threat of real war has receded together with the "Cold War."

We owe this in large measure to the "new thinking" elaborated and implemented by M.S. Gorbachev and his closest supporters in foreign policy. The sword of Damocles of nuclear annihilation that hung over us and all mankind for over 40 years has vanished. The peace of which we dreamed so much has arrived.

In the hustle and bustle of our daily life we often forget this. I think it is worth reflecting on this and appreciating the positive processes that are taking place in the world.

[Signed] George Blake

Near East & South Asia

Belousov Views Soviet Withdrawal From Iraq

LD0611205590 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1800 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Interview with Igor Sergeyevich Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by correspondent N. Chernysheva; place and date not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—live or recorded]

[Text] [Chernysheva] Igor Sergeyevich, almost a month, less two days, has passed since you returned from Iraq and gave an interview to the "Vremya" program. You said that the withdrawal of Soviet people from Iraq would begin from that time and you gave guarantees and promises. Have you fulfilled them?

[Belousov] Yes, over the past month our people have been arriving in the USSR in full accord with the schedule we agreed upon after the talks and contacts with the Iraqi leadership. During the period, 1,680 of our Soviet people have arrived in the USSR.

[Chernysheva] Igor Sergeyevich, but as far as I am aware there are 3,500 of our specialists still there today. Does there exist some sort of plan for their withdrawal, or are they people who must remain there to work?

[Belousov] A plan has now been drawn up for the further evacuation of people to the USSR. When Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, was recently in Iraq again he reached agreement that during November 1,000 Soviet specialists will be withdrawn, on our aircraft, naturally. But they will include not only those who have insistently asked to return to the USSR before the end of the contract work, but also those whom we must bring back to the USSR because the work front on a whole range of projects is decreasing in size. It is well known that the Security Council sanctions envisage the impossibility of delivering to Iraq equipment components and materials. It is also well known that the USSR is strictly adhering to the implementation of these sanctions. The working group I head, the working group set up on instructions from the president, is monitoring all of this.

The mood of our comrades has improved. The fact that the withdrawal of our people from Iraq to the USSR took place during October in strict accordance with the agreed schedule made a good impression on everyone. The mail remains normal. The necessary monitoring has been established over this. We shall continue to monitor the development of events and the development of the situation at our building sites in Iraq. This concerns, in particular, those working on contract No. 24-400. These are our specialists working on fitting out the oil deposit at Western Qurnah.

I am sure that it is possible to make political, highly responsible decisions to avoid a military conflict.

Reason must prevail. I think that it is very important for all of us to know this and to struggle for these political decisions.

Iraqi Spokesman Calls Kuwait 'Iraqi Province'

LD0511121290 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT
5 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Malyarov]

[Text] Cairo November 5 TASS—"The Gulf crisis is steadily heading toward a shooting war. The count down has already begun. Only Saddam Husayn's order to withdraw from Kuwait can yet prevent hostilities," says the Saudi AL-BILAD newspaper. It believes U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's current shuttle mission in the Middle East and Europe was intended to coordinate military operations in Iraq with all sides concerned.

"Iraq will never withdraw from Kuwait. The world must forget about something that was once called Kuwait. It is merely an Iraqi province," Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nusayyif Jasim briefed foreign journalists on Sunday [4 November].

The AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper reports today that all reserve officers have been called up in Iraq.

"An Iraqi spokesman said that two unidentified warplanes violated the "Iraq airspace from Saudi Arabia on Sunday," the newspaper notes.

The first units of a Syrian tank division sent to reinforce the Syrian contingent in Saudi Arabia, arrived in the port of Yanbu' last night. Welcoming the Syrian troops, commander-in-chief of the multinational Arab-Islamic forces Saudi General Khalid Bin-Sultan-Bin-'Abd al'Aziz said they would be immediately deployed on the Saudi-Kuwait border. Syria plans to send to Saudi Arabia up to 20,000 servicemen to help repulse a possible Iraqi aggression.

Fifteen more Western hostages were released in Iraq on Sunday. They arrived in Amman last night, the Middle East News Agency (MENA) reports. They include 14 Germans and one Belgian. According to MENA, the hostages were released by Saddam Husayn's personal order.

The Egyptian-Libyan and Egyptian-Syrian summits will focus on Gulf events and problems of coordinating the Arab stand on the conflict. According to local press reports, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has reached agreement to hold separate meetings with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and leader of the Libyan revolution Mu'amar Al-Qadhafi within the next three days. It was decided to hold these meetings in Egypt. Several Egyptian newspapers believe the meetings will be held today.

'Top Priority' Views Gulf Prospects

*LD0311163190 Moscow in English to North America
2300 GMT 2 Nov 90*

["Top Priority" program, hosted by Irina Tkachenko, with Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Kortunov of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada]

[Text] [Tkachenko] November 2nd marks three months since the beginning of the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait, the occupation of Kuwait. Now three months later almost the whole of the world is united in the economic embargo on land, sea, and in the air. The international forces ranged against the army of Saddam Husayn are ready to plunge forward. Talk has escalated over the last few days of futility of diplomatic effort and the imminent war. How avoidable or unavoidable does military action look to you Sergey?

[Plekhanov] I think it is avoidable. I think the escalation of the talk about possible fighting reflects several things. Number one, certain frustration about the results of the blockade—although people must be reminded that when the blockade was being instituted experts were saying that it will take six to nine months to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Of course there is the problem as to the societies in various countries which are taking part in the blockade would go for continuing to finance [sentence as heard].

In the United States there are worries that Congress may—under the pressure of public opinion—may start withholding money from this operation or at least reducing the spending on it. So there is a frustration and that inevitably leads to calls for military action. Secondly, the business of deterrence. If you want to intimidate a country to force it out of another country which it has invaded there is always the question of how much terror is enough, how much of a threat is enough in order to force the country out. In this particular case I think demonstration of a readiness to start military action is functional to this threat projection, if you will. I am convinced that the use of military force to start a war in the Gulf remains for policy makers the opinion of last resort and the time for that last resort has not come yet.

[Tkachenko] Do you think many people realize that that could possibly be the major and perhaps the last economic and ecological, if you will, disaster in the area—that can produce a catastrophe far more widescale and (?morbid) than the recent oil spill in Alaska caused by the accident in the Exxon Valdez, with the ship [sentence as heard]. Do you think that the world leaders are weighing the economic rather than the ecological and the human losses on the scales, Andrey?

[Kortunov] Well of course for all the world leaders economic consequences of the crisis are very important. It can at certain point trigger worldwide economic recession but I do not think that they simply neglect the ecological aspects of the problem. These aspects are very

important and I think it is one of the constraints the world leaders have in their deliberations about their military actions. The usual approach to this crisis would be of course search for diplomatic compromise and I guess that the Soviet position is exactly an attempt to reach such a compromise—but still the question is even if Saddam Husayn withdraws, Iraq will enjoy the superior position in the region and there is absolutely no guarantee that such attempts can not be repeated in any future.

[Tkachenko] Do you think that the Soviet and Americans sides [words indistinct] united, perhaps for the first time in recent history, at the very start of the aggression, of the Iraqi occupation, and spoke in one voice against it—do you think they are right now drifting apart somewhat with the United States, insisting more and more often on the imminent military action, perhaps by year's end, and the Soviet Union still insisting on the diplomatic solution to the problem?

[Plekhanov] Well I would say that there is more of a difference between the postures of the two sides but I do not think that it is anything resembling a split or anything like that. While somebody has to lay the role of the intimidator, somebody has to be able to talk to the intimidated side. I still think that a peaceful solution is possible, that the military and economic pressure applied against Iraq is absolutely crucial to the peaceful negotiations so whatever the outcome will be it will be achieved under the duress....

[Kortunov, interrupting] And if I may add, of course the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in this crisis coincide in many very important issues, but we should also take into account that there are serious differences in the interests of the two countries in the Middle East and specifically in this situation. For the United States, Saddam Husayn is a villain, he is a very clear case of an enemy and I think the best option the United States can foresee is the actual removal of Saddam Husayn and his replacement by somebody more cooperative to the West.

But for the Soviet Union the situation is somewhat different because the Soviet Union enjoys a longstanding relationship with the country, we have economic interests in Iraq, military interests in Iraq, and it is not absolutely evident for the leaders in Moscow that Saddam Husayn will be replaced by somebody who is more willing to cooperate with Moscow.

That is why I think for Soviet leaders a compromise which will allow Saddam Husayn while withdrawing but still staying in power is more preferable an option than for the United States. And naturally these differences affect the postures of the two countries in the region.

[Plekhanov] I would differ with that. I do not think that the survival of the Husayn regime is an important foreign policy interest of the Soviet Union. I do not think that they think in these terms in Moscow. The primary goal is to achieve a peaceful solution of the conflict based

on the withdrawal, complete withdrawal, of Iraqi troops from Kuwait—that is the foreign policy impact. The survival of the Husayn regime may or may not happen but it is not an important policy consideration and, by the way, one should not paint the American-Iraqi relations as those of absolute hostility. We know that the United States has been getting closer to Iraq in the months before the invasion, that in the conflict between Iraq and Iran the United States was supporting Iraq and that getting close to Iraq and possibly enlisting Iraq in some kind of a pro-American, pro-Western combination in the Middle East has been characterizing the American policy for some time. So it has not been a clear cut case of an American enemy and a Soviet Ally. It has been more complex than that.

[Tkachenko] Do you share the view, Sergey, that there is a considerable difference in the vested interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the area, considering that the U.S. after all getting ready for a war remains conveniently far away from the theatre of war, being in the other hemisphere....

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Right, but it is also more vulnerable to the economic consequences of the war than the Soviet Union because it is the Western economy that will suffer the most as a result of a full scale war around the Gulf. The Soviet Union is not dependent on the flow of oil from the Gulf....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Yes, but you should also take into account that our traditional partners or clients in the region basically supported Iraq in its aggression—Libya and Yemen and PLO—so of course the Soviet Union has to take into account the position of its traditional allies in the region.

[Plekhanov] You mean choosing an Al-Qadhdhafi over a Mubarak or....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Well I just mean that....

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Or King Husayn? Or Saudi Arabia? As a result of the crisis we have been establishing diplomatic relations with a regime in the Arab world which we could not have normal relations....

[Kortunov, interrupting] Well, as far as I understand the Soviet policies right now Shevardnadze and especially Primakov are very cautious not to send a wrong signal to our traditional partners in the region. He definitely wants to limit the differences in our position into this specific situation and when Shevardnadze is speaking about a Geneva conference on Middle East settlement he definitely means that basically our position in the region, though it is changing, is not changing radically and that we still support our traditional partners there. No, it is questionable whether, you know, this position is right or wrong but I think that we can read the recent statements of our leaders exactly as an attempt to show that we are not changing the sides altogether.

[Plekhanov] I read it differently because I do not think it has to do with our traditional ties with either al-Qadhdhafi or the PLO, it has to do with another thing and that is that Saddam Husayn has emerged in the eyes of many Arabs, of most Arabs (these days), especially if you take the masses rather than the governments, as somebody who is able to stand up to the West. The conflict between the West and the Arabs is something that goes.... [changes thought] rooted in history and any realistic settlement will have to take that into account. You cannot do a settlement which would alienate most people in the Arab world. That is why it will have to be a settlement more based on the peaceful negotiations than with an all out war. I mean just knocking out Saddam Husayn and getting 50 million enemies in the Arab world as a result would not be in the interests of either West or the East or the world.

[Kortunov] Exactly, that is why I am saying that the survival of Saddam Husayn, at least for the time being, is important because if he faces immediate danger of losing power, if he is pushed into the corner, then there is no place for compromises. You know there is a Chinese proverb: if you want to win a war build a golden bridge to your enemy.

[Plekhanov] Sure, absolutely.

[Kortunov] And I think that is why it is important that we should not create, well I mean that our policy does not create, an impression that it wants, you know, immediate withdrawal or rather removal of Saddam Husayn from power and his replacement by somebody else, which would be, I think, the preferable option for Americans: to see some kind of coup d'etat in Baghdad, to see some upheaval that could lead to replacement of Saddam Husayn by some more pro-West oriented leader.

[Tkachenko] One question here: How do you think, how much does Saddam Husayn himself realize the threat of war? Or do you think he believes that in the long run the war is not going to be started, given all the risks involved, for the economy, for the world ecology, the risks of huge casualties and material losses in the area?

[Plekhanov] I think Saddam Husayn realizes that he made a big blunder and the question now is over what terms he will be forced out of Kuwait. It is all a process of bargaining.

[Tkachenko] Let us now look at the hostage-taking issue, as President Bush said the other day, a crime against the innocent that should be punished. He, receiving a message from American citizens held hostage in the Gulf, he said his patience is running out and that hostage taking is not going to affect his ability to make decisions.

How much do you think this issue is a political tool for some of the Western leaders, and what is the price tag of the lives of thousands, if not millions, of the Kuwaitis and Iraqis as compared to the lives of Westerners? And

do you think if all the hostages had been released by now military action would have started perhaps?

[Kortunov] Well, my guess is that Saddam Husayn is trying to exploit the weaknesses, in quotation marks, weaknesses of the Western democracy because if you, you know, getting reports on television, on radio and if you read papers and get information about hostages, about their suffering, about the possibility of their extermination, psychologically it is more difficult to agree to a kind of military operation there. And I think that he is trying to play for time. We already saw the first big demonstration in New York against the American presence in Saudi Arabia, and I think therefore this hostage issue politically and psychologically is very important and it can be also important for the Soviet Union if some of our people are held there in Iraq as hostages.

[Tkachenko] Do you think, then, launching a military offensive against Iraq, using Iraqi civilians as a buffer is not a hard moral choice?

[Kortunov] Well, you know there are different rules of the game in a democratic society and in a dictatorship. Saddam Husayn will find it easier to sacrifice lots of Iraqi people. You should take into account the possibilities of Muslim religion to mobilize the population, and it is not just the case of Iraq. I guess that Saddam Husayn could expect a lot of volunteers from other countries of the region, especially from the poorer countries of the Arab world. So I think that at least politically he could afford losses more easily.

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that right now the responsibility for the possible huge losses as a result of the war in the Gulf lies on the shoulders of Western powers because it is their decision. I mean, you cannot, you will not be able to shift the blame onto Saddam Husayn by saying well, you know, he did not budge so we had to start shooting. The party which will start shooting will bear the responsibility for the calamity that will follow. According to all analyses by responsible experts, it could develop into the biggest war since the Second World War.

[Tkachenko] Surprisingly, I would even say paradoxically, President Bush when declaring that his patience is running out seems to have more than half of the American population, at least the opinions, recent opinion polls, suggest that he has from 50 to some 60 something percent of the American people behind him on the military attack even if the American citizens were killed in the assault against Iraq. Where do you think this paranoia is coming from? I mean, how do you explain this popular sentiment of being able to sacrifice even the lives of Americans—in America that is so far away from Iraq, among the common people?

[Kortunov] Well, you know, my opinion is that too much is at stake right now and in fact the American position as a superpower is undergoing a very important test because the United States cannot just yield after all the statements, after all the steps it has already made. Besides, from my point of view the experience of last

year showed to the United States that it could use military power rather effectively and without big losses. Grenada and Panama were just two cases that changed the post-Vietnam attitude of the American society, but I am deeply convinced that if this situation develops further the attitudes of the American society could change very fast.

[Plekhanov] I think you have to look carefully into the polls. Very much depends on how the question is phrased and such figures may be deceptive because I have seen these kind of figures in late August. And then in September and early October there were other polls which indicated that the Americans, most Americans were in favor of continuing to apply pressure and go to war only in case that the pressures do not achieve any result. By the way, yesterday the State Department spokesman Margaret Tutweiler has stated that in the opinion of the U.S. Government the sanctions are having an effect, an increasing effect, on both the economy and the population and the military machine of Saddam Husayn so sanctions are working despite all the frustration.

[Tkachenko] One last quick question. Should the war be unleashed, God forbid, what is the likelihood of Soviet participation and in what form?

[Kortunov] Well, I think that up to now the probability of direct Soviet involvement is pretty low. I think it could be higher if there is a military operation undertaken by the United Nations but not as a multilateral effort guided by the United States. I do not think that the Soviet Union will ever take part in such an action.

[Plekhanov] Well, you see, if the war starts in the next few weeks, which is not impossible, or in the next few months, the amount of [words indistinct] soldiers in the Gulf is already so great that adding a few Soviet ships or a few thousand Soviet troops is not going to help tip the balance against Saddam Husayn. So if it does start the military value of Soviet participation will be minimal. I really think that one should not stress too much this idea of Soviet participation. Besides, the Soviet public opinion, let us face it, is not in favor. We have our own Afghanistan syndrome and sending our boys to fight in another desert somewhere south of Soviet borders does not strike people as a very worthwhile idea.

[Tkachenko] Thank you, Mr. Plekhanov and Mr. Kortunov, experts from the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, for taking part in this edition of Top Priority. Wrapping it up now is Irina Tkachenko saying goodbye until next week.

Commentaries Continue on Persian Gulf Crisis

'Myths' Surround Gulf Events

91UF0115A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 44, 31 Oct 90 p 2

[Report on comments of Igor Sidorov, deputy editor in chief of CHAS PIK, by correspondent Tatyana

Putrenko; place and date not given: "The Iraqi Blockade Through the Eyes of a Leningrader"]

[Text] At the end of October, journalists of the popular Leningrad newspaper CHAS PIK were able to visit Iraq. Our correspondent Tatyana Putrenko met and talked with them. This is what one of them, Igor Sidorov, deputy editor in chief of CHAS PIK, had to say.

I would like to speak about the myths surrounding the situation in Iraq that have been created by our press and the Western press.

Myth No. 1: concerning the efficacy of the economic blockade of Iraq. It is galling and shameful to say this, but would that we had such a blockade! Baghdad's stores and counters are by no means empty. First, Iraq has picked Kuwait clean, and shelves of Baghdad's stores are piled high with Kuwaiti merchandise. Only a bread shortage can be felt, but Saddam has ordered all Iraqis to cultivate grain crops on vacant land. They are expecting a harvest by May. It is said that they will sell the surplus to the USSR even! Second, according to certain reliable reports, Iraq is receiving daily 1,200-1,400 tons of various freight, food primarily. The additives necessary for gasoline production are arriving also, and oil there is. Freight is coming from Jordan, Iran, Turkey.... The Persian Gulf is not entirely closed: Coastal vessels are plying its waters. The total amount coming in is small, but sufficient for catering to minimum requirements. And the Iraqis, it should be noted, have become accustomed to belt-tightening: They have the long Iran-Iraq war behind them. It is not the first time for them. The blockade is having some effect, of course: Many industrial enterprises have been closed down in the country. But I doubt that it will be possible to achieve the desired result, destabilization of Iraq's economy, in this way. The regime is strong, and the secret services are keeping the situation under control so there should be no undue harboring of illusions....

Myth No. 2: concerning the situation of our specialists in Iraq. I can testify that this is far from the truth. We went to the south of the country, primarily where Soviet citizens are working. Everything is all right with them regarding food and living conditions. They are merely frightened by the letters of their families and our press reports, which are replete with inaccuracies and exaggerations. There was no firing at anti-Saddam demonstrations in Basra nor any demonstrations, and our people can drive there unhindered in their cars, and no one stops them. On the part of authorities and the public, the attitude toward our specialists is entirely friendly. It is perfectly obvious that the Iraqi regime does not want to jeopardize relations with the USSR. In Iraq at the present time there are approximately 4,000 Soviet specialists, approximately half of whom wish to continue their work. Of those who wish to leave the country, 500 are still without visas. Negotiations about them are under way. And the Iraqi side, according to them, is not holding up our citizens for political reasons, what is more. They want the work per the contracts that have

been concluded to be performed in full. Of course, the situation could change abruptly in the event of the outbreak of a military conflict. But, as far as I know, there is a contingency plan for this to evacuate our citizens via Iran. The sole thing we were asked to tell our people was: "Do not heat passions in connection with our situation in Iraq. This really could do some harm." I am complying with their request.

'Zero-Hour' Seen as Imminent

PM0211124540 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 90 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent A. Shumilin under the rubric "News from the Gulf" and general heading "A War Next Week?"]

[Text] Algiers—Following the adoption of the 10th anti-Iraqi resolution by the Security Council and the proclamation of full combat alert by Baghdad right afterwards, it seems as if zero-hour—the start of combat operations in the Gulf—is that much nearer. Different times are mentioned, from mid-November to mid-January.

S. Husayn's plan for "selective trade in hostages" is obviously failing: France's position has not changed even after the release of virtually all French hostages this week. Furthermore, according to a report by the U.S. magazine NEWSWEEK, France has made available to the United States the necessary information on means to neutralize the latest "surface-to-surface" French-made missiles in Iraqi hands.

Meanwhile, S. Husayn is gradually abandoning his arguments designed to justify the capture of Kuwait. In an interview with Algerian weekly ALGERIE-ACTUALITE, he specifically stated that Iraq should have captured Kuwait back in 1961, when the British departed from there, but was prevented from doing so by Egypt's President Nasir. The Baghdad leader has probably forgotten that he is associating his present aggression with Israel's occupation of Arab lands, dating back to 1967!

The London-based National Committee for Iraq's Salvation, citing SANA, reported a fresh wave of executions of high-ranking Iraqi officers. Specifically, 68 top Iraqi officers have been executed and their bodies secretly taken to a military hospital in the southern part of the country. At the same time, the Kuwaiti News Committee in Damascus reports fresh operations by the Iraqi occupiers against the Kuwaiti resistance. Some 4,200 persons have been killed during Kuwait's occupation and 12,000 Kuwaiti military are under arrest. All the families of Kuwaiti diplomats abroad, as well as Kuwait's ambassador in Baghdad, are also under arrest.

According to a study published in London, about 10 percent of Iraqi citizens have left their country to seek asylum abroad, mainly in the United States, Canada,

Australia, the Scandinavian countries, Britain, Iran, and Turkey. Those who have left Iraq are primarily representatives of the intelligentsia.

Crisis Enters 'New Stage'

LD0611145190 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The Persian Gulf crisis is entering a new stage. The statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker after his first meetings with Arab leaders in the course of his tour of the region. Observers put it simply: the United States is beginning direct preparations for a military operation against Iraq. In this context the future of thousands of foreign experts turned into hostages by the Iraqi leaders and used as a trump card in the game for survival is coming to the fore. Baghdad has declared that it is ready to let all foreigners go home if nonaggression and a political comprehensive solution of all regional problems, including the Palestinian problem, are guaranteed. These conditions camouflage the cynical hope of exchanging hostages for Kuwait. Can we save the people and reconcile ourselves with the aggression or doom them to death and war for the restoration of justice?

There can be no simple and hasty answers to all these questions. The approach of either everything or nothing is also unacceptable. I mean the calls of some Western leaders who demand renunciation of any separate deals on the release of hostages with Baghdad. To save even one life is an achievement. For example, I appreciate the noble mission of Willy Brandt. Official and unofficial representatives of other countries going to Iraq to have at least some of the people released. The Soviet Union, for example, was satisfied with the understanding of the special representative of the Soviet president, Yevgeniy Primakov, and Saddam Husayn that 2,500 out of the 4,000 Soviet experts will leave Iraq for home by the end of this month. I must add that during the talks with the Iraqi president Primakov also raised the issue of releasing citizens of other countries held by Baghdad.

It is quite a different matter that we should not give in to the tricks of Iraq, who is letting out foreigners in portions in the hope of splitting the anti-Iraqi front and weakening the pressure on the aggressor. It is still possible to reach a settlement without human losses or bloodshed through collective effort.

Palestinian Leader Holds News Conference on Gulf

LD0211164190 Moscow International Service
in Arabic 1500 GMT 2 Nov 90

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP] delegation which is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee of Afro-Asian Solidarity, held a news conference in Moscow today.

Nayif Hawatima, delegation leader and DFLP secretary general, hailed the talks and meetings the delegation had in Moscow. He said:

[Begin recording] We came here at the invitation of our Soviet comrades and officials. We have held profound and fruitful talks. These talks revolved around the general situation of the international conference and its relation to Arab issues: the Palestinian issue and the Gulf crisis.

The Gulf crisis formed the major part of our talks with officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry [words indistinct].

We realized that the Gulf region and the Middle East are sitting on a volcano. The U.S. Administration is obstructing all efforts to find a solution to the Gulf crisis within an Arab framework. The Israeli expansionist policy is putting pressure on the U.S. Administration daily to launch an attack on Iraq. It is regrettable to see that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are very active in trying to pressure the U.S. Administration to accelerate aggression against Iraq.

We agree with our Soviet friends that we want a peaceful, political, and (?permanent) solution to the Gulf and Middle East crises. We agree that the resolutions of the international legitimacy [words indistinct]. It is not just that some resolutions are implemented [words indistinct], whereas these resolutions are not implemented when it is a question of the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian cause. [end recording]

Afghanistan's Najibullah Meets With Journalists

LD0511181890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Nov 90

[Report by correspondent A. Shkirando in Kabul; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A group of Soviet journalists recently visited the Republic of Afghanistan at the invitation of the country's President Najibullah.

[Shkirando] It is surprising but a fact nonetheless: The subject of Afghanistan which just two years ago was at the focus of attention in the Soviet mass media is moving more and more into the background. President Najibullah drew attention to this. The war continues, stated the president of Afghanistan, because the extremist leaders and their patrons in the region are reluctant to listen to the voice of reason. They are escalating military tension but they realize the inevitability of talks and hope to come to them with at least some kind of military successes. The president set out in detail the Afghan plan for a peace settlement. He also stressed that Afghanistan can supply a great deal of what the USSR currently needs: meat, fruit, cotton, and precious stones. His account of the situation in the country was a long one but as Najibullah himself said: It is better after all to see for yourself. [passage omitted]

Leaving the Soviet journalists Afghan president Najibullah expressed confidence that the world public will be given a broad and faithful picture of the situation developing in the country.

Prospects for Afghan Peace, Bloodshed Viewed

LD0611173890 Moscow TASS in English 1635 GMT
6 Nov 90

[By TASS news analyst Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—Will peace be established in Afghanistan or will the bloodshed in the country continue, causing inestimable misery to its people, destabilising the situation and obscuring prospects for peace and security in the region? Many who are not indifferent to a political settlement in Afghanistan are asking this question in the run-up to the 45th U.N. General Assembly session.

On the one hand, there is a number of hopeful signs showing that a settlement is possible. Officials in the Soviet Union and the United States, the main guarantors of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, have admitted that both powers came close to reaching accords on a political settlement. Remaining disagreements, the difference in approaches to the problem can well be papered over. The Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers, who are expected to meet within the next few days, will apparently devote much attention to this issue.

The Afghan Government is also open for talks. It advanced and consistently implements a sensible and pragmatic policy for national reconciliation—from beginning a dialogue to free elections under U.N. auspices through the mechanism for the transitional period. In Kabul they have not put forward any unacceptable conditions and do not claim territories presently under opposition control, if the latter also does not claim what does not belong to it.

Rebels seem to have realised that the war must end. As many as 120,000 people from the opposition have already ceased hostilities. Ahmed Shah Mas'ud, leader of the "Islamic Society of Afghanistan," one of the largest rebel groups, told the Pakistani NATION newspaper recently that the rebels' goal was to ensure peace and stability rather than conduct hostilities infinitely.

What is the matter then? Is it not time to match words with deeds? The more so that Mas'ud's meeting with other rebel commanders and leaders of the "interim" government, held in Pakistan, concentrated not only on peace but also on continuing war on the entire territory of Afghanistan, a war with foreign aid. None other than Mas'ud was quoted as saying that rebels will all join forces together in a united front to fight the enemy. He said that Pakistan promised to continue weapons supplies to rebels.

The stance by the U.S. Administration, which decided to redirect the flow of supplies to the Afghan opposition

from the "interim" government to field commanders, gives cause for caution. What is it: A stake on procrastinating the war, on continuing bloodshed? In Washington they allege that the move will strengthen the United States' position at talks. But would it not be more sensible to stem all arms shipments irrespective of where they go in Afghanistan, and not only to withdraw such arms supplies, but to work towards having the warring sides cease fire and sit down at the negotiating table? For it is only in this way that the long-awaited peace in Afghanistan and stability in the region can be attained.

Afghan Envoy Speaks on Relations, POW's

LD0611192590 Moscow TASS in English 1829 GMT
6 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Aleksandrov]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—"Soviet-Afghan friendship, which originated in 1917, is very important to our country in its efforts to overcome the current difficult stage," Afghan Ambassador to the Soviet Union Mohammad Daud Razmyar told TASS today.

Highly assessing the Soviet Union's gratuitous assistance, he noted that as the situation in Afghanistan normalises, mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation between the two countries is moving to the foreground in bilateral relations.

In spite of the continuing war, ties are actively developing between Afghan private and state companies and Soviet partners, which are profitable for both countries. He said that in the near future deliveries of natural gas from Afghanistan to the Soviet Union will resume. The Soviet Union is increasing purchases of wool and dried fruits.

Border trade is actively developing. Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Tajikistan signed bilateral and multi-lateral agreements in Tashkent in October. After the situation in the country normalises, Afghan exports to the Soviet Union will considerably grow, the ambassador said.

Speaking about an Afghan settlement, the ambassador said the domestic factor is playing the main role here, as "Afghans should resolve their problems themselves at a round table and by means of talks." He said that on the instruction of the Afghan Government, talks and other contacts with opposition field commanders are being held, and considerable understanding has already been reached.

Indirect talks are being held with moderate opposition leaders, based in Pakistan, the ambassador said. Rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States and understanding on the main international issues open up new prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, he said.

"The Afghan Government spares no efforts to free Soviet servicemen, captured by the military opposition,"

the ambassador said. "The measures taken have resulted in the release of seven servicemen, and work in this direction continues."

The Afghan Government is discussing all reasonable proposals on the release of POW's, Razmyar said. He noted that efforts focus on contacts with field commanders holding Soviet POW's.

Envoy to Pakistan Discusses Afghan MIA's

PM0511153590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by V. Baykov with comments by Ambassador to Pakistan V.P. Yakunin under the general heading "Bringing the Soldiers Back Home"]

[Text] Islamabad—Your PRAVDA correspondent asked V.P. Yakunin, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR to Pakistan, to describe what efforts the Soviet side is making to ascertain the fate of our compatriots who have vanished without trace and get them released.

"The lists of people who have vanished without trace run to more than 300 people," V.P. Yakunin said. "According to the most diverse sources of information, the data relating to who of these is alive and in captivity are very contradictory. The figures range between 50 and 100. The largest group of Soviet prisoners of war is held by G. Hekmatyar's grouping and also by field commander Ahmad Shah Masud. They are all being held on Afghan territory. As for claims that some of the Soviet servicemen are on Pakistani territory, the Pakistani side has given us firm assurances that assertions of this kind do not correspond with the reality.

"Work to get the Soviet servicemen released from captivity," the ambassador continued, "is one of the main areas of activity of the USSR embassy and all Soviet missions in Pakistan. This work has been going on for a long time, constantly, via the most diverse channels. Thus, a few days ago I had a conversation with Afghan mujahidin 'transitional government' president S. Mojaddedi. We talked specifically about one of our guys—I will not mention his name—who does not feel well. S. Mojaddedi promised to help to get him released.

"We are also trying to make use of the opportunities which official representatives of Pakistan possess. It is well known, for example, that as a result of conversations with former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto, Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, and Pakistani Army Chief of Staff General Aslam Beg, we managed to obtain the release last year of two Soviet prisoners of war, Prokopychuk and Lopukh, who were handed over to the Soviet embassy. Such contacts are continuing. The Soviet ambassador recently had a conversation with General Durani, chief of the Pakistani Combined Intelligence Agency, who promised all possible assistance in a matter of interest to us.

"We are also making use of the potential of various regional missions of specialized UN organizations represented in Pakistan. This includes first and foremost the International Red Cross. With the assistance of its officials it recently proved possible to establish contacts with seven prisoners of war and arrange for them to correspond with relatives. We are cooperating with representatives of the UN High Commission for Refugees, the Commission for Emergency Aid to Afghanistan, and others.

"Work for the release of our prisoners of war will continue until all those who remain alive are released or establish contacts with relations back home. Because a number of Soviet people, we are informed, have already set up home in Afghanistan and are doing everyday things: plowing, sowing, working as bus drivers. As for those who want to return home, however, we will do everything to ensure that this wish comes true as soon as possible."

Bhutto Defeat, New Pakistan Leadership Viewed

PM0511145190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
1 Nov 90 Second Edition p 4

[By Venyamin Shurygin "Viewpoint": "Changing of the Guard"]

[Text] Another failure has befallen the former ruling Pakistan People's Party (PPP), headed by Benazir Bhutto. It has been defeated in the elections to the province legislative assemblies. This came after the PPP's major failure in the parliamentary elections held 24 October this year, in which, together with its partners in the People's Democratic Alliance, it managed to win only 45 of 217 seats in the National Assembly—the lower chamber of parliament. Its main opponent, the Islamic Democratic Alliance, won 105 seats.

Are these election results accidental or inevitable? The answer to this question naturally demands in-depth analysis of the ballot results, the nature of the election campaign, and the strategies and tactics of the parties and groups participating in it. Nevertheless, even today a number of factors that influenced the result of this important political event in the country's life can be distinguished.

Benazir Bhutto affirms that during the elections, her opponents violated the voting procedure and the counting of votes. And this is quite possible, given the intensity of the election campaign and the opposing sides' desire to win at all costs. The elections cost the Pakistanis dozens of lives and hundreds of injuries.

At the same time, the fall in the popularity of the PPP and its leader appears inevitable. The electorate had pinned on its victory in the previous elections hopes for significant positive changes in the country's political and economic life, the resolution of urgent problems, the maintenance of law and order, the pursuit of a realistic foreign policy, and, above all, the normalization of

relations with its neighbors. These hopes, or at least the majority of them, were not destined to be fulfilled for a number of objective and subjective reasons.

I think that the broad masses of Pakistani voters were not particularly interested in the fact that the former prime minister's hands were tied, that she had to operate within a rigid framework established by the military and the country's president, that she had to constantly look to Washington and foreign banks, and so on. Evidently they primarily compared the former ruling party's words and its actions, its promises and their fulfillment.

Benazir Bhutto's government changed little in the political and economic situation in the country and its position on the international arena. Most of the budget continued to be spent on servicing the growing foreign debt and on military needs, and the attempts to fight the shadow economy and the drugs business did not have any tangible results. The government proved unable to cope with intercommunal conflicts, particularly in the province of Sind and its administrative center, Karachi. Relations with India have recently deteriorated as a result of events in Kashmir, and Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs is continuing.

The opposition effectively exploited the government's weakness and mounted a broad campaign demanding its resignation. It was backed by the military as well as the president, and the result was quick to emerge.

The next few days will show who is going to be Pakistan's new prime minister. I think that the change of leadership will not lead to major changes in either the government's domestic policy or its foreign policy, since it will represent the forces that have determined the development of the situation in the country to date—the military leadership and the bureaucratic apparatus.

Gorbachev, Iranian Envoy Note Bilateral Ties

*LD0511215190 Tehran in English to Europe
1930 GMT 5 Nov 90*

[Text] The Islamic Republic of Iran's Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nematollah Yazdi, in a ceremony at the Kremlin, presented his credentials to the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today. According to our correspondent from Moscow, during the ceremony also attended by the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Mr. Yazdi in a speech describing the bilateral ties between the two countries as good and growing, expressed hope that they would expand day by day.

The Soviet president, too, welcoming the Iranian official, expressed pleasure over the expansion of the two countries' relations, saying that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Ryzhkov Meets Iranian Mining Minister

*LD0511123290 Moscow TASS in English 1153 GMT
5 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov received in the Kremlin today Iranian Mining and Metallurgical Minister Hoseyn Mahlujchi who is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet minister of metallurgy.

During the meeting, the sides noted with satisfaction that Soviet-Iranian relations continue to develop in the interests of cooperation and trust between the Soviet and Iranian peoples.

They expressed a mutual desire to make efforts for the earliest possible implementation of understandings reached during the top-level meeting in Moscow in June 1989.

The sides stressed the importance of the Soviet-Iranian political dialogue and regular contacts at various levels, including growing border relations, similarity or proximity of Soviet and Iranian stands on regional and international issues, including the assessment of the Gulf crisis and ways of pulling out of it.

When discussing bilateral economic relations, the sides focused on Soviet-Iranian interaction in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the mining and coal-mining industries, including the establishment of joint ventures.

The noted that experience of cooperation would enable the USSR and Iran to successfully implement projects over the next few years.

TASS Urges U.S. 'Energetic Efforts' on Israel

*LD0511135990 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT
5 Nov 90*

[By TASS political news analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—Nineteen Arab states have sent a collective letter to the United Nations secretary-general, firmly declaring against recognising the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the current 45th session of the U.N. General Assembly. This demand by Arab countries was prompted by the fact that Tel Aviv systematically fails to comply with U.N. resolutions.

Tel Aviv has hardly complied with a single resolution by the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly concerning Palestine and the situation in the Middle East.

On Sunday the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the U.N. chief's proposal to hold an international meeting to discuss the position of the Palestinians on the occupied territories.

This was proposed after the Yitzhaq Shamir government refused to receive a U.N. mission that, on the U.N.

Security Council's instructions, was to inquire into the circumstances of the recent Temple Mount shootings in Jerusalem, which claimed 21 lives.

The Israeli authorities also ignored U.N. resolutions on Lebanon that prescribe them not to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs or violate its sovereignty.

For years Israel has been persisting in the occupation of Arab territories that it captured by force. The United Nations do not recognise the Israeli annexation of either those lands or East Jerusalem.

The U.N. Security Council has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning Israel for violating human rights on the occupied territories and urging it to cease its policy of terror and violence there.

But Tel Aviv continues to trample on the Palestinians' rights, and the number of victims of Israel's genocide is growing.

Israel continues to frustrate the international community's efforts to convene an international Middle East peace conference, at which an attempt could be made to achieve a global and lasting settlement of all problems in the region.

I am convinced that Israel would not have sabotaged the resolutions, were it not for connivance on the part of the United States, Israel's main ally in the Middle East.

For the sake of objectivity it must be said that the majority of Israeli violations took place during the cold war period, when, in order to campaign against the Soviet Union which actively supports the Arabs, Washington did everything to buttress up Israel's positions in the region.

The United Nations suffered from that U.S. policy, the Middle East conflict gained in scope, and the suffering of the Palestinians was augmented.

Now that the cold war epoch has ended and the United States and the Soviet Union has moved from antagonism to cooperation, Washington must exert energetic efforts to call to order its high-handed ally.

The United States has already taken some steps in this respect. Recently it voted for a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Israel for the Temple Mount shootings and supporting the idea of dispatching a U.N. mission there to investigate the crime.

In addition, Washington is refraining from financial aid to Tel Aviv for the construction of housing for immigrants if there are no guarantees that construction will not be conducted on the occupied Arab lands.

But this is clearly not enough. I think more resolute steps are essential to make Israel respect the opinion of the international community.

East Europe

Polish, Soviet Economists Discuss Market Economy

PM0511112990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Oct 90 Union Edition p 4

[Article by L. Toporkov under the rubric: "Panorama of International Life": "Cards on the Table. Soviet Economists Study Polish Experience Firsthand"]

[Text] Warsaw—Unfortunately, only now, as the first year of implementing fundamental socioeconomic transformations in Poland comes to an end, have our "official" economists shown intense—and now practical—interest in the Polish experience of switching to a market economy.

To what extent is this experience useful to us? What is its essence and how can it be used? What can be taken from it? To discuss these and other questions a group of Soviet experts and politicians came to Warsaw, including USSR People's Deputies O. Bogomolov, N. Shmelev, and V. Yaroshenko (RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister for foreign economic ties), Prof. B. Milner, M. Myasnikovich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers, and others. Taking part in the discussions on the host's side were well-known economists R. Bugaj, J. Mujzel, C. Jozefiak, S. Gomulka, W. Trzeciakowski, M. Nasilowski, and, naturally, the author of "shock therapy" himself, L. Balcerowicz, vice premier and Polish minister of finance.

Cards on the table. That is perhaps the main thing that characterized the lively and frank discussions that took place in the Polish Sejm and Council of Ministers. We will tell you all about the good and the bad, the Polish figures said. And it is your right to learn the necessary lessons from it. But we will also talk about what, in our opinion, is hindering and might hinder Soviet society in its radical transformations. Especially as Yu. Kashlev, Soviet ambassador to the Polish Republic, appealed to the interlocutors for the utmost frankness and homing-in on the problems.

The meeting with Leszek Balcerowicz was central. He paid attention to the need for rapid privatization in the national economy. Privatization is not somebody's machinations but a search for the real master of business, a search for the property owner. Under socialism state property is considered to be the property of the whole people—that is, nobody's property. That is how they regard it. Hence its low efficiency, hence the eternal shortages. Certain major enterprises in Poland are being transformed into joint-stock companies where, thanks to shares, citizens become the co-owners of an enterprise, that is, people with a vital interest in the prosperity of a business. Not all, however, have solid financial savings. In Poland they have taken the path of granting privatization bonds which give the right to acquire shares on credit.

"How is property liable to privatization assessed?" Bogomolov asked.

"By a simplified scheme," Balcerowicz replied: "Let us sell it cheaply in some cases so we do not lose momentum. The Law on Privatization provides for the right to buy shares (up to 20 percent) at half price, but the total sum acquired must not exceed a person's annual wage. Part of the shares naturally remains in the state's hands. In any case it cannot lose: Even the profit taxes go into the state budget."

"Can a person sell bonds received?"

"We are inclined to the view that they cannot be sold."

"What will not be liable to privatization?"

"Here we have an example from the West, where the state retains, for instance, power generation and railways. Our trade, food enterprises, and automotive transport are being privatized first of all. Apartments and land plots are also becoming commodities."

The interlocutors attached great importance to the problem of our currencies' convertibility (internal convertibility first). In Poland the zloty has acquired stability in relation to the dollar. Apart from a number of other stabilization measures, they have embarked on a decisive operation here—they have made the "black market" dollar rate the official rate. The inflation spiral was thus halted and confidence in the zloty—for which you can now buy the same as for a dollar—has grown and strengthened. At what price is another question.

"In a word," Balcerowicz noted, "in our somewhat similar conditions you must be constantly seeking a way of solving problems and taking risks. Not to do anything—that is also a risk. It is better to take a risk by doing something."

The well-known economist Prof. R. Bugaj, Sejm deputy, spoke about some undesirable consequences of the initial market transition period, which is characterized by the ending of state subsidies, pay restrictions, and stern tax measures. He cited the fall in production (up to 20 percent) and the growth of unemployment (already around 1 million) as such consequences. Such is the price of switching to market relations. However, there is no avoiding perceptible material and moral costs. But these sacrifices can and should be eased. Thanks to, for example, wage and pensions indexing and the introduction of unemployment benefits. It takes time to improve matters in the economy. And firmness in carrying out the chosen policy being implemented.

How, for example, is the fight against the fall in production being conducted? Balcerowicz recounted: We have liberalized exports and removed customs duties on the import of agricultural means of production. Banks have made credit terms more liberal and newly formed private sector enterprises have been freed from taxes. Special low-interest credits have been introduced for the

purchase of agricultural products. Small-scale privatization has been accelerated—stores, small production enterprises, small service points. The revitalization of production and exports has resulted in the budget's already having currency reserves of \$3.4 billion. They do not solve the problem of servicing the country's huge foreign debt, but they will be very handy when trade between the USSR and other East European countries switches en bloc to settlements in hard currency from the new year.

What kind of 1991 can Poland expect? Balcerowicz is convinced that it will be the beginning of the process of improving the people's living conditions. In mid-1991 it will be exactly 500 days since the decisive changes in the country's whole lifestyle began. The current captains of the Polish economy believe in what they are doing. For the moment only the possible result of the forthcoming presidential elections can worry them. Who will win? How will the unemployed vote? Will there not be a change of government and, consequently, will new approaches not prevail in politics and economics?

During the meetings between the Polish and Soviet economists all and any significant problems of the transition to a market economy were broached. Both sides are sure that the success of reforms in one country is also to the other's benefit.

West Europe

French Defense Minister Interviewed on Gulf

PM0211164490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 43, 4-11 Nov 90 p 12

[Interview with French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement by Dmitriy Yakushkin in Paris, date not given: "Iraq Is Losing Time"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Paris—French President Francois Mitterrand recently paid an inspection visit to the Persian Gulf. He was accompanied by the head of the French Foreign Ministry, and the Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement, who was interviewed by the MN special correspondent.

[Yakushkin] the Persian Gulf conflict seemed to come as a surprise for everyone. How can you explain that?

[Chevenement] "Our attention was focused on the Iran-Iraq war for eight years. Since then we have been monitoring the controversial situation in the region—the interim peace was far from stable. Nevertheless, Persian Gulf watchers ignored warnings indicating that Iraq was going to resolve its argument with Kuwait by force. An authoritarian regime finds it easier than do democratic regime to keep preparations for aggression secret. Europe has seen examples of this."

[Yakushkin] What is the numerical strength of the French contingent and its comparable fight power?

[Chevenement] "There are now about 6,500 French military in the Arabian Peninsula. French is the third largest military contingent, comparable with the Egyptian forces but far fewer than the Americans."

[Yakushkin] In one of your interviews you mentioned the danger of a global conflict. Who would be the opponents in the conflict? And with what goal in mind?

[Chevenement] "If the embargo policy turns out to be effective we will avoid military confrontation. But if war breaks out—the goal is irrelevant—then I am afraid escalation will be inevitable. Any of the grave unresolved issues in the region—distribution of oil wealth, the Palestinian issue, Israel's security, Lebanon's integrity—can turn into the apple of discord and trigger off a conflict. There is real danger that a conflict aimed at the restoration of international justice might evolve into a war between the North and South. We must avoid this eventuality. President Mitterrand has therefore advanced a four-point plan."

[Yakushkin] Is France going to revise its policy of arms sales due to Iraq's aggression?

[Chevenement] "France is strictly abiding by the UN Security Council resolutions and as of August 2 has interrupted all supplies of arms and spare parts and halted technological assistance. True, we gave military aid to Iraq in the past, but we did it in order to help preserve stability in the region in view of the potential outbreak of religious fanaticism. It is not us who have changed. It was Iraq that risked the destabilization of the region. France's future policy will depend on the conditions under which the crisis is resolved and the equilibrium established in the Middle East. France is not going to undertake anything which could be seen as connivance in the aggressive and hegemonistic tendencies now evident in the region. France is on the side of international law, peace and stability."

[Yakushkin] As the situation develops, how do you see a possible resolution of the crisis?

[Chevenement] "Through UN Security Council the world community has adopted a very clear stand which must form the basis for any solution of the crisis. We have at our disposal unprecedented means to bring about a peaceful solution. Iraq's leaders must understand that they are going to lose everything if they continue their aggression and their occupation of Kuwait. Time is not on their side. Our collective resolution is supported by powerful forces capable of immediately repulsing any new moves in the region. The gross methods used by Iraq have necessitated the deployment of troops near its borders. This alone is enough to show that there can be no resolution of the conflict other than by international law. The largest nations of that region—Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan—must be involved in the search for stability, as well as the five members of the UN Security Council."

Falin Holds News Conference, Details 'Putnik' Issue

PM0211133990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
1 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by I. Andreyev: "V. Falin: "Putnik" Was Swindling, Sheltering Behind CPSU's Name"]

[Text] A news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents held 31 October by V.M. Falin, CPSU Central Committee secretary and head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, broached in particular the subject of the CPSU's attitude toward the scandalous transfer of Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] funds to foreign accounts held by the joint Soviet-Cypriot enterprise "Putnik" (IZVESTIYA Nos. 292, 298, 299, and 301).

In response to questions on this matter, Valentin Mikhaylovich said that the CPSU Central Committee and the party itself learned of the financial transaction involving "Putnik" accounts several hours after the Berlin police's nighttime invasion of the PDS Board premises in Berlin. The party did not know before this that someone, sheltering behind the CPSU's name, was trying, on one side, to transfer this money to the PDS, while someone on the Soviet side was trying to obtain this money.

The CPSU Central Committee did not know of "Putnik's" existence until it declared it in this manner. What is more, people at the Central Committee and I personally even tried to clarify whether the reports were mistaken and whether this enterprise was not called "Sputnik."

I can voice my own opinion of "Putnik": In the case in question its representatives were conducting an illegal financial operation, expecting to profit from the difficult situation in which the PDS found itself. As far as we can tell, "Putnik" was demanding a usurious rate for its services, and this was what it seems to have been promised. The end result will be known when competent organs, including the prosecutor's office, investigate this matter.

Falin gave the total of the PDS' debts, which were established once and for all from both sides' documents during G. Gysi's recent brief visit to Moscow. They total 1 million rubles to date.

I cannot agree with the recriminations which Falin leveled at the press, including IZVESTIYA, of allegedly biased coverage of the ins-and-outs of the scandal. It is far more important to ascertain the truth than to seek "culprits" among journalists.

Kolesnichenko Reviews Gorbachev European Tour

PM0511121290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko: "Attempt at a Postscript: On the Results of Two Visits"]

[Text] The USSR president's Spanish and French visits are continuing to prompt a great international response, and their results are being commented on in detail in the press both here and abroad. And although the conclusions do not always converge in every respect (and incidentally, this is most often true here at home), observers are united on the most important point: This was an important foreign policy step which, in addition to diplomatic success, has made a tangible contribution to our economy.

So, to move from the general to the particular: For all the differences in the concrete manifestations of the USSR's bilateral relations with Spain and with France, there is a common denominator. I would call it the "European factor." It has recently been acquiring an increasingly autonomous tone.

West European countries, on observing the Soviet-U.S. summit meetings, especially in Malta, Washington, and Helsinki, had mixed feelings: They supported enthusiastically the Soviet and U.S. course of dismantling the cold war structures, but at the same time they did not find at all attractive the prospect of an exclusive alliance of "superpowers" dictating to others their concept of a world order. Especially because America, as head of NATO, has long had a firm hold on the position of what we liked to call "primus inter pares," or in other words—leader.

USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's visits to Spain and France, following on from Helsinki (and this should be stressed particularly) to the "westernmost" point of Europe, are highly symbolic. Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals—that is not only a geographical factor, it is political too. After all, only recently West Europe, and indeed the whole of our continent, jam-packed with nuclear weapons, was the main potential detonator of a world explosion and universal catastrophe.

How easily we forget....

Yet by no means everything has yet been dismantled. Bridges of mutual understanding and friendship have not been built everywhere. It is too soon to sit back and rest. That is why it is so important that, for instance, the Soviet-French treaty is called a Treaty on Accord and Cooperation.

We had not previously signed such a document with any NATO country. The USSR and France now regard each other as "friendly states," despite the fact that they are in different blocs. This document expresses, I would even say, the empathy of the French with our people.

We have now received, so to speak, official membership of the "European club" and are an acknowledged part of the continent's ancient civilization.... Some readers may shrug all this aside: Have we got time for all this right now? We need something simpler, more substantive.

But look: First, for all our troubles, we remain and must remain a great power, for the sake of our national

self-preservation and survival, for the sake of our security. The transition to the second rank would not only have a fatal effect on our national psychology, it would blast from beneath our feet an economic support of considerable importance.

Exercising the president's foreign policy functions, M.S. Gorbachev resolved at least three important tasks, in my view, during these two visits.

First, the detailed blueprints for building a common European home were checked. For instance, it became clear that this idea is similar to, and capable of being integrated with, the plans for an all-European confederation put forward by Mitterrand and other European leaders. In other words, preparations were made for the "Helsinki-2" all-European conference, which is to be held in Paris 19-21 November. That is when the new era in all-European time will begin to be reckoned, the time of the creation of a Europe without blocs, without conflicts, a Europe of cooperation and mutual understanding.

Second, both Spain and France have become much closer to us on a bilateral basis. Very important documents were signed in Madrid and Paris, opening up long-term prospects for the development of mutual relations between our countries on a whole range of the most important problems of culture, science, ecology, and so forth.

And last, but by no means least: During the visits large and advantageous credits and direct economic aid, including food aid, were granted to our country.

Much has already been written about this. I do not want to be repetitive, but I must observe that "over there" they do not give anyone money just like that. And however hard some people may try to minimize the benefits from these sums (by using arithmetic where algebra is required), facts are facts: We simply need this money, and it will give us some respite. So what is surprising is not the fact that these funds do not amount to much per head of population, but the fact that we have received them at all. It was not easy for either Gonzalez or Mitterrand to give credits amounting to billions. No one has any surplus money, least of all now. And, most important, the present state of our economy and of the state as a whole, torn as it is by centrifugal forces, does not dispose people to count out money to us unthinkingly. In a situation like ours you cannot expect to receive a single cent just like that. There must be great confidence in the leader, in his personal authority. And not merely authority. He must be seen as a unifying, constructive force. In other words, there must be faith in our perestroika.

Not the least important role was played here by the attitude to us as a great power. During the visit this role was not only displayed, but affirmed to an even greater degree. Those who accompanied M.S. Gorbachev on his trip can confirm, for instance, that at the press conferences in both Madrid and Paris the majority of questions

from representatives of the Western media were devoted to the USSR's position on the Persian Gulf crisis. And that is no accident. In southern Europe, where the hot breath of events in the Arabian desert feels particularly close, they pin great hopes on Moscow's attempts to resolve the crisis through a peaceful settlement. Talks on this subject held an important place in Madrid and Paris. It may be noted that all the participants in the talks fully support the USSR's peacemaking efforts, in particular the talks held during those same days by the president's special representative Primakov (the "Primakov mission," as the press christened it). Here M.S. Gorbachev stressed the unchanging nature of our position, which is that Iraqi troops should leave Kuwait. As a result common positions on this important question were clarified and, most of all, developed. The French newspaper *LES ECHOS* even wrote: "Since Mitterrand stressed that the assessments of the Gulf crisis on the part of Paris and Moscow 'converge,' they can now form a kind of common front within the framework of the five permanent members of the Security Council.... Only a few months ago such an alliance in the United Nations would have been simply unthinkable."

If we are "thinking about the unthinkable," I would like to note an entirely new aspect which, in my view, played an important role in the course of the two visits. Not only is it global in nature, it also relates directly to our society's internal development. In both Madrid and Paris the Soviet president was also speaking in his role of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The same goes for his partners in the talks. Gonzalez as secretary general of the Socialist Workers Party, Mitterrand as leader of the French Socialists.

The CPSU was engaged in dialogue with socialists and with the Socialist International even before 1985. But now that historic changes have taken place in Europe and the very idea of socialism is subject to revision, M.S. Gorbachev's talks take on a fundamentally new significance. It is a question of defending the socialist idea as such. Of exchanging experience and cooperating in asserting the socialist ideal.

We are now ready, without our former fears and maximalism, to profit from socialists' experience, especially in the economy. Here, as the president stressed at a press conference, we should preserve all the diversity of socialist ideas, their individuality. We, for instance, departing from the utopian model of socialism that was artificially imposed on our society and was accompanied by phenomena of a totalitarian character, are returning to the origins of October. But with a new understanding of the values associated with the socialist idea and panhuman priorities.

Spain's unique experience of a smooth transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is in many ways instructive for us too, although, of course, our experience is also unique in its own way: from barracks socialism, from the domination of totalitarianism, we are setting

ourselves the task of making the transition to a democratic, humane socialism. And in such a disparate, disunited world, and indeed in our country, which is far from united today, the president's emphasis on commitment to the socialist idea and the unique "seminar" that was "held" on that subject with Gonzalez and Mitterrand take on not only a theoretical character, but also a strictly practical character.

To conclude with a personal impression which I formed, as did all the journalists accompanying the president, in those sleepless nights. Within a tight time frame—from the middle of Friday 26 October until late on Sunday evening, 28 October—M.S. Gorbachev and the entire Soviet delegation had a schedule not only for working hours, but for every minute. There was no time for sleep. For instance, on Friday 26 October, after the official program for M.S. Gorbachev's day ended at midnight, he held a kind of conference with those accompanying him. When it ended and the president started giving interviews to television and IAN, I looked at my watch: It was three in the morning. The new program was to begin at eight on the same day....

Presidential Adviser Writes on German Unification

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[Article by Soviet Presidential Adviser Vadim Zagladin:
"The Soviet View of German Reunification"]

[Text] Let it not be taken as a paradox, but Soviet policy was confronted with the question of Germany's unity or division even in the years of World War II. It was not on the USSR's initiative that already in 1941 Stalin uttered the now famous phrase: "Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain."

The possibility (or even advisability) of Germany's division into several states was examined in the Western member-countries of the anti-Hitler coalition beginning from 1942-43. The motives of the authors of projects differed respectively. Some proceeded from the desire to prevent a repetition of German aggression. Others viewed Germany's division as the panacea for the revival of Germany's economic might and for competition on its part. In the postwar years, the Cold War gradually gaining momentum had an appreciable imprint on the West's Germany policy.

Naturally, Moscow was faced with the question: how to react to all these ideas, which were then discussed at various levels, including the meetings of the big three. Already in Tehran, the Soviet side expressed the view that a split of the German state was capable of giving rise to challenging issues: indeed, the German people would certainly aspire to restore their unity.

At the Potsdam Conference, the view on the need to preserve a single Germany prevailed, but on the condition of its denazification, demilitarisation and democratisation. Very soon, however, the allies began to differ

over the matter. In 1947, Germany was divided *de facto*, and in 1949, as the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were formed, *de jure*.

Afterwards, however, the Soviet Union put forward various options for Germany's reunification, provided the Potsdam agreements were observed and the country neutralization was ensured. If I am not mistaken, a similar option was last proposed in 1958. But the West declined the Soviet offers: the logic of the Cold War made itself felt.

There are no doubts that the division of a single—and ethnically homogeneous—state was a tragedy. Incidentally, wouldn't any other people have taken such a condition in a similar way?

The division of Germany was, indeed, no boon to all Europe, either. The point is not that it symbolised as it were the division of Europe, the excruciating condition it found itself in against the background of East-West military confrontation. The crisis situations concerning Germany, in the first place, Berlin, fraught with the most serious consequences had repeatedly arisen.

There was awareness of this both in the East and West, I think. There was awareness of this, in the first place, in the FRG and the GDR (though this was glossed over in East Berlin, for understandable reasons, on the contrary, it was asserted that the division was a boon). But it was inconceivable to overcome the obtaining situation, as long as the two parts of Europe had a great many missiles targeted upon each other.

Everything changed, when the situation began to evolve. Thanks to Soviet perestroika's renewed foreign policy in many respects, the past five years became the period of gradual recession in confrontation and then of its actual termination, a start was also made on real progress towards phasing out the military confrontation.

This process was bound to have a most diverse impact on both relations between states and their domestic affairs. Much is yet to be thought out and analysed here, all the more so as, I am convinced, far from all the effects of detente—both international and domestic—have already fully revealed themselves. Much still lies ahead.

But one thing is clear even now: the relaxation of tension in interstate relations has helped release many internal political processes which were held up by the Cold War. A considerable stimulating role, and, indeed, a very considerable one for Eastern and Central Europe, was played by perestroika, by the process of democratisation and humanisation of the life of society which has started and is fast developing in the USSR.

The course of events, particularly in 1989 and the beginning of 1990, is well known: none of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe was able to sidestep far-reaching changes of a revolutionary character. As a rule, all of them began thanks to the clear-cut, explicit desire of their peoples. These changes, I gather, are still

far from having been completed, many processes in Eastern Europe have not yet manifested themselves in full.

There is an exception, however. It is the German Democratic Republic, which ceased to exist on October 3, 1990, merging with the Federal Republic of Germany as its organic part. Here, everything seems to have been settled (though the transition from the old system, which existed for 41 years, to the new one may not be quite simple and easy for the residents of the GDR).

From the moment of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the question of the FRG's and the GDR's unity moved into the foreground as a practical task. Had anyone expected this? Well, yes and no. Political leaders and scientists both in the West and the USSR had been aware that reunification of the two Germanys would eventually take place, but almost no one thought that this could happen so soon.

Naturally, when Germany's unity turned into a practical question to be decided, not some day, but in the near future, politicians, diplomats and scientists both in the West and the East entered the period of hard work.

The situation was not simple at all. Leafing through the files of Western newspapers for last year, one can easily see that understanding was expressed that the reunification of the two Germanys was inevitable and that it was impossible to prevent it, but no one was particularly delighted with that. In some instances, the question was asked (directly or indirectly): wouldn't Germany's unity revive the old dangers, long since known to Europe? In others, apprehensions were expressed about economic might of a future united state that could become a dominant force in Europe.

Frankly speaking, I got the impression from talks with Western politicians that the West was hoping that Moscow would apply the brakes, for the Soviet Union to halt or at least drag out the process of reunification for a long time.

Evidently, these hopes were expressed with an eye to the grim imprints made on Soviet history by the Second World War, which took a heavy toll of 27 million lives. Indeed, as public opinion polls (already at the end of last year) showed, more than 50 per cent of Soviet citizens treated the prospect of Germany's unity with understanding, whereas a quarter to one third of them voiced their doubts. That held true of not only war veterans (incidentally, many of them were in favour of reunification at once, for the need to write "finis" to the sombre chapters of the past), but also young people.

Apprehensions about the two Germanys' reunification were also voiced earlier this year, too, including in the legislative bodies of the country, its parliament, at the forums of the CPSU and other political associations.

These apprehensions, I must say, were warmed up by the speeches of those referred to as "ewig gestrige" (forever

yesterday's), that is, advocates of reviving the Reich within the 1937 borders. Even if there are not many people like that (by the way, they were even more active in the GDR than in the FRG), they are not giving up their designs. Quite recently, a group of MPs from the CDU-CSU [Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union] led by the chairman of Verband der Landmannschaften (Union of the Provincial Comradeship Societies) of the FRG made an attempt to torpedo the ratification of a treaty on the restoration of Germany's unity, demanding that the constitutional court of the FRG should repeal a number of articles therein making it plain that a new Germany renounced claims to certain territories held by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Naturally, the constitutional court rejected the demand.

Soviet public opinion gave serious thought to the West-formulated demand for a reunified Germany's membership of NATO. Of course, these thoughts were echoes of the old way of thinking, which habitually reduced everything to the alignment of military forces. On the other hand, however, NATO really remained the same as it had been in the years of confrontation. Naturally, the question arose: what aim did the West pursue?

Of course, the Soviet leadership had to take all those sentiments into account. But not with a view to creating obstacles to the FRG's and the GDR's reunification. Indeed, perestroika has announced as a basic principle of its foreign policy the right of nations to decide their own destiny. How could then the USSR deny this right to the German people?

The Soviet leadership also proceeded from the premise that, as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act envisaged the right of every country to independently choose its allies and to decide what alliances it wants to be a party to, we could not raise barriers to a free choice by a reunited Germany.

Discussing all these issues, the men in Moscow, naturally, considered the far-reaching processes of change in Germany over the postwar years. The Germans, like all the Europeans, have learnt the lessons of history. We trust them, believing, as Helmut Kohl put it, that only peace shall come out of Germany.

I am aware that the reader might put this question to me: this being so, why did then the Soviet Union first object to Germany's membership of NATO? Why did it make the proposal now on Germany's neutrality, now on its simultaneous admission to the two allies: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation? And why, after putting forward these ideas, did it give up the efforts toward putting them into effect and agreed to a reunified Germany's membership of the North Atlantic Alliance?

These are legitimate questions. I would not say that any country's foreign policy never shows all of its cards at once and that the price offered at the start of negotiations on practically any question is usually 'overstated', because all this is widely known. I will tell of the logic of our actions instead.

I repeat that we proceeded from the premise that Germany's unity was inevitable, that we should not interfere with it and that it was impossible to prevent its joining NATO, if it itself wished to do so. This meant that the practical task before our policy was limited to one thing: to ensure the creation of such conditions and to bring about such changes on the European political scene that would meet as far as possible the interests of our country's security. But these interests on the whole are concurrent with the interests of all European states.

What conditions and what changes had to be discussed?

First of all, as far as Germany itself is concerned, we were interested to see a lower level of its arms potential than the one that existed at the moment when the process of reunification had been started, to see the obligation earlier assumed by both the GDR and the FRG not to have and not to produce weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological—consolidated.

Further, it was essential to consolidate the principle of the inviolability of frontiers. Here, our Polish neighbours were particularly worried. But other states also closely followed the development of events around this problem. The French President Francois Mitterrand, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the US President George Bush were insistent in expressing their wishes aloud, in the first place, precisely concerning the border with Poland.

We understood well that all this could not be achieved through pressure or dictation. It is unacceptable to lower the dignity of any nation. As far as Germany is concerned, all of us, very likely, remember that it was precisely the humiliation of Germany by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles [that] became one of the arguments of Hitler and Nazi propaganda in favour of preparations for a war of aggression.

And now for those things which concern NATO. We were worried, nor could it be otherwise, about the fact that in the period when the Warsaw Treaty Organisation took the initiative and started taking steps towards arms and force reductions (doing so unilaterally), formulated a purely defensive military doctrine and then began to discuss the question of turning it from the military-political into a politico-military alliance, NATO remained unchanged.

It continued to be as it had been in the years of the Cold War and confrontation. Its military doctrines and strategic plans, essentially oriented towards a conflict with the East, with the USSR, also remained intact. Under the new circumstances, we and others believed that NATO, too, should take the road of change. Simultaneously, its relations with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and its members should also change.

And, lastly, we and others believed that, if the division of Germany is ended, the division of Europe, too, should end. The ideas of the Helsinki Final Act: to build a new system of security and cooperation in Europe, should

begin to be put into effect. And this should proceed at least in parallel with the emergence of German unity and changes in NATO.

All of our intermediate proposals (which, I must say, were never put forward in the form of official documents, but were set out in Soviet leaders' speeches and interviews) were aimed at finding the best ways of attaining the said objectives.

Western partners at once shared the Soviet position on some questions, while it took them a long time to ponder over others. A very happy forum was found for deciding questions connected with the external aspects of Germany's reunification: the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the FRG, the GDR and the four victor-powers in World War II: the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and France (it was referred to as the Two Plus Four formula).

As a result of a great deal of work, at times hard but on the whole well-concerted, all questions concerning the external aspects of Germany's unity were decided to meet the basic demands of security for the USSR and the other European countries.

On September 12, the six Foreign Ministers signed in Moscow the treaty on a final German settlement, where the sides recorded their agreement with the terms on which German unity shall be effected. The process of reunification was thus a peaceful one, taking place in the conditions of cooperation and mutual understanding among the parties concerned. The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International affairs has lately examined the treaty and decided to submit it for ratification by the Soviet parliament.

Another process was under way simultaneously. The NATO Council session in London passed the resolutions testifying to a start to changing the character and doctrines of the alliance. After the session, mutual understanding was reached on the advisability of drafting and signing by the NATO countries and the Warsaw treaty member-state a declaration finalising a changeover from confrontation to cooperation between them. The declaration is to be signed in November.

A whole chapter of European history, at times a grim one, is thus drawing to a close. Germany's reunification is, on the one hand, an expression of change in Europe. On the other hand, it opens the way to further positive changes, to a Europe of peace and cooperation. It is to be hoped that the meeting of heads of state and government of the 35 participating states of the Helsinki process in Paris, slated for November 19, 1990, will fix the route of such changes.

Let's not guess how the CSCE process will specifically develop in the future. We would like to see it move forward successfully and without unnecessary delays. The furtherance of this process, we are convinced, will be facilitated, among other things, by the development of

new relations between the USSR and the united Germany. On September 13, a document was initialled in Moscow on the principles of these relations: the treaty of good-neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, which, after the process of reunification is completed, will become a treaty between the USSR and Germany.

"We are looking to the future of Soviet-German relations with optimism," the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said. "What is very important is that a major factor of these relations for the future—that of trust—took shape in good time. We can, I am confident of this, have normal, good-neighbourly and diverse relations with that great nation in the interests of both peoples, the peoples of Europe and all the world."

It stands to reason that Soviet-German relations will not affect the Soviet Union's relations with all European countries. On the contrary, all these relations taken together will help lay the solid foundation for a new and peaceful Europe of cooperation and co-development in the interests of man.

Dzasokhov Meets FRG Ambassador on Ties

*PM0711100990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Nov 90 Second Edition p 4*

[TASS report under general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 1 November this year a meeting was held between A.S. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs, and Klaus Blech, FRG ambassador to the USSR.

There was a thorough exchange of opinions on the prospects of scientific, cultural, and other Soviet-German ties and emphasis was placed on the importance of the forward development of humanitarian contacts and the significance of interparliamentary ties.

K. Blech confirmed his country's line toward the development of the European process. A.S. Dzasokhov drew attention to the tasks which are being resolved in the USSR Supreme Soviet, particularly in the field of economic reform, and in the course of preparation for the signing of the Union treaty.

Soldiers To Help Load Potatoes at German Ports

*PM0711112090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 90 p 3*

[By KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent I. Yavlyanskiy "Rejoinder": "Get Stuck Into Potatoes!"]

[Text] Berlin—BILD claims that 100 Soviet soldiers were to "invade" the city of Hamburg 5 November. Fortunately, they were to be unarmed and with the noble aim of helping port employees load 60,000 potatoes onto a ship bound for the Soviet Union. The newspaper also

reports that the troop contingent is being redeployed from Schwerin. Servicemen have been guaranteed good food and pay—100 marks each per day.

It seems that there is a chronic shortage of port workers in Hamburg. For that reason transport carrying potatoes for us (which were, incidentally, bought for hard currency) cannot leave there on time. What is more, frosts are imminent.

The port leadership asked the Federal Defense Ministry for aid but they were told that Bundeswehr soldiers will only take part in loading and unloading work if the Hamburg Senate declares a state of emergency at the harbor.

Your correspondent asked Yu.I. Alyayev, senior instructor at the Western Group of Forces Political Directorate, responsible for press relations, for explanations. Yuriy Ivanovich said that the Western Group of Forces command considers the BILD article an obvious "false report." No soldiers from the group of forces have been allocated to help Hamburg. Servicemen are currently engaged in loading potatoes, but in Rostock—200 men.

Here is the opinion of Colonel A. Vasilets, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's regular correspondent for the Western Group of Forces: "The main thing is to rescue potatoes for the country. City resident G. Klypper [name as transliterated] who specially traveled roughly 1,000 km by car for this, brought us information at the office about the disastrous situation with root crops at the port of Hamburg. Incidentally, he talked to the port leadership and they are prepared, provided that Soviet soldiers are assigned to work with them, to allocate tens of thousands of marks more as a charitable contribution to the aid fund for the children afflicted by the Chernobyl disaster. Soldiers must work in loading potatoes without fail. They could be Soviet Army employees, for instance. I repeat: The main thing is to preserve vegetables for the country. This can be done with a single telephone call from Moscow."

Now I have a question for the Defense Ministry: What will we do with the potatoes?...

Austrian Envoy Visits Foreign Ministry

LD0611194990 Moscow TASS in English 1914 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—It was officially announced here that Austrian Ambassador to the USSR F. Bauer visited the Soviet Foreign Ministry today.

On the instruction of the Austrian Government, Bauer conveyed a report. It says that proceeding from sweeping changes that have occurred in Europe as a result of the signing of the treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany, the Austrian Government regards articles 12-16 (military and airforce resolutions) and point 13 of

article 22 of the state treaty on restoring the independent and democratic Austria of May 15, 1955 as outdated.

Simultaneously, the Austrian Government reaffirms its commitment to the state treaty as a whole and the pledge not to have, not to produce or make experiments involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

In response, an aide memoire setting out the Soviet Government's stance was handed to the ambassador. It says, in part, that the 1955 state treaty was and remains an important component of Europe's post-war set-up and its fundamental provisions retain to this day their importance for maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

As for the mentioned articles of the state treaty, the Soviet Government, being mindful of the changed situation in Europe and contacts that took place with the U.S., British and French governments and also with the Austrian Government, does not object to interpreting them as having lost practical importance.

Simultaneously, satisfaction is expressed with Austria's readiness to continue abiding by the state treaty and not to have weapons of mass destruction.

Latin America & Caribbean

U.S. Military Aid Cuts to El Salvador Examined

PY0111134290 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America
2300 GMT 29 Oct 90

[Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] Here is a brief commentary by Leonid Levchenko on the U.S. Congress decision to reduce military aid to El Salvador.

It would have been better if all military aid to Alfredo Cristiani's government had been cut. This would have made it much easier to find a peaceful solution to the Salvadoran crisis, but at least the U.S. military aid has been reduced to only 50 percent; that is, \$42.5 million. It is difficult to determine whether this decision will increase the chances for success in negotiations between the Salvadoran rebels and Cristiani's government.

The U.S. Congress has conditioned this military aid on an agreement by the Salvadoran Government to hold peaceful negotiations with the rebels, to approve UN mediation in the talks, and to conduct a serious investigation into the November 1989 murder of six Jesuits and punish the guilty officers.

As is known, the last condition is a rebel demand in their negotiations with Salvadoran officials. The refusal by Cristiani's government to punish those guilty of bloody acts of repression and to reduce the number of Army troops has been a major stumbling block in the latest round of negotiations in Costa Rica, which have yielded almost no positive results.

I believe that, under the present circumstances, the United Nations must actively mediate the conflict in order to bring about mutually acceptable agreements. The parties involved in these negotiations must take into account the peaceful position prevailing in the United Nations as well as in Soviet-U.S. cooperation in efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Central American conflict.

Soviet-U.S. cooperation on finding a solution to the Central American crisis in general, especially the Salvadoran crisis, cannot be overlooked. It is believed that this cooperation would be even more successful if the contending Salvadoran parties show a greater desire to achieve a peaceful solution.

'Peaceful Settlement' Needed in El Salvador

LD0611193390 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT
6 Nov 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—An analysis of the latest developments in Central America shows that an awareness of the need to complete the peaceful settlement is growing, despite essential difficulties. This was confirmed, in part, by the results of the regular meeting of Central American countries held in El Salvador from October 29 to 30, a top-ranking Soviet diplomat said.

He was asked by TASS today to comment on the development of the situation in the region, specifically in conjunction with press reports about the resumption of combat operations in El Salvador.

Efforts to reach a consensus on the key item on the agenda—on demilitarising Central America—have failed for several reasons, the diplomat said. Nevertheless, participants expressed unanimous support for the peaceful dialogue in El Salvador and pointed out the need to elaborate accords to guarantee the safe involvement of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front fighters in the country's life at peace.

It seems that this constructive approach by the foreign ministers of Central American states can be regarded as

an important impetus to exert positive influence on the positions of the Salvadorean Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in the run-up to a regular round of talks between them.

In this regard, reports that the Salvadorean Government troops began large-scale offensive operations against the Farabundo Marti Front's detachments on November 3 were received with concern in the USSR, the diplomat stressed. The USSR's stance on this score is well known. It was repeatedly formulated by the Soviet side, including at our briefings.

We stand for continuing the peace dialogue in El Salvador and proceed from the conviction that stable agreements in that country can be reached only if both warring parties jettison their stake on force and agree to make mutual concessions and sensible compromises. This is the only path towards a final settlement, the Soviet diplomat said.

In this context, we regard any attempts to gain essential advantages at the ongoing talks by intensifying combat operations, irrespective of the side from which such attempts are made, as unwarranted and damaging the peace process.

Mindful of this, we share the view of those circles of the public at large, which oppose the use of force and advocate a constructive and responsible approach to dialogue, the diplomat said.

Argentine Intelligence Chief Meets KGB Chief

PM0111120990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Oct 90 Union Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Meeting at USSR KGB"]

[Text] On 25 October V.A. Kryuchkov, member of the Presidential Council and chairman of the USSR KGB, received Hugo Anzorregui, Secretariat for State Intelligence secretary, who is in the Soviet Union in connection with a working visit by the president of the Republic of Argentina.

During the conversation there was an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest.

Supreme Soviet

Paper Defends Supreme Soviet Coverage

PM0711102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Nov 90 Union Edition p 3

[Yu. Makarov "Rejoinder": "Where Is the Blasphemy?"]

[Text] The following accusation was leveled at IZVESTIYA 31 October at a sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers: The newspaper is charged, no more and no less, with "humiliating the dignity" of the legislature.

What happened? Let us cite the speech by N.N. Engver, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, from the stenographic record.

"Yesterday was Political Prisoners' Day. I raised the question that the USSR Supreme Soviet should react in some fitting manner to this. No reaction was forthcoming. Today the mass media humiliated the dignity of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

"I will begin with the inoffensive SELSKAYA ZHIZN. A TASS legislative correspondent reports: There are congratulations for Deputy Kugultinov, there are congratulations for Deputy Sukhov, but no material about Political Prisoners' Day. Everyone has read Freud and knows the meaning of 'slips of the tongue,' the meaning of 'censorship of consciousness,' and, correspondingly, the 'consciousness of society.' This resembles a quite definite line of behavior.

"Take IZVESTIYA: There is material about Deputy Kugultinov, but nothing about Deputy Sukhov or about Political Prisoners' Day.

"The blasphemy resides in the fact that IZVESTIYA front-pages photographs and material headlined 'Remembrance Stone From Solovki on Lubyanka Square' but carries no USSR Supreme Soviet reaction... This distortion of the countenance of the Supreme Soviet is the beginning of the eschatology of perestroika..."

The charge is too serious to let it go over our heads, so to speak.

Thus, I have a direct question: Why does the report by IZVESTIYA's legislative correspondents for 30 October not carry the Supreme Soviet's reaction to Political Prisoners' Day?

There is a very simple answer—because THERE WAS NO legislative reaction to this event at the 30 October sitting in the Kremlin. This is illustrated by the official stenographic record. It contains no mention of parliamentarians' reaction to Political Prisoners' Day.

We could have finished here and posed as aggrieved objective journalists. Were it not for another small factor: This important political event WAS indeed mentioned in the Kremlin that day.

After the congratulations for USSR People's Deputies Kugultinov and Sukhov it was Nikolay Nikolayevich Engver whose comment from his seat reminded the legislature that it was Political Prisoners' Day. There was no reaction to this comment from the Presidium or from the hall. The stenographic record even omits the comment itself altogether.

N.N. Engver, USSR Supreme Soviet member, certainly, did his civic duty—he tried to draw his legislative colleagues' attention to a highly important political event. But he was not heeded.

We think that IZVESTIYA also tried to do the press' duty—it front-paged events connected with Political Prisoners' Day.

Where is the blasphemy: In the fact that the newspaper voiced its attitude to Political Prisoners' day or in the fact that it failed to mention in its brief report a comment made by a people's deputy which did not even make the stenographic record.

It is at the least strange to charge journalists with "humiliating the dignity of the Supreme Soviet."

One can only be amazed that this question was discussed by people's deputies in a fairly animated manner after the charge leveled against the press which had not reflected the legislature's reaction to Political Prisoners' Day (a reaction WHICH DID NOT TAKE PLACE).

Chairman R.N. Nishanov: "...I think that the press organs which presented this event in a fairly selective way should immediately rectify the situation. Highly objective information must always be provided from Supreme Soviet sittings."

I.P. Zelinskiy, USSR Supreme Soviet member: "...Let legislative correspondents, albeit belatedly, heed our voice and our request: It is necessary for today's press to define the Supreme Soviet's attitude to Political Prisoners' Day in an unequivocal fashion."

...Newspaper reports of legislative sittings are by no means stenographic records. Our correspondents try to reflect what they consider to be the main events of a particular day in the Kremlin. The newspaper cannot report everything said in the conference hall to the letter. That is why we will never be able to satisfy individual deputies' grievances that their words "did not make the newspaper." There is the stenographic record for that. But we are obliged to report the USSR Supreme Soviet's attitude to important political events in the country. Provided, of course, that this attitude "is indeed relevant," so to speak.

Political & Social

Shots Fired in Red Square During Celebration

LD0711110290 Moscow TASS in English 1057 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—Several shots rang through Red Square during the official celebrations marking the 73rd anniversary of the October revolution today.

A man from Leningrad fired two shots into the air from a sawn-off shot gun near Gum department store on Red Square, KGB officials told TASS. No one was hurt. Authorities are investigating the incident.

Shooting Incident Detailed

AU0711110490 Paris AFP in English 1054 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow, Nov 7 (AFP)—A man was arrested Wednesday on Moscow's Red Square a short distance away from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev after firing a sawn-off shotgun into the air, a KGB secret police officer told AFP.

The incident took place during the official celebrations marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

The man, whom the KGB spokesman said was from "out of town", "possibly Leningrad", sought to join the official march past by communist and trade union organisations which was being reviewed by Mr. Gorbachev and other officials from atop Lenin's mausoleum.

As police sought to seize him, the man brandished a shotgun, firing twice into the air, the spokesman said. There were no reports of any injuries.

The man appeared on the square from a point opposite the mausoleum, the spokesman added.

Gorbachev, Yeltsin Both Attend GOSR Parade

LD0711073490 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent from Red Square]

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—A military parade marking the 73rd anniversary of the Great October socialist revolution began at 1000, Moscow time, in Moscow's Red Square.

On the tribune of the mausoleum are Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin Russia's prime Minister Ivan Silayev, members of the Presidential Council and military leaders.

Gorbachev addressed the participants in the parade in a speech of greetings.

Parade Detailed

LD0711084990 Moscow TASS in English 0816 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—By TASS correspondents from the Red Square:

A civilian demonstration marking the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution has just begun in the Red Square here.

This year the festive demonstration was sponsored by public movements that support and share the ideas of humane democratic socialism and civil accord.

The demonstration radically differs from previous ones in the way it is organised and in outward attributes.

It is for the first time that President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and Russia's Prime Minister Ivan Silayev dismounted the mausoleum tribune and joined the demonstrators' leading column consisting of members of the organising committee of the demonstration, war veterans and veteran workers, and members of the Moscow general public.

The leaders of Soviet and Russian Federation communist parties and of the Moscow Communist Party organisation were among the district columns of demonstrators.

When the leading column reached the mausoleum, a delegation of party and state leaders, veterans and representatives of the work collectives of the city laid baskets of natural flowers at the mausoleum in memory of Vladimir I. Lenin, leader of the October Revolution and the founder of the Soviet State.

Gorbachev, Lukyanov, Yeltsin, Ryzhkov, Silayev, Ivan Polozkov, the first secretary of the Russian Federation Communist Party Central Committee, Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Council, and General Kalinin, commander of the Moscow Military District, then remounted the central tribune of Lenin Mausoleum.

SS-25 Missiles Included in Parade

LD0711085490 Moscow TASS in English 0839 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—By TASS correspondents from the Red Square:

A military parade marking the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution took place in Moscow's Red Square. Participants in the parade were addressed in a speech of greetings by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The military line-up included troops of the Moscow garrison as well as navymen, paratroopers and missilemen that arrived specially for the parade from other regions of the country.

All buildings near the main square of the capital are decked out with streamers and red bunting.

The revolution anniversary is being marked by a special decision of the Soviet president and parliament as a state holiday.

Defence Minister Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Yazov heard a report by the commander of the parade, General of the Army Nikolay Kalinin, inspected the troops and congratulated the participants of the parade on the holiday.

The parade, according to years-long tradition, opened with a march-past of cadets from the Military Music School. Their flute melody was picked up by a massed military band. Officer cadets of military academies and military schools marched past the mausoleum.

Two columns of combat vehicles of the Taman Motorised Rifle Division rolled past the mausoleum, followed by columns of combat vehicles of the Cantemir Tank Division, self-propelled artillery mounts, rocket artillery vehicles that originate from the famous Katyusha rocket mortar vehicles, anti-aircraft missile systems and the missile launchers of land forces.

This parade featured ballistic missiles which are referred to in the West as the SS-25. These are most up-to-date missiles by far more powerful than those that were first demonstrated during a parade in 1957.

The emergence of this high-powered military hardware is viewed now not as a demonstration of military might but as a vivid reminder to politicians and the military that in the world there are weapons the elimination of which depends on an active attitude of all the sides concerned at the negotiating table.

The parade ended with a traditional march-past of the massed military band consisting of 1000 musicians.

Leaders Attend GOSR Reception in Kremlin

*LD0711160190 Moscow TASS in English 1551 GMT
7 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—Soviet leaders Mikhail Gorbachev, Anatoliy Lukyanov, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and members of the Presidential council, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government attended a reception in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, marking the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, today.

Also invited were Soviet and Russian people's deputies, Communist Party and war veterans, prominent public,

scientific and cultural figures, the clergy, participants in the military parade in Red Square, foreign and Soviet diplomats and reporters.

Gorbachev made a speech.

The reception was held in a friendly atmosphere.

GOSR Celebrated Throughout Country

*LD0711135390 Moscow TASS in English 1232 GMT
7 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS - Residents of the Soviet Far East were the first to mark the 73rd anniversary of the 1917 socialist revolution today.

Tens of thousands of residents took to the streets in regional capital Khabarovsk to demand economic reforms and better living standards.

In Vladivostok, celebrations were orderly and solemn. Speakers at the official rally presented their programmes of reforms. Slogans carried by participants said "yes to perestroika, no to anarchy".

The rally followed the traditional military parade.

In Chita, thousands of people, braving biting cold, flocked to the city centre as temperatures fell below minus 20 degrees centigrade. Celebrations began with a military parade, which was followed by a rally, organised by local communists.

Crowds applauded as a banner reading "we will defend the socialist gains of the Great October" sailed through the square.

Speakers praised the importance of the October Socialist Revolution for all nations. They spoke about the imminent victory of Lenin's ideals and socialism. Participants then placed flowers at the foot of a monument to state founder Vladimir Lenin.

Celebrations in Novosibirsk lasted just 15 minutes instead of the usual two or three hours. Participants carried slogans calling for economic normalisation and a peaceful solution to ethnic conflicts.

"I have come to the demonstration with hopes that much of what has been lost by society during perestroika would be restored—discipline and order, trust and understanding between the people," engineer Igor Petrovskiy told TASS.

"Strife and hostility, increasingly common in our life, only impede changes in the country," he said.

Demonstrations in Chelyabinsk and Tyumen proceeded without the usual hoopla.

In Volgograd, speakers at a rally in the city's central square called for civil reconciliation, which they said is a key condition for democracy and economic revival. Participants placed flowers to a monument to Vladimir Lenin, the common graves of Red Guards killed during

the civil war and soldiers who died defending the city during the Second World War.

Tashkent, Baltics Celebrate

PM0711140990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Nov 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS reports under general heading: "On Eve of Holiday"]

[Text] Tashkent, 6 Nov—Baskets with fall flowers were placed this morning at the foot of the monument to V.I. Lenin on the main square of Uzbekistan's capital, which bears the name of the leader of the revolution. Despite the dull weather war and labor veterans, representatives of the working class and creative intelligentsia, and Tashkent students came here to honor the memory of the founder of the CPSU and the Soviet state on the eve of the 73d anniversary of the Great October.

Flowers were laid on behalf of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the republic's government, and party, public, and other organizations.

A ceremonial meeting to mark the anniversary of Great October was held in the A. Navoi State Grand Theater of Opera and Ballet.

A military parade and festive procession of the city inhabitants will take place 7 November on V.I. Lenin square.

Riga, 6 Nov—Despite the fact that by a decision the republic's Supreme Soviet has excluded 7 November from the list of state holidays, a ceremonial session was held in the Latvian capital to mark the 73 anniversary of Great October. Taking part were representatives of the city's labor collectives, war and labor veterans, Communists and nonparty people, Soviet Army servicemen, and deputies of soviets of various levels.

Vilnius, 6 Nov—Despite bans and warnings from the republican and local authorities, inhabitants of the Lithuanian city of Klaypeda gathered in the fishermen's culture and sports center for a ceremonial meeting to mark the 73 anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Those assembled, and there were about 1,500 of them, included party, war, and labor veterans, underground revolutionaries, sea and shore workers, and representatives of the port city's public.

Assessing the holding of this measure, Yu. Bremkauskas, first secretary of the Klaypeda Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) city committee, noted: "This meeting has shown yet again that the Soviet system has been and remains the system in which all honest people of Lithuania see the embodiment of their aspirations and ideals. It is invincible."

Tallinn, 6 Nov—A ceremonial meeting to mark the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution

and the 70th anniversary of the first Estonian Communist Party Congress was held in the republic's capital today.

P. Panfilov, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party [CPSU] Central Committee, delivered a report, dwelling in particular on the objective and subjective sources of the October revolution, the birth of the Estonian national state and the USSR's role in strengthening it, the republic's present-day problems, and the Communists' role in the transition to the market.

Further on Baltic Activities

LD0711163490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1439 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondents]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Nov (TASS)—Demonstrations and military parades on the occasion of the celebration of the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution took place today in all the Baltic republics. They passed in a difficult situation evoked by the decisions of the authorities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to cancel this festival—despite the presidents' decree—and to declare today a working day.

A traditional parade of troops of the Tallinn garrison took place on the central square of the capital of the republic, then there was a demonstration by workers of the city's public labor. The Tallinn authorities tried to refuse to sanction the parade and demonstration. Calls were voiced to reply to the "demonstration of strength" by armed means. However despite this, thousands of people from Tallinn welcomed the participants of the military parade and then took part in the festive procession which ended with flowers being laid at the monument to V.I. Lenin.

Over 100,000 people gathered today in the capital of Latvia, Riga, on the banks of the Daugava under the slogans: "We will defend the gains of October!," "No to nationalism!," "We demand the conclusion of a Union treaty!" Words were expressed at the festive demonstration to the effect that without the October Revolution the Latvian republic itself would not have been possible. The military parade and the demonstration passed calmly, if one does not take account of the handful of pickets at the monument to Lenin in the center of Riga.

In spite of the Lithuanian authorities' decision, inhuman in its nature, on not celebrating the October Revolution, party, war, and labor veterans; old revolutionaries who had fought in underground organizations; and representatives of labor collectives and public organizations started gathering from early morning at Vilnius' main square where a monument to Lenin stands. Hundreds of red carnations and roses were laid at the monument to the founder of the socialist state. The flags of the USSR and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and slogans saying "No to terror and persecution for ideas!," "Yes to a new Union treaty!," "Lithuania will remain Soviet!"

are everywhere. "The supporters of the Republic's authoritarian regime, Mikolas Burokevicius, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Lithuanian communist party (CPSU), are using all means to limit the political, economic, and social rights of the working people. [sentence as received] Lithuania's real sovereignty as an independent state can be attained only within the composition of a renewed Soviet Union."

After the rally, a military parade by detachments of the Vilnius garrison took place. The capital's residents and guests hailed the soldiers with loud cheers. Then a many-thousands columns of demonstrators filled the main street of the town.

Central Asia, Azerbaijan Celebrate

LD0711124790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1031 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Nov (TASS)—TASS correspondents report: Demonstrations and military parades to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution were held in all of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan today.

A military parade was held in the capital of Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata. Columns of troops from the local garrison and military hardware passed across the city's main square, and then there was a large and vivid demonstration by working people, taking part in which were representatives of various public organizations. Following this public fetes got under way.

Thousands of inhabitants of the capital of Kirghizia, Frunze, gathered for a demonstration dedicated to the main state holiday. Troops from the local garrison passed across the city's central square. The beating of military drums had scarcely ceased when columns of demonstrators appeared. Above them today were the banners of the USSR and of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic. Among the demonstrators were many children, music rang out, and slogans of greeting were heard.

And now a column enters the square, draped in white and blue banners and placards instead of red cloth. This is the democratic movement "Kyrgyzstan" which has organized its column with the permission of the municipal authorities. Above the column are the slogans: "Our aim is an independent democratic law-governed state", "we demand a division of party and state power", "freedom for the press".

The traditional parade of troops and festive procession of inhabitants of the city in honor of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 were held in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, today.

Confirmation of the enduring significance of the October Revolution for the destiny of the peoples of the multinational soviet state was provided by a festive demonstration in Ashkhabad, the capital of Turkmenia. Tens of thousands of city dwellers—representatives of many

nationalities, veterans and young people—expressed their aspiration to live in peace and accord, and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of a voluntary union of sovereign republics.

The capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, was draped in red cloth according to tradition, and the day before there was a gathering of the Baku Soviet jointly with the public and troops from the garrison. This morning began with a naval parade of ships from the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla.

Tradition notwithstanding there was no subsequent working people's demonstration after the parade in this city. Colonel Valeriy Bunyatov, military commandant of Baku, had cancelled it in accordance with the law on the legal regime of the state of emergency and on the basis of the sociopolitical situation in the city.

Ashkhabad Parade Reported

LD0711134690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] Ashkhabad—Flags and slogans decorated the autumnal garb of the capital of Turkmenistan, the central streets of which became filled from morning onward by thousands of Ashkhabaders. Having merged with the festive columns of work forces, they headed for the main thoroughfare of the capital, Prospekt Makhtumkuli. Niyazov, president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]; veterans of the Communist Party; war and labor veterans; production front-rankers; heroes of the Soviet Union; heroes of socialist labor; and merited science, culture, and arts figures were on the central rostrum. After a military parade, a festive march of the city's working people began.

The festive demonstration of the working people in Ashkhabad has become, in the view of its participants, not merely a tribute to tradition but a confirmation of the lasting significance of the October Revolution for the fate of the peoples of our multinational country, an expression of readiness to strengthen the friendship among us and to develop multifaceted and mutually advantageous cooperation on the basis of a voluntary union of free Soviet republics.

Nizhniy Novgorod Celebrates

LD0711101690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0928 GMT on 7 November broadcasts a four-minute report by an unidentified correspondent from Nizhniy Novgorod on the Great October Socialist Revolution festivities in that city. Noting that the demonstration has already ended, he says: "The main thing is that it was shorter than usual, but it passed off in a very organized manner." Representatives of all the city's rayons participated with the exception of Sormovskiy rayon, where the local authorities had decided to hold a demonstration in their own rayon, he notes.

Referring to the city's main demonstration, the correspondent says: "There was a good, festive atmosphere, simply, although to be honest, before the start of the demonstration there were some fears about whether it would take place at all, whether the people would assemble. But the people came—fewer than usual, but the demonstration took place and, in general, it was very interesting and—the main thing—very organized. It's true that there were slogans among the columns of demonstrators calling for a greater level of activity and criticizing the city soviet. For example, there was this slogan: The City Soviet - many words but no deeds. In principle, there were slogans calling for the continuation of perestroika and the strengthening of our country and our state structure."

TASS Notes Controversy Over Celebration

LD0711080690 Moscow TASS in English 0748 GMT
7 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondents Gennadiy Gavrilenko and Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—The principal state holiday is being marked in the Soviet Union on these November days. But the country is marking the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a not easy atmosphere. Economic troubles, ethnic conflicts and confrontation between various social forces make up the overall picture of present-day life.

Arguments about the advisability of marking the revolution anniversary continued in society ever since the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad in September called for abandoning the traditional November 7 festivities.

Arguments against marking the date are obvious—a negative attitude to the road the country took after 1917. A different attitude is also understandable: The errors made and crimes committed in the Soviet Union since the October Revolution were not the outcome of the revolution itself.

"We firmly stand for the maintenance of traditions which have taken shape in this country after the revolution. One of them is to celebrate the Great October Socialist Revolution anniversary," President Mikhail [as received] stated recently in response to such arguments.

"To us, this is not just a bygone event, a revolution that receded into the past, but is an epoch-making event for our country and the whole world," he said.

Similar thoughts have been also expressed by a person who is very distant from politics—patriarch Aleksey of Moscow and all Russia.

"There cannot be 'superfluous' pages in the life of a person or the life of the people. Shall we be able to realise that 1917 was not a superfluous page in the history of Russia?" he asked in an address to the citizens of the country, published on Monday.

Various attitudes in Soviet society to the socialist choice that Russia made in 1917 manifested itself in the very scenario of ceremonial functions, after a traditional military parade in Moscow, there will be three civilian demonstrations spaced out in time and venue, instead of the previously usual one "official" demonstration.

One of the demonstrations has been organised by the Moscow City Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and public organisations that cooperate with it, another one by the Democratic Russia Movement and the Moscow Voters' Association, and the third one by radicals from among USSR people's deputies.

The fact that social forces that refer to themselves as left-wing are now holding two demonstrations is characteristic of the present-day political picture: This is an illustration of an emerging split in the ranks of the opposition itself into adherents of the moderate wing and the ultras.

Although the Soviet parliament presidium a week ago recognised it as "inadvisable" to hold parallel or alternative demonstrations and meetings in Moscow on November 7, the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council still allowed all the three demonstrations to be held in the capital so as not to stir up political passions over the memorable date and ensure equal rights for all citizens to express views that do not run counter to law.

Thousands of Muscovites will march in different columns today. And still, the call for civil accord should be the main slogan of all demonstrations at this complex time the country is living through.

At any rate, spokesmen for the organising committees of the demonstrations stated at a session in the Moscow City Council that they are not interested in confrontation.

Alternative Demonstrations Held in Moscow

LD0711153290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1355 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] One of the centers of an alternative demonstration, organized today by the "Democratic Russia" movement, by a number of its parties, and by the Moscow Voters' Association, was Staraya Ploshchad where the CPSU Central Committee building is situated.

USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies and the leaders of a number of political parties, united by the "Democratic Russia" movement, spoke to the gathering of Muscovites. Practically every speech contained a thought about the need for civic peace in the country. In particular, RSFSR People's Deputies Mikhail Chelnokov and Vladimir Komchatov, and the cochairman of the Moscow Voters' Association, Lev Shemayev, spoke about this.

Participants in the meeting greeted the head of the Russian parliament, Boris Yeltsin, with stormy

applause. Having recognized the fact that "the center and Russia seem to have split," he spoke in favor of additional efforts directed at "the improvement of our people's lives." Boris Yeltsin expressed gratitude to "all Russians" for supporting him in his activities.

If demonstrations [manifestatsiya], including those in the very center of Moscow, have become commonplace, the same thing cannot be said at all about the "office for innocent people killed," which a people's deputy of Russia, the priest Gleb Yakunin, established on Staraya Ploshchad.

Leading the procession with banners, participants in the demonstration passed along the central streets of the capital to the house where Academician Andrey Sakharov, Nobel Peace Prize winner, lived. The second part of the rally, dedicated to a considerable extent to that great scientist and citizen, took place there.

The rallies held by Democratic Russia and the Moscow Voters' Association passed without the slightest incident. Major-General Yuriy Tomashev, first deputy chief of the main directorate of internal affairs of the Moscow city executive committee, noted in an interview with a TASS correspondent that complete law and order was observed. He positively assessed business contacts between the organizers of the demonstration and the representatives of the law enforcement bodies.

According to the estimates of the Moscow militia, approximately 10,000 people took part in both these rallies and the procession.

Yeltsin, Popov Attend Opposition Marches

LD0711140390 Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Excerpt] November 7 is the national holiday in the USSR, the 73d anniversary of the 1917 socialist revolution. Now reports about how the holiday was marked in Moscow and in the capitals of the union republics.

The revolution anniversary was marked in the most complex ever social and political situation this year. This was reflected in the smaller scale of the festivities and in the holding of alternative civilian marches by supporters of the forces who are in opposition to the Soviet Communist Party. Another display of that was the cancellation of military parades in a number of cities, or in holding them on the premises of military units.

However in Moscow on Red Square on 7 November traditional festivities started as usual at 1000 Moscow time. On the viewing platform of the Lenin Mausoleum there were the president, Mikhail Gorbachev, the head of the Soviet Parliament, Anatoliy Lukyanov, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, the leaders of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and Ivan Silayev, and military leaders. By the way, Boris Yeltsin and the Moscow mayor, Gavriil Popov, explained their participation in the festivities on Red Square and then in an alternative

march by the interests of consolidating society and by the presence of their voters in the ranks of both civilian marchers. Well indeed, achieving civic accord is a highly pressing task in this period of another revolutionary turn of our society, to the ideals of the socialist revolution of 1917. A reminder of the tasks was made in his address to the participants in the festivities by President Mikhail Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

Demonstration Reportedly Calm

LD0711101590 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0917 GMT 7 Nov 90

[From the "Mayak Panorama" program]

[Text] May we remind you that the Moscow city soviet has given permission for three demonstrations in the capital, and has meanwhile refused to finance or organize any of them. The one which took place on Red Square was organized by the CPSU city committee, the VLKSM [Communist Youth League], the Veterans' Union, the Committee of Soviet Women, and others.

But now we will be talking about another demonstration, an alternative one. Who is the initiator of the demonstration that you are about to describe? That is the question for my colleague Aleksandr Korshunov, who is right on the spot where the events are taking place, at Ploshchad Vosstaniya. Hello, Aleksandr!

[Korshunov] Hello, Aleksey! We have now moved off from Ploshchad Vosstaniya along Ulitsa Vorovskogo, and the column is approaching Kalininskiy Prospekt, in the vicinity of the Praga restaurant and the Khudozhestvennyy cinema. As far as the organizers of the demonstration are concerned, the initiators were several public organizations—the Shchit union, the committee of soldiers' mothers, and the memorial society. There are quite a few people's deputies, of the country and of Russia, in the column of demonstrators. They are (Ambartsumov), (Tsurkov), Ion Andronov—probably familiar to our listeners as LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent in New York—and others. This is column number two of the alternative demonstration. The first column, composed of Democratic Russia, in which members of the Moscow voters' association are represented, is passing along Ulitsa Gorkogo. The columns will join up in a few minutes' time near the history museum and will pass through Red Square.

[Announcer] What are the slogans like?

[Korshunov] It has to be said that the participants in this column, this demonstration, are marking the holiday of 7 November as a day of mourning, as they call it, for those who perished innocently, a day of struggle for human rights, a day of civil and ethnic accord. Well, one can judge the essence of the ideas with which these people are going out on the demonstration from some of the slogans: the 73d anniversary is the anniversary of Sloveskaya power [pun on "Soviet power," referring to a gulag camp], of a monstrous social experiment. Some

of the slogans say: Yazov and the generals should retire! The people and the army are united! The participants are marching through the streets and chanting slogans demanding the resignation of the president and of the USSR Supreme Soviet. One must add that the procession is going on in an organized fashion; there are no excesses. I will come back to the Panorama program later and tell you how the meeting and further events went.

[Announcer] Thank you. In other words, everything is going calmly without deviations from orderliness. Thank you very much.

Human Rights Demonstration Held in Moscow

LD0711120190 Moscow TASS in English 1115 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow November 7 TASS—Several radical lawmakers led a counter-demonstration in downtown Moscow today to mourn victims of the official oppression and rally for human rights and Russian sovereignty.

The march was organized by Moscow's "Democratic Elections" society and a group of radical lawmakers and began soon after the official October revolution celebrations in Red Square.

The walk started on the capital's garden ring and the crowd is expected to march through Red Square, around the Kremlin, and hold a rally on Manege Square.

The procession is led by former KGB general Oleg Kalugin, ousted prosecutors Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov and Russian people's deputies economist Tatyana Koryagina and Vitaliy Urazhtsev.

The demonstration was joined by representatives of various parties and movements, including, constitutional democrats, leftist liberal democrats and the Shield group.

The slogans carried by protesters called for the resignation of the president and the Supreme Soviet, demanded genuine sovereignty to Russia and freedom for political prisoners.

Some slogans called for the nationalisation of property belonging to the Soviet Communist Party, market reforms and national reconciliation.

Democratic Groups Demonstrate Peacefully

LD0711111190 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0940 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Telephone report by correspondent Sergey Omelchenko from Novaya Ploshchad, Moscow, on 'second parallel demonstration;' questions by announcer—live]

[Text] [Omelchenko] I'm now in Novaya Ploshchad. A demonstration has assembled here which [Moscow City

Council Chairman] Popov yesterday asked not to be called alternative—it's a demonstration which is taking place in parallel with the Red Square demonstration. A requiem for the dead is now taking place here. Then a religious procession will begin along Maroseyka street [old name of Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo street] and Chkalova street to the home of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. At the moment the requiem is taking place. But a few moments ago speeches were made here by Yeltsin and Popov, and then Gleb Yakunin. Many people and democratic representatives spoke at this meeting.

[Announcer] Who organized this procession?

[Omelchenko] This was organized... There are several organizations here, I have counted a number of organizations which have been taking part: the Voter's Club, Democratic Russia, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, Sotprof [Association of Socialist Trade Unions]—the banner of Sotsprof is here—the all-Union anti-fascist center.

There are a lot of organizations which are united in the Democratic Union complex. The main theme of this mass meeting is the day of mourning for the innocent victims, a day of campaign for human rights, a day of civil and ethnic concord. The slogans here, too, are of the widest variety. I'll quote some of them for you: USSR President and Supreme Soviet Resign! The army and the people are united! Genuine sovereignty for Russia! Security for Yeltsin! I don't know, no one's threatening him, and what's more he's spoken and said that he feels alright, and that he's going to continue working fruitfully.

[Announcer] Tell us in your view how is the demonstration proceeding? Is everything peaceful and normal, without any deviations from order?

[Omelchenko] Yes, as one might have expected the mass meeting began fairly quietly. People gathered together peacefully.

Events in Moscow, Leningrad Previewed

LD0611152390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1325 GMT 6 Nov 90

[by correspondent Gennadiy Gavrilenko]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Nov (TASS)—The Soviet Union is celebrating its national holiday, the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in difficult circumstances. Economic disorder, national conflicts, confrontation between different social forces: This is the real picture of the present day. It is not surprising then that some politicians should have raised the question of whether to celebrate the holiday or not.

We resolutely favor keeping the traditions that came into being here after the revolution and one of them is to celebrate the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, said USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev

recently in answer to this question. For us it is not an event that has faded into the past, a revolution that has sunk into oblivion, but a global event for our country and the whole world, he said.

Similar thoughts have also been expressed by someone far removed from politics, Aleksey, patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. "There are no 'superfluous' pages in the life of an individual or people. Can we understand that 1917 was not a superfluous page in the history of Russia?," he enquires in an appeal to his compatriots published on Monday.

What will happen tomorrow? A minimum of three demonstrations are expected in Moscow, in addition to the traditional military parade. The first will be held on Red Square by the city committees of the CPSU, Komsomol, and organizations involved in cooperation with them. It is anticipated that the country's leadership will be present. The second is organized by the "Democratic Russia" movement and a number of other organizations. Moreover, if the first demonstration is to be a festive one, the second, it has been stated, is dedicated to the memory of the victims of repression over the last 70 or so years.

The instigators of the third demonstration are a group of extremely radical USSR people's deputies. They include investigators Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, expelled from the USSR Procuracy, former KGB General Oleg Kalugin, and others.

In Leningrad, the city in which the October Revolution took place, the festival will begin, as usual, with a naval parade on the Neva. Troops from the Leningrad Garrison will then march through Palace Square. Columns of demonstrators will then immediately come on to the Square, headed by Boris Gidaspov, leader of the Leningrad communists. They intend to hold a rally in the middle of the Square in defense of the ideals of October and loyalty to the socialist choice.

Two hours later, a procession of mourning by the opposition forces will take place in the same spot, designed, according to its organizers, to demonstrate that not all the people of Leningrad share the official point of view on the events of October 1917.

In Riga, the capital of Latvia, a military parade is to take place in compliance with the decree of President Gorbachev, even though the republic's Supreme Soviet has adopted a statement saying that this decree "does not have legal force on Latvian territory." There will then be a demonstration. The Communist Party, the Internationalist Front of the Working People, and the "Soyuz" group of deputies, have called upon the residents of the republic to take part in it.

It must be assumed that solemn events will be held in all the republics which make up the USSR, whatever the attitude of their present authorities to the events of 73 years ago.

Television Reports on Planned Demonstrations

*LD0711011890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 2136 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] There will be three demonstrations in Moscow on 7 November. The first is the official one in Red Square. The second is being organized by Democratic Russia, and the third by a group of radically-minded people's deputies. The fragmentation of society has already reached a stage at which, if there were more alternative demonstrations, there would certainly be participants. The organizers of each of these demonstrations intend to demonstrate their group unity. Will this not give rise to a contrary reaction in a society that has been heated to the limit? [video shows people walking in Red Square]

[Begin recording] [Reporter N. Ivanov, identified by screen caption] Everything has become confused inside our house on the eve of 7 November. The troubadours of the Armed Forces are already singing the praises of the SS-25 missiles—the chief novelty of this year's parade. Immediately after the parade, the ironed-out cobblestones of Red Square will receive the glorious sons and daughters of the party, the Komsomol, and the Marxist platform within the CPSU, while collective shame for a violated great country motivates the organizers of an alternative demonstration led by People's Deputies Urazhtsev, Gdlyan, Ivanov, (Karyagina), and Kalugin. [video shows V.G. Urazhtsev being interviewed]

[V.G. Urazhtsev, cochairman of the Shchit Union, identified by screen caption] We are staging our demonstration under the slogans: True Sovereignty for Russia!, Retire the President and the USSR Supreme Soviet!, Retire the President and the USSR Supreme Soviet!, and The Army and the People Are One!

[Ivanov] The view has been expressed that an alternative demonstration will lead to an intensification of the confrontation between the various public movements.

[Urazhtsev] Not at all. We are staging this demonstration not as a festival, but as a day of remembrance for the innocent human lives that were ruined. We have agreed that 20,000 KGB men will march in our column.

[V.P. Turchin, assistant to an Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputy, at the stankoagregat [machine-tool assembly] works, for example, two days off are offered to workers who go to the demonstration.

[Ivanov] As we were told by the Shield Union, volunteers will be agitating in the streets of Moscow for people not to take part in the communist demonstration but to join in the anti-demonstration. Is it necessary to split the people on different sides of barricades, even with the most benevolent of intentions?

Today, when calls are so frequently voiced to use the Lobnoye Mesto [part of Red Square used in the past as a place of execution] for its original purpose, it is probably

a good thing to remember the words: The unachievable is painful—love your enemies. [end recording]

Gorbachev Speaks at GOSR Awards Ceremony

LD0611212890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1845 GMT on 6 November carries a 20-minute recording of an awards ceremony to present state decorations to workers, artists, scientists, and servicemen at Vladimir Hall in the Bolshoy Kremlin Palace in Moscow on 6 November.

The announcer sets the scene saying: "Industrial and agricultural workers, writers and scientists, cosmonauts and artists, doctors and teachers, who have been awarded orders and titles of merit in the course of this year, were invited to Vladimir Hall in the Great Kremlin Palace today on the eve of the October holiday for a festive ceremony to present high state awards. The recipients are cordially congratulated by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev." The video shows Gorbachev addressing the gathering. In his opening remarks Gorbachev says:

"It gives me immense pleasure to present you with the state awards of our great multi-national state. These awards contain an expression of recognition of the enormous work you are contributing—some for more than a decade, others less. This is nevertheless an outstanding contribution to the prosperity of our fatherland. And I am consciously using this word, prosperity, because even today when things are difficult for us, when we are faced with incredibly complex tasks, we don't forget that in general we are not poor relations. We are standing on firm soil here and we possess immense possibilities and resources, talent, and scientific potential in order to attain new forms of life and open a broad path for the movement of this state.

"So what is being done today, each in his place: one at the place of production, in the factory and enterprise; another in the field, on the farm; a third—I wanted to say at the drawing board but it is probably now better to say at the computer—a fourth in the scientific laboratory; a fifth at the piano; a sixth on the stage, composing and interpreting the drama of our life, literary works—all of this is labor which in coming together elevates our fatherland. Therefore I think that what you have done is an immense contribution, a necessary one, so that we can set our tasks today boldly and cope with them.

"Comrade Kasyan looked and said: Has the president remembered the doctors? [laughter from audience] Certainly, the doctors, certainly, yes! All of you here represent our society very well and it is with great joy that I would like to carry out the instructions of the state and present you with these awards."

Following Gorbachev's opening remarks the camera shows award winners stepping forward and receiving their awards from Gorbachev. Recipients are identified

on an off-screen announcer. Several recipients are shown making short speeches of appreciation for the awards.

Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR Aleksandr Nikolayevich Balandin receives the Gold Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union and the Order of Lenin. Balandin expresses his thanks for the award.

Writer Alim Pshemakhovich Keshokov is among the recipients of the title Hero of Socialist Labor together with the Hammer and Sickle Gold Medal and the Order of Lenin.

Writer David Nikitich Kugultinov is among the recipients shown receiving the Gold Star of a Hero of Socialist Labor.

Konstantin Viktorovich Kunitskiy, general director of the Ramenskoye agricultural combine in Moscow Oblast, is among the recipients of the Hero of Socialist Labor awards. Kunitskiy speaks on the successes of his enterprise.

Other named recipients of the Hero of Socialist Labor title include the composer Aleksandra Nikolayevna Pakhmutova and the actor Innokentiy Mikhaylovich Smoktunovskiy. Smoktunovskiy speaks on what an actor does for society.

The Order of the October Revolution is presented to Pilot-Cosmonaut Anatoliy Yakovlevich Solovyev.

Colonel-General Vladlen Mikhaylovich Mikhaylov is given the military rank of army general.

In his concluding remarks Gorbachev says:

"I would also like to conclude these congratulations by wishing you new creative strength. I know our people. We are all made of the same stuff despite our diversity. We always want to be doing something, to respond to something. Our people are the most responsive people. This is a great time, a disturbing time. The opportunities are immense and the dangers great. We need to use the opportunities so that the country can stride ahead and make life better for people. The dangers need to be overcome and the difficulties need to be overcome.

"What can we say? If some people think that we do not know how hard things are, how tense, or what is being said at factories and enterprises and in the lines, especially, then...And comrades think that we are people somewhere far removed. No. We know it all. But I perceive it moreover with pain and deep feelings in order to reach conclusions from this and so that things can be changed more quickly. But I cannot agree with those who call our whole cause into question. To some it is of no benefit; others have been offended by it. But now that we are on the subject the country cannot be renewed in this way without changing ourselves and without changing the form of life. Just imagine when major repairs are suddenly begun at home, at the factory, how much torture this is. And the whole country is going through

this. What is more, a country overburdened with problems, hang-ups, attachments and traditions, which we need, some of which we need to get rid of, leaving the main values and the main traditions of our society and of all our peoples.

"I think we can manage it all and I hope for your support and for your new contributions now as our dear award winners. Let me congratulate you once again on your awards and once again on this holiday." [applause]

Leaders Assemble for GOSR Formal Meeting

LD0611143690 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—A formal meeting marking the 73rd anniversary of the 1917 socialist revolution [GOSR] has held at Moscow's Kremlin Palace of Congresses today. This year, the meeting was held on behalf of the Soviet parliament.

The meeting is being attended by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzkov, Soviet Parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, members of the Soviet Presidential Council, Soviet and Russian parliament deputies, leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and other political parties and movements, representatives of public organisations, work collectives of Moscow and Moscow region, and servicemen of the Moscow garrison. Lukyanov delivered a speech.

Lukyanov Speech

LD0611155790 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1403 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Speech by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at festive meeting devoted to the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Kremlin Palace of Congress—live]

[Text] Comrades, we have gathered here today in the Kremlin Palace to mark the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which 73 years ago threw down a bold challenge to the old world. By this, we are not simply paying tribute to our national traditions, common to all the peoples. October 1917 is for all of us a revolutionary turning point inseparably linked with the work of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, of Lenin's Bolshevik Guards, and of generations of Soviet people who fought for the people's happiness.

It is the landmark marking the beginning of the complex, very difficult and contradictory path of socialist transformations, whose foundations are composed of the ideas of popular sovereignty and democracy, the ideas of humanism and justice, and the idea of internationalism.

Neither in the past nor present has there been any shortage of different interpretations of the October Revolution, or of assessments of its progress, gains, and mistakes. But neither in the past nor today has anyone

the right to belittle the enormous effect of this event on world history, on the progress of the whole of human civilization. [applause]

Just as in the 18th Century the thunder of cannon on the streets of Paris awoke a generation of free thinkers, so the shots fired by the "Aurora" in Petrograd at the start of the 20th Century summoned forth the mighty tidal wave of the liberation struggle on all continents of our planet. The way of the pioneers, opened up as it was by the October Revolution, was incredibly difficult. It involved great tumult, deformations, and casualties. But the truth remains that the October Revolution was an embodiment of the aspirations of the working people, the creation of the people's masses, and their response to the age-old demand for social justice.

A new society was built by the efforts of generations of Soviet people; a society was created which repelled a fascist invasion and which was exerted a huge influence on the whole of post war world history. Today, from a historical distance, it is quite simple to ask the question—could the October path have been easier and less painful? Yes, possibly it could have been so. But history cannot be lived anew. It is much more sensible to learn from the experience of the revolution the correct lessons—not to repeat extremes or mistakes. Under the conditions of the perestroika of all aspects in the life of Soviet society, these lessons of October, of the path taken after it, will be our most valuable asset. This is why we perceive perestroika as a continuation of the cause of October, as a necessary revolutionary process of the renewal of society on genuinely democratic and humanist principles.

The fundamental issue in any revolution is the issue of power. Perestroika establishes not only the power of the soviets, which resounded for the first time in October. Perestroika establishes a new political situation. It raises people's power to a higher level. Formed on the basis of free democratic elections, the local soviets are called upon to become the main institutes of civil concord and dialogue and of the formulation of opportune decisions. And we are more and more boldly taking upon ourselves responsibility for state affairs. Cooperation between soviets at all levels from the Supreme Soviet to the village soviet is being established. And it may be that not yet all, even far from all soviets have understood this new role of theirs. Well, there are now the necessary legal, economic, and organizational linchpins for them to become genuinely strong and authoritative bodies of people's power.

It was said in October: works and factories to the workers! Perestroika signifies the creation of a new economic mechanism and economic relations that are new for our social structure. The essence of the processes beginning in this sphere lies in removing ownership from the state ambit, in utilizing all its diverse forms, and in returning the main feeling to people and to labor collectives—the feeling of being master. The attainment of these reforms today requires the implementation of

extreme measures directed toward reviving the economy and the consumer market, toward strengthening contractual and financial discipline and monetary circulation, and toward improving foreign economic activity. And, moreover, the main thing here lies in developing the initiative and responsibility of each worker, in catering for citizens' social protection, and the strictest law and order, without which both the transition to the market and economic reform as a whole are simply impossible.

It was said in October: Land to the peasants! Perestroika has already done a great deal in terms of granting the peasant broad freedom of action: the new law on land passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet; the development of collective and state farms, of diverse forms of leasing, individual, family, collective contracting, private farms—these open up new prospects for the regeneration of our countryside, and of the whole of the country's agro-industrial complex.

It can be said without exaggeration that the restoration of the ruptured natural link between man and land will not only bring benefit to people, but will also ensure a solid basis for the whole of our way of life. Born under the banner of emancipation, October brought to life the declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia, which proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of all nations and ethnic groups, their right to self-determination, and the free development of national minorities.

It is precisely these principles that perestroika is defending today. A renewed Soviet Federation is being born. The elaboration of the concept for a new union treaty is under way by the joint efforts of the republics and autonomous formations.

We know how far from simple, how difficult this process is. It has brought us not only an understanding of new realities but also the cold wind of hostility between nationalities, separatism, national chauvinism, and the tragedy and torment of refugees. May the appeal for sense, for the preservation of the brotherhood and friendship of Soviet peoples go from this hall to reach every small corner of our country. In this difficult time for our state, may the principle of sovereignty become every more closely linked with the idea of radical renewal, the preservation and strengthening of the union of Soviet republics and the development of all-round, equal relations between all those who live in our multi ethnic fatherland. [applause]

It was said in the October Revolution: Peace to the peoples. Perestroika has offered to the world community the concept of the new political thinking, the essence of which consists in recognition of the priority of universal human values, prevention of the death of the planet in the conflagration of a nuclear catastrophe, and this means not just the elimination of entire classes of nuclear armaments, not just reduction of the army to a level of necessary sufficiency, not just wide-scale conversion enabling more and more resources to be directed into civilian programs. It is also the destruction of a huge

mass of mutually-linked problems of disarmament and development, ecological security, humanitarian and other cooperation between peoples in the broadest possible sense.

All these changes in the life of our society and in the international situation can under no circumstances be discounted now that we have arrived at the most difficult, one can say quite frankly, critical point of perestroika. Social tension, interethnic conflicts, economic instability—all of these are all unfortunately the realities of our days. At times it is difficult to understand them. It is difficult to find a bearing, to reach any simple solutions. For this is the fate of any revolutionary epoch, of any period of transition.

However, striving to single out the main thing in this maelstrom of events—and it is something that, as it is, unites October with perestroika—it can be said with confidence: The essence of all these complex processes consists not in adjusting them to any abstract schemes, but in the reconstruction of socialism which is economically efficient, politically democratic, morally pure and, most important, geared toward the individual as being of the highest value on earth. [applause]

Karl Marx once wrote that revolution is the locomotive of history. Added opposite that spot, in Lenin's handwriting, were the words: to drive that locomotive at top speed and keep it on the rails.

It seems to me that here is the key to our current situation. We are obliged to master the skill of revolutionary endurance and today when, once again, time is asking us the alarming question in all its magnitude of "what is to be done?", a sense of responsibility for the fate of the country and future generations persists in dictating the one answer: In order decisively to renew our society, it is necessary for all its patriotic forces to unite. It is only this that guarantees success for our perestroika revolution and keeps it on a peaceful course. [applause]

It is not destruction, but construction; not law wars, but a joint struggle for legality; not politicking, but an honest political dialogue. This is what we call for and it is a civic duty of all politicians, of all parties and movements to become aware of this and to respond in deed to the people's universal desire for consensus, cooperation, and law and order. [applause]

Perestroika opens the scope of thought about a struggle against diehard conservatism and destructive radicalism. It revives the authority of conscientious labor and businesslike initiative. It requires that durable order and legality be brought about and that political and national quarrels be overcome. It is not easy to do this. The dangers threatening our society are far from abstract, but we must pass this crucial test of history and be able to rise above the quarrels. We must rally and consistently implement the program of stabilization and construction that we have drawn up. [applause]

We have one path—through diversity to unity and consensus for the sake of the renewal and prosperity of our motherland, in the name of a peaceful present and future all over our world. [applause]

In fulfillment of the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, allow me cordially to congratulate on the anniversary of Great October all comrades present in this hall and, through them, war and labor veterans, workers and peasants, white-collar workers and the intelligentsia, women and young people, servicemen of the Army and the Navy, communists and representatives of other parties and movements functioning within the framework of our constitution. Allow me on the eve of our common and nationwide holiday to wish Soviet people, the whole Soviet people, unity, happiness, prosperity and a peaceful and confident view of the future. [applause]

Art Director on Cultural Threats

*LD0611182890 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1425 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[Speech by Irina Aleksandrovna Antonova, director of the Pushkin State Museum of fine Art, at a festive meeting devoted to the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist revolution in the Kremlin Palace of congresses—live]

[Text] Esteemed comrades, our solemn meeting devoted to the October Revolution is being held at an hour of great trials, at fateful moments, indeed, for our motherland. Our minds are shaken by the catastrophic state of the economy and by national tragedies. The problems of our culture are of the same rank. The buildings of libraries, theatres, concert halls and museums, which store the spiritual memory of peoples, are crumbling. Scientists, writers, musicians and painters are leaving the country. The system of national education based on dogma is at an impasse. And the spiritual corrosion afflicting society is even more frightening. Moral principles are oppressed intellectual potential is in decline, and the bounds of conscience are being overstepped. The bitterness that has engulfed society does not always allow it to grasp the underlying causes of the catastrophe that has hit it and, consequently, to seek for correct ways out. The irresponsible voices are growing louder of those who waste no time in explaining away any negative phenomena of our life, including in the sphere of culture, by the inherent fallaciousness of the October Revolution.

In consequence, there are proposals to give up celebrating the October Revolution, to give up vandalism toward monuments to revolutionary figures, the idealization of the country's pre-revolutionary life and of monarchy, and a disgusting nationalism, bordering on cruel and absurd farce. We have lived by lies for many long years. We cannot permit the people to be poisoned with a new lie. [loud applause]

In October 1917 the revolution in our country was carried out by great people and true heroes inspired by the lofty and noble ideals of freedom, justice, and equal

opportunities and the dream of happiness for mankind. By their thinking, participation in people's movements, uprisings and revolutions, scores of human generations before them strove to change life for the better. The October Revolution in Russia was brought nearer both by the 1789 French Revolution and the consequent revolutions of 1830, 1840, the Paris Commune, and the European revolutions of the 19th century. It was preceded by the revolutions of 1905 and February 1917. Just as Dante and Giotto were precursors of the Italian Renaissance and Voltaire and Rousseau were precursors of the French Revolution, so Tchev and Tolstoy, Chekhov and Gorkiy heard the mighty advance of the Russian Revolution. You must listen to the revolution with all your body, heart and mind, Aleksandr Blok wrote on 9 January 1918 in his address to the intelligentsia. It is a lie that the revolution started the destruction of culture. Here is a fragment from the appeal published in *Izvestiya* on 4 November 1917:

To the workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors and all the citizens of Russia. Apart from natural wealth, the working people have inherited enormous cultural riches, buildings of amazing beauty—wonderful words!—museums full of rare and beautiful objects which are educating and inspiring, and libraries which preserve enormous values of the spirit. One has to look vigilantly after the people's property. The Soviet Government published over 20 decrees and instructions during the first years after the revolution. They were aimed at preserving the cultural heritage. They included those on protecting libraries and book storages and on banning the export and sale abroad of objects of artistic and historical importance. In 1917-1918, during very hard and difficult years, restoration work was carried out in the Kremlin. Lenin wrote on a draft regarding the transfer of the Great Kremlin Palace under the authority of museums: I am in favor of transferring this palace to museums. During the revolution itself and the following decades, the creative and constructive spirit of the revolution enriched world art of the 20th century with brilliant achievements in all spheres. It is enough to recall the names of Mayakovskiy and Pasternak, Meyerhold and Tairov, Gorkiy and Bulgakov, Eyzenshteyn and Dovzhenko, Shostakovich and Prokofyev, Tatlin and Melnikov. Unfortunately, like other revolutions, our revolution did not escape its Termidor. The forward movement was interrupted by terror and the establishment of a totalitarian regime. The policy in the sphere of culture suffered gross distortions. During the '80s, treasures from the Hermitage, paintings by Botticelli, Titian, Rafael, Velasquez and Rembrandt were sold to American millionaire (Mellon), and the Sukharev tower, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, and the Kazan Cathedral were pulled down. Incidentally, that vandalism, as much as the present-day one, reminds one of certain facts of pre-revolutionary history. In 1930 Aleksandr Benois published in *MIR ISKUSSTVA* [The World of Art] magazine documents on the history of vandalism in Russia. In a number of articles such as "Peterburg's

agony," "Vandals," and others, he protested against the destruction, elimination of, and barbaric attitude toward architectural monuments.

During the years of Stalinism, shameful decisions on writers and composers were promulgated, the Chamber Theater was closed down, and the Museum of New Western Art in Moscow, one of the world's best museums of fine art whose collections had been gathered by outstanding Russian collectors Shchukin and Morozov, was dissolved. Thousands of art and culture figures, including Meyerhold and actor Mikhoels, were physically annihilated. The list of martyrs of our long-suffering culture is endless. Dostoyevskiy was right, indeed, when he wrote: Man is not born for happiness, he attains his happiness and always through suffering. And nevertheless, the light of the ideals of good and justice has never been extinguished. There was opposition to the evil in the most difficult years. Just as the revolution that preceded it, perestroika, to a great degree, is guided by the barometer of truth which is preserved in culture. The best representatives of culture have been the knights of light. They helped the people to maintain the fire of life and the sun of hopes.

Today we are in a frenzy looking for ways to rejuvenate our society. As in the past, culture provides support for our courage along this way, for not only does existence determines consciousness, but consciousness determines existence, too, to a great degree. [applause]

Consequently, care for the development of culture, the humanization of education, creative freedom, and the preservation of cultural movements must become a priority task for those who so often hold meetings in this hall. As long ago as 1941, academician Vernadskiy warned that major flaws in our power result from its weakened culture. By helping culture we will help policy, the economy, and our whole life. Nothing but culture is capable of profoundly changing its qualities by integrating the efforts of all the sides, forces, and peoples of our country because, as outstanding philosopher Pavel Florenskiy profoundly remarked, culture is a language that unites mankind. One has to understand, at last, that culture is not an institution but the main goal of society's and humankind's development in general, the pivot that will direct us towards truth.

Esteemed comrades, I congratulate you on our state holiday, the Great October. We do not have any other holiday. Certain people with callous and cruel hearts would like to spoil it. But history will have its say. On 14 July 1789, Parisians stormed the Bastille as the stronghold of the old feudal world. A hundred years ago later, that day was proclaimed France's state holiday, and at the same time a combat song of the revolutionaries, the Marseillaise became the national anthem. France appreciated the true greatness of its revolution, albeit not immediately. In yesterday's IZVESTIYA a respected journalist asked with sincere anguish: Is it possible to recover faith in the purity of the ideals of the October Revolution? Perhaps Blok's words will be an answer to

her and all of us: Great Russian artistes—Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevskiy and Tolstoy—used to plunge into darkness, but they had the strength to stay and hide in that darkness, for they believed in the light. They knew the light. Just as the entire people, which had borne them close to its heart, they gritted their teeth in the darkness, in despair and often in anger, but they knew that sooner or later everything would be different because life is beautiful. They knew this. [applause]

Leningrad Name Change Disputed

LD0611170790 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1436 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Speech by Yevgeniy Sergeyevich Krasnitskiy, CPSU Central Committee member and electrician at Leningrad Maritime Trading Port, at a gala session devoted to the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Moscow Kremlin Palace of Congresses—live]

[Excerpts] You are aware, of course, of plans to restore the name of Saint Peter to our city. The desire to look back to the great pages of the past is completely understandable at a dramatic time in our country. However, I do not understand the desire of certain forces, quite specific forces, to erase the name of Lenin from the map of the world. Each of us has his own profoundly personal view of this problem. My grandfather died on the Leningrad front on 5 October 1941. Yesterday was the 49th anniversary of the day he died. My father is 70. He volunteered, again for the Leningrad front. And my grandmother worked at a factory for all the 900 days of the Leningrad blockade. For me now to vote in the Leningrad Soviet for the name of the city to be changed would be just the same as spitting on their graves. [prolonged applause] You may be assured that I am not the only one to think this in Leningrad.

The country is at a turning point [applause]. Perhaps it would be wrong to say at the moment that the socialist fatherland is in danger, but we are facing danger, the danger of our statehood being destroyed, as has been the case many times in the thousand years' history of our country. [passage omitted]

The cohesion of all the healthy forces of the socialist choice on the basis of common human values is our hope and salvation. If we are able to make the correct use of the precious inheritance of our forebears' wisdom, it will increase our strength and reason. If we cannot, then there will be no one to be sorry for us, and no reason why they should. I think, however, that I have the right to say that we in Leningrad do believe in the constructive forces awakened by perestroika and the ultimate triumph of common human values which include, as a right, the ideals proclaimed 73 years ago: Peace to the peoples, land to the peasants, the factory to the workers and all power to the Soviets! Congratulations, dear comrades!

Speaker Criticizes Leader's Conflict

LD0611162490 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1448 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Speech by Leonid Yevgenyevich Bliznov, maintenance man at Moscow kerchief production association in Pavlovskiy Posad, at a festive meeting devoted to the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Dear comrades: The country at the moment has an awful lot of different unofficial associations, parties, groupings, blocs, and movements. There is no getting away from it that not infrequently they speak of good sense. But wouldn't it be wonderful to combine and consolidate all this sense with the sole objective of reviving the country. [applause]

Yet sometimes all these associations do is disunite us, providing grounds for anti-social phenomena, and crime above all. In this time of revolutionary change, the issue of confidence in the country's political leaders is of exceptional importance. Not so very long ago the hope arose of a constructive alliance between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. [applause]

Little remains of that now! [laughter and applause]

It is hard to understand who or what is hindering them, these people whom the people have acknowledged as their leaders, and who understand full well the needs of the working man. It is time the two of them realized that their continued opposition will reduce the popularity of both of them. [stormy applause]

As I congratulate everyone today on the 73rd anniversary of the October Revolution, this is the main thing that I should like to wish them: a steady tread on the road to stabilizing the country's national economy. Have a happy holiday, dear comrades! [applause]

Gorbachev Meets Diplomatic Corps

PM0711105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Nov 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "President's Meeting With Diplomats"]

[Text] The traditional ceremony of the presentation of the heads of the diplomatic missions of foreign countries in Moscow to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev took place in the Grand Kremlin Palace Georgiyevskiy Hall 6 November. The ceremony was attended by N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze.

The diplomats were presented by V.I. Chernyshev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry State Protocol Administration.

I sincerely greet you on our state holiday—the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution—M.S. Gorbachev said addressing the diplomats. I view

the meeting with you as confirmation of a good tradition, as one more opportunity to express respect for the important and crucial mission which you are fulfilling in representing your countries in Moscow.

The October revolution was a heroic event in the history of the peoples who once made up the Russian empire. It drastically altered the fate of tens and hundreds of millions of our compatriots of several generations and has had enormous influence on the course and nature of world development in the 20th century. Its aims—justice, equality, and peace—sustain the policy of perestroika and the revolutionary renewal of our society.

We are now passing through the most difficult and crucial stage of perestroika. Our intention is to expand and deepen democracy, to create a healthy economy that serves man and a Union of sovereign states, and to elevate the individual. We are open to cooperation, partnership, and broad collaboration with all countries which adhere to the ideals of peace and to general human values.

It is not easy for us. But we believe in the correctness of our choice and we cannot see a sensible alternative to perestroika, a sensible alternative according with our own interests and with the interests of the world community.

We are grateful to all those who in a difficult time are displaying solidarity with perestroika and see in it a very important factor for the renewal of the present-day world.

In the past year the world has changed resolutely. Before our eyes a new, peaceful transition is being born in relations between states. And although the situation in individual regions is alarming, the world community, inspired by the principles and aims of the United Nations, is displaying the ability to counter the keen challenges.

The Soviet Union intends persistently and consistently to pursue a constructive foreign policy aimed at ensuring that the positive changes in international relations become irreversible.

I ask you to convey to the leaders of your states and governments wishes for success in their activity and to your peoples the best wishes for peace and prosperity.

The doyen of the diplomatic corps, Pascal Antoine Sane, Senegalese ambassador to the USSR, said in a reply speech:

"Now that your country is celebrating the 73d anniversary of the October revolution I should like on behalf of the diplomatic corps accredited to the USSR to state that the ambassadors are happy, here with you and among you, to be living through the special time which has begun in this country thanks to your efforts and your imagination. We realize that today you are not simply fulfilling an enormous and more than enormous,

colossal, and even incredible task which is predetermining the destiny and everything connected with the future of a people who expect from you a qualitative improvement in their living conditions.

"That is why we wish you the robust health necessary for the successful implementation of the reforms generated by perestroika, that is the ideology which you have put forward and which will gradually change all the present economic structures for the sake of the maximum welfare of your country's population.

"We followed with great attention your recent visits to Spain and France. You worthily represented the Soviet Union in those two countries, showing your interlocutors the temporary difficulties which you are experiencing now and expressing hope that your country will one day be free of East-West confrontation, demonstrating profound adherence to the idea of the all-European home toward whose construction you are striving so much.

"It is thanks to your persistent desire to create, despite the present difficulties and adversities, a single space of peace and consensus, that you, Mr President, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and on behalf of the diplomats present I should like to ardently congratulate you on this. Finally, wishing you every success in your ventures, we voice the hope that your people will be able to understand your intentions and will render you ardent support on the path you have chosen for them."

The meeting with the diplomatic corps passed in a friendly atmosphere.

Gorbachev Presents State Decorations

*LD0611175890 Moscow TASS in English 1647 GMT
6 Nov 90*

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today presented state decorations to workers, writers, cosmonauts, farmers, heads of enterprises, actors, scientists, artists, physicians, teachers and servicemen. The ceremony was held at the Vladimirovskiy Hall of the Bolshoy Kremlin Palace in Moscow.

Gorbachev presented gold stars to heroes of the Soviet Union and heroes of socialist labour, orders, military ranks of general of the army and honorary titles.

The president warmly greeted the audience, saying that he was particularly glad to present decorations on the eve of the state holiday—the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Speaking of the situation in the country and prospects for its development, Gorbachev said: "We have great chances, but there are also great dangers. We should use chances in order to make the country stride forward and ensure a better life for people. We should also overcome difficulties and dangers."

"We know of the current difficulties," Gorbachev said. "We know what they speak about at plants, factories and

in lines. We perceive them painfully and are drawing conclusions, wishing to accelerate changes for the better." "I cannot agree with those who doubt our great cause. We cannot renew the country without changing ourselves and the form of life of the country overburdened with problems and difficulties. We must do away with many of them, keeping the main values and the main traditions of our society and all our peoples," Gorbachev said.

Grigoriy Revenko Outlines New Union Treaty

*LD0611172990 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT
6 Nov 90*

[by TASS correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—"The draft of the new union treaty of the USSR will be published in the press before November 15." Soviet Presidential Council member Grigoriy Revenko told Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

Asked by TASS to comment on the draft's structure, Revenko said that the treaty would consist of three parts. The first concerns rules for entering the union, on voluntary and equitable principles, and also citizenship issues. The rights and freedoms of man, irrespective of the place of his residence, are put to the fore.

The second part deals with the union's powers as a sovereign state, and the third - with the mechanism of power based on the separation of the three powers—legislative, executive and judicial.

A voting system that takes into account the number of residents in every republic is envisaged in the union. For instance, Russia will receive the number of votes corresponding to the number of residents. It is important for republics to decide on their own how they will adopt the new treaty—through supreme soviets or through a referendum.

Asked about the future structure of the country's armed forces, Revenko said that "none of the republics has yet claimed a strategic defence. Rather at point are interior troops." He believes that the union army can be formed on the basis of quotas for each union republic.

The new treaty defines the USSR as "a union of sovereign republics-states." Revenko said it was too early to speak about whether the union would be a federation or confederation, as it depended on the powers delegated by republics to the union as a sovereign state.

If a republic does not sign a union treaty, it nevertheless can obtain a special status within the union. This will be specified by way of talks. Talks to settle all disputable issues will precede full secession from the union.

In Revenko's view, the need for the congress of USSR people's deputies will obviate after the union treaty is concluded. "We rather need a normally functioning

Supreme Soviet. You may call it parliament, congress or knesset, as you wish," he said.

The draft also envisages the national election of the president and vice-president of the USSR and the formation of the Council of Ministers. The question of the expedience of the cabinet of ministers chairman post remains open.

Asked if the new union treaty will replace the union constitution, Revenko said it would rather become its second part. The first part of the document will be a "human rights bill declaring the USSR's full commitment to all international covenants on human rights."

More on Revenko

*LD0611223190 Moscow Television Service
in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[Remarks by Grigoriy Revenko, USSR Presidential Council member, at a news conference on 6 November; place not given; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent L. Kushnarenko] The fate of the union of the established and newly created sovereign republics worries not only the Soviet people, but also the representatives of the outside world. We are not keeping it secret that we find ourselves in the abyss of crises—economic, political, and ethnic crises. The conclusion of a new Union treaty pursues the purpose of eliminating these crises. A preliminary discussion of it took place at the beginning of November.

[G.I. Revenko] There were different opinions, including the opinions to substitute some economic agreement for the treaty. But, I think, every man of common sense understands that undecided political issues will be seriously hindering the advance of economic programs, in particular of such an important program as the transition to the market. I don't want to preach, but the market does not tolerate either ethnic or territorial isolation. It would be very hard, so to speak, to get to it through the barriers that already today manifest themselves in the form of various customs boundaries, and so forth.

We came to an agreement that first of all we need to concentrate on the clear distribution of powers between the Union and republics. Second, to set up a committee for currency which will be joined by all the republics and where they will decide the issues of currency distribution. Third, to set up an inter-republican committee for economic reform with the view of helping to make decisions on the program for the transition to the market. And that's why such an accord has been reached.

The last thing that is very important to be emphasized today is that at that meeting of the Council of Federation ideas were expressed that it would be possible to agree with the submitted versions of the documents, and would be possible, so to speak, to start work on drawing all the issues closer to the future Union. Nevertheless, the following has been agreed: To take into account all

the remarks that were expressed by the 15th of the month and to make public the concept of the new treaty in our press and other media, and thus to draw all the people into the discussion of our future Union.

Moscow Permit Refused to Politburo Member

*LD0611160790 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1500 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[Text] To refuse Polozkov a Moscow residence permit—this decision was adopted by deputies of the Moscow Soviet. In all honesty, it is a sensation today and, well, going by journalists' and readers' rules it's just impossible to ignore such an event. For the first time in the history of the country, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee has been refused the possibility of living and working in the capital.

Conflicting Reports on Army Plans for Coup

PM0611142790

[Editorial Report] London Independent Television Network in English broadcasts in its 5 November 2200 GMT "News at Ten" program a David Smith report from Moscow speculating on the possibility of a military coup in the USSR. The report contains a comment by Colonel Vitaliy Urashev, one of the leaders of Shchit [Shield], described by Smith as "a radical movement within the army." Urashev says, in Russian with English subtitle translation: "We received information about a conference of high-ranking Army and KGB officers which agreed on the best time to introduce martial law between November 10th and 20th."

Smith's report ends with the following comment from Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, in Russian with subtitled English translation: "Our Army guarantees democracy. It's not a threat."

Housing Privileges for Officials Revealed

*LD0611214790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[Text] Now some information about privileges enjoyed by certain people who live according to special laws. It turns out that there is a secret joint decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers according to which the right to a Moscow residence permit and living space in the city is granted to certain categories of party and state leaders after they retire. For example, starting from January of last year apartments in the top people's blocks were given to retirees (Bogdanov), former first secretary of the Magadan Oblast CPSU Committee; (Kozorev), former first secretary of the Novosibirsk Oblast CPSU Committee; (Telepnev), former first secretary of the Arkhangelsk Oblast CPSU Committee; (Pogosyan) from Stepanakert; (Obushenkov) from Khabarovsk; (Petrik) from Moldova, and many others. It looks as though after working in their local towns, they are seeking refuge in Moscow,

readers of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY write. The above information was taken from this weekly.

The Moscow Soviet subcommission on housing policy is now checking on the distribution, presentation, and use of housing in the top people's blocks, which were constructed with funds provided by the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the KGB, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, Moscow City Party Committee, and other privileged departments and organizations. Pride of place in the list goes to representatives of the highest CPSU bodies. So, Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received on 18 January this year a four-room apartment with an overall floor space of 130.3 square metres for three people. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and editor in chief of PRAVDA, received last year a four-room apartment with an overall floor space of 125.2 square metres for three people. Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received last year a two-room apartment with an overall floor space of 100.9 square metres for two people. Shkabardnya, administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers, received a three-room apartment with an overall floor space of 126.1 square metres for two people.

USSR people's deputies who are members of the Presidential Council are also well represented in this list of the strong of this world. Aytmatov received a four-room apartment with an overall floor space of 159.9 square metres for five people. Yarin received not only a four-room apartment with an overall floor space of 120.3 square metres for four people but also a permanent Moscow residence permit, which violates the legislation. Comrade Primakov, who holds the post of the chairman of the Anti-privilege Commission, received a two-room apartment with an overall floor space of 104.3 square metres just for himself. At the same time the administration of affairs of the CPSU Central Committee gave his daughter a three-room apartment with an overall floor space of 88.7 square metres, for two people. We are not against people living comfortably and in decent conditions. But how do the others live?

We found this information in the latest issue of the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY weekly in which a conversation with (Zharov), member of the Moscow Soviet commission for social policy, is published.

Diplomat Deplores Foreign Ministry State

PM0611143090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 90 p 3

[Interview with diplomat Vladimir Romanovskiy by A. Pankratov; date, place of interview not given: "The Foreign Ministry 'Bear': Diplomat Vladimir Romanovskiy Talks About the Professional 'Factory' of the Foreign Policy Department"]

[Text] [Pankratov] Vladimir Romanovskiy is 44. He has spent 17 years working in the Foreign Ministry system.

He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and the USSR Foreign Ministry Diplomatic Academy. He has worked in the Congo, Ruanda, and the Foreign Ministry central apparatus. For the last three years he was consul at the USSR Consulate General in Czechoslovakia (Brno).

[Romanovskiy] To be absolutely sincere, let me say this: I recently left the CPSU. This was not a sudden decision. The statement I submitted to the USSR Foreign Ministry party committee says: "15 years in the CPSU have led me to disagree with the party."

[Pankratov] Perhaps, Vladimir, we could start at the very beginning. How one becomes a Soviet diplomat...

[Romanovskiy] Selection for the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (incidentally, a strictly departmental establishment) was always tough. At the time I joined, 20 percent of places were set aside for people of "proletarian extraction," and all the other students gained entry on the basis of special lists. But even those who formed part of the 20-percent minimum had to have Komsomol [Communist Youth League] or party warrants. Thus from the outset a person became a hostage to our political system, because first and foremost he was required to show reliability and ideological loyalty.

The second Foreign Ministry educational establishment is the Diplomatic Academy. Cadre diplomats study there for two years, and party workers for three years. What is the Diplomatic Academy? According to many of my former colleagues, and even staffers at the Foreign Ministry Personnel Administration, it is a kind of "reserve" where people in the system await a new appointment, because the ministry's manning levels are inflated beyond all bounds. Many people justifiably regard study at the academy as a rest, a "sinecure." But is it not disadvantageous to us to maintain such educational establishments? And as a first step, I think we should open up these VUZs [higher educational establishments] and in general admit people to Foreign Ministry work on a competitive basis, and not only Moscow State Institute of International Relations graduates.

The Foreign Ministry system in general is highly scattered and fragmented, and staffers often have rather inadequate information at their disposal. Furthermore the level of incompetence is maintained by the Foreign Ministry structure itself—the practice involves widely differing types of access to necessary materials, a whole bureaucratic science of compiling various papers about nothing at all, and so forth.

Often young people are employed in work on the press, but all this is applied rather than analytical in nature. Work based on imitation is very widespread. After spending 15 years or so in this way until he reaches the "decent" rank of first secretary, a person well and truly loses the habit of thinking, because no one particularly asks him to do that. Incompetence later plays its part, at the level of various kinds of decisions. And hence, I

think, our mistakes, failures, and incorrect recommendations, which are then passed on, upward. Abroad, junior diplomatic personnel are entrusted with very few serious matters, and until recently diplomats' contacts with foreigners were strictly limited: "in case anything happens."

The reason for this situation lies, in my view, in the fact that the Foreign Ministry is first and foremost an ideological department which remains to this day one of the main instruments of CPSU policy.

A young person cannot work at the Foreign Ministry unless he belongs to the Komsomol, and subsequently the CPSU. Despite repeated assurances of democratization and perestroika in the Foreign Ministry's work, in effect a feudal system of relationships and decision-making still prevails there. This is manifested particularly in our institutions abroad, where the ambassador is literally czar and god and personifies soviet power and Soviet law. Under the Provision on the Rights of an Ambassador the latter can, for instance, expel anyone from the country in 24 hours, without taking any particular trouble to look for evidence. Incidentally, Soviet diplomatic workers to this day live, when abroad, not by the laws of the USSR, but by the Rules of Conduct for Soviet Citizens Abroad—compliance with these rules, which are absurd for any normal person, hangs like the sword of Damocles over every staffer.

And even the personal life of diplomatic workers is ideologized. Despite, for instance, the fact that our law does not ban divorce, a Foreign Ministry staffer who gets divorced is committing a *de facto* "immoral" act and becomes unsuitable for foreign travel. Hence the frequent fictitious marriages whose sole purpose is a trip abroad.

[Pankratov] You have said that the Foreign Ministry is still an "arm" of the party, but surely Article 6 of the constitution has been revoked?

[Romanovskiy] It has been revoked, but not much has changed in practice, and this can be seen first and foremost in the placing of cadres. Very many of our diplomats in, say, East European countries are former staffers of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, and that applies particularly to leadership personnel. At present places abroad are being sought urgently for a whole group of party workers who have been left without a job. For instance, former Politburo candidate member Razumovskiy has gone to Shanghai as consul general. Why this demotion, you may ask? Simple: The post of consul general, as distinct from ambassador, does not require confirmation by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Incidentally, about the very latest appointment—that of writer and Presidential Council member Ch.T. Aytmatov as ambassador to Luxembourg. Chingiz Torekulovich is a very good writer, and you will remember that [prerevolutionary Russian writers] Griboyedov and Tyutchev, in their day, worthily represented Russia's

interests abroad. But after all, both of them were professional diplomats. And diplomatic experience is of course very necessary for the job in Luxembourg now—from 1 January next year that country will be chairing the EEC, and will therefore be coordinating economic aid to the East European countries and the USSR.

[Pankratov] How far do you think Foreign Ministry information accords with reality?

[Romanovskiy] Basically, the Foreign Ministry is not an autonomous organization. It does not take decisions, it only provides a service for decisionmaking in the foreign policy sphere.

[Pankratov] Can the flow of information be blocked at the Foreign Ministry and go no further?

[Romanovskiy] It can, because the information comes in from missions abroad to the central apparatus, and is then submitted, or not submitted, to other organizations, primarily the CPSU Central Committee. Calls have repeatedly been made for our diplomats to form different opinions and make their own predictions of the development of the situation, but in practice this is far from the case. Unanimity of thought is part of our makeup.

Apart from the widespread Foreign Ministry fashion for tailored information, there are also examples of outright fabrication—as a rule, it is a question of reactions to our "peace initiatives" or visits and speeches by high-ranking figures of ours. And there you have the "unfeigned interest of the world public," the "heartfelt response"—in short, everything you could wish for...

[Pankratov] Will we ever learn the whole truth about the big politics "factory"? For instance, what lay behind Brezhnev's "peace initiatives"?

[Romanovskiy] I think it is unlikely that this will happen in the near future. This factory will be hidden from the public eye for a long time to come. Take Afghanistan, for instance; all our present "aid" to that country is a continuation of the Brezhnev line. As for what lay behind the aforesaid initiatives, here, I think, everything is clear—it was a question of a large-scale political bluff. And then let us not forget that people from Brezhnev's team are even now in posts of some importance in our foreign policy department.

[Pankratov] How do you assess events in Eastern Europe, particularly in Czechoslovakia, where you worked?

[Romanovskiy] Here too our lack of professionalism and the department's excessive ideologization played a part. Because we were oriented solely toward links with the ruling party and did not enter into contacts with representatives of other political movements—and that is why the "Prague autumn" of 1989 came as such a surprise to us.

[Pankratov] Do similar "surprises" lie in store for us in future?

[Romanovskiy] The classical formula declares that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. Unfortunately, this does not yet apply to us.

To this day, for instance, the adoption of a law on citizens' travel outside the country, such as exists in all civilized countries, is being postponed. We never have time for it—let people hijack planes and put the lives of dozens of citizens of our country at mortal risk, but we "cannot allow it!", as we say. I am touched by the "serious misgivings" about our citizens' lack of currency: What will our compatriots live on over there? A touching concern for the dignity of USSR citizens, against the background of the empty shelves of the stores in our own country?

A brain drain need only be feared by those who cannot or will not create prospects for every individual's growth in their own Fatherland, grant them the opportunity for creative work, and so forth.

We talk a lot about perestroika in our foreign policy and the primacy of the moral principle, but do these assertions always coincide with our real actions outside our country? Take, for instance, the persistent desire to continue at all costs to grant aid to Afghanistan, the visible avoidance of giving a direct moral assessment of events in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, the patent desire to take refuge in the UN Security Council decision on the Persian Gulf conflict...

[Pankratov] Well, Vladimir, I cannot agree with you—some very important steps have in fact been taken in the sphere of our foreign policy recently.

[Romanovskiy] I would not be too euphoric about that. In my opinion it was not the art of diplomacy, but our disastrous economic situation that forced us to take a more or less sober look at the foreign policy situation that is taking shape for our country.

[Pankratov] It is no secret that intelligence staffers operate actively under diplomatic cover...

[Romanovskiy] It is indeed no secret to anyone in the world, except us. This practice is typical of the institutions abroad of any country that has representatives of such departments among its employees, but what distinguishes us is the fact that our organs' activity is also oriented toward our own citizens, because they are assigned the role of "the party's sword of retribution."

[Pankratov] Do staffers abroad receive, for instance, a big wage—people say they are living in clover there?

[Romanovskiy] As far as I know, the ministry has several thousand staffers—that is far more than its foreign counterparts or our own ordinary ministries. As for wages, they are in two parts—in foreign currency and rubles. I, for instance, received 7,000 Czechoslovak korunas, about 200 U.S. dollars, and 150 rubles a month.

Plus a car paid for by the state, 50 square meters of housing, and free medical services. But all this is regarded as a very modest level of income in the Foreign Ministry, because the value of a similar post for our diplomatic colleagues in Western and developing countries is equivalent to approximately 1,000-1,100 U.S. dollars.

But this topic is the source of the widespread mythology about "life abroad." It is indisputable that there can be no doubt about the striking contrast in living standards for our people here at home and over there. But an even greater contrast arises when you compare the living standard of staffers at our institutions abroad with the living standard of citizens of the countries where we are working. The wage of our consul in France, for instance, is virtually equal to the minimum permitted wage in that country, and moreover that is a guaranteed minimum wage.

Furthermore, and this is often forgotten, the atmosphere of a "fortress under siege" which existed for a long time in our country is automatically transferred to our life over there. The atmosphere of the life of Soviet colonies—that is what we ourselves call them—because of the prevalence of bans, suspicion, and mere rumors, only serves to degrade the human personality.

[Pankratov] Is a reform of the Foreign Ministry possible in the immediate future, do you think?

[Romanovskiy] I am absolutely convinced that nothing can be done with the present Foreign Ministry, because it is an integral part of our political system. That is why I left the department. Changes can only take place under the influence of reforms throughout our society. And first of all that means new people joining the Foreign Ministry. We should begin, I believe, by publishing the Foreign Ministry budget, then discussing it and amending it according to the effectiveness of the department's work and the country's real needs. I am confident that at a 50-70 percent reduction in the number of Foreign Ministry staffers is needed...

Government Studies Appeals on Legal Conflicts

PM0711103090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Nov 90 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has been receiving numerous appeals from labor collectives and leaders of enterprises and organizations and from private citizens over the fact that republic and local organs of power and management have recently been adopting legislative acts and resolutions which are mutually exclusive and often contradict USSR legislation.

These appeals stress that the lack of correspondence between union and republic laws puts enterprises in extremely difficult conditions, acutely complicates the

process of compiling plans and budgets at all levels, and may lead to the complete disruption of economic ties and mutual relations between enterprises and bank and financial organs, a further decline in production, including of consumer goods, and a fall in the population's living standard.

These questions were studied at a USSR Council of Ministers Presidium session 3 November. The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium noted that the fundamental problems of delegating powers in the legislation and management sphere must be resolved when concluding the new Union Treaty. Until that treaty is concluded, however, all organizations, officials, and citizens are obliged to strictly observe the provisions of the existing USSR Constitution and laws adopted in accordance with it, USSR presidential decrees, and other acts of the supreme bodies of state power and management of the USSR.

The USSR Government expresses the confidence that this will help to prevent the development of destructive processes in society, promote the stabilization of the economy, and help the country to overcome the crisis as soon as possible.

Speakers at Federation Council Session Listed

PM0611163990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
3 Nov 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[TASS report: "USSR Federation Council Session"]

[Excerpts] A session of the USSR Federation Council was held 2 November under the chairmanship of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. [passage omitted]

The Federation Council session was addressed by R.I. Khasbulatov, L.M. Kravchuk, N.I. Dementey, I.A. Karimov, U.K. Karamanov, A.N. Mutalibov, M.I. Snegur, A.A. Akayev, K.M. Makhkamov, S.N. Muradov, M.G. Rakhimov, M.Sh. Shaymiyev, M.Ye. Nikolayev, T.A. Yeshimbetova, D.G. Zavgayev, V.N. Stepanov, A.I. Lukyanov, R.N. Nishanov, N.I. Ryzhkov, V.F. Yakovlev, and V.N. Kudryavtsev.

Prisoner Freed; Others Stage Hunger Strike

PM0611162490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Nov 90 p 1

[Yu. Besspalov report, with INTERFAX footnote: "'Prisoner of Conscience' Freed"]

[Text] There are no political prisoners in the USSR. It would be nice to believe that this propaganda cliché will soon become a reality. On 1 November, with the active participation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Human Rights Committee, one more "prisoner of conscience" was freed—V. Kazachkov, who was sentenced to 15 years for "treason to the Motherland." He was pardoned 20 days before

the end of his term. Kazachkov's case is now at the Russian Supreme Court for review under the oversight procedure.

According to various lists, there are now between 16 and 140 political prisoners in the USSR awaiting an objective review of their cases.

A Propos

Yesterday seven prisoners at correctional labor institution VS-389s35, which is in Perm Oblast, declared a one-day hunger strike. An INTERFAX correspondent reports that the colony is the only one in the USSR where people convicted of treason to the Motherland, espionage, and other state crimes are held. There are 16 of them in all. By holding the hunger strike the seven people involved gave a "reminder" of their demand to be recognized as political prisoners.

Published Appeal to Youth Questioned

PM0611140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Union Edition p 3

[I. Ovchinnikova "Rejoinder": "Without Fists!"]

[Text] On the front page of its No 132 issue PIONER-SKAYA PRAVDA has published an appeal to the Fatherland's young patriots from G. Beregovoy, commander of the all-union young army movement, and V. Pesterev, chief of the movement's Main Headquarters. Any father and any mother would eagerly subscribe to some of its lines. Who indeed would fail to support the appeal to render whatever aid they can to war and labor veterans (one wants to add—irrespective of their former services, but simply because they are old and helpless people). And to put monuments and memorial plaques in order is also a good thing: In general order never hurts anyone.

But when youths are insistently asked, in a tone that is almost an order, "in collaboration with servicemen, reserve servicemen, and law enforcement workers to set up 7 and 8 November memory posts near memorial sites and monuments to the heroes and defenders of the revolution," one very much wants to inquire: But have you asked their parents? Are they prepared in the present unsettled times for their sons and daughters to take part in something like that? Are you 100 percent certain that "collaboration with servicemen" will be entirely peaceful? Particularly if you consider that the appeal for this collaboration is preceded by a direct indication of those from whom the memorial sites must be protected. From those, in particular, who are trying "to prevent the celebration of the 73d anniversary of Great October."

Tell me how the quite recent proposal from the CPSU Central Committee secretariat that children should not be involved in political disputes combines with this strange appeal, in fact an order from the army, albeit a children's army, which directly pushes young boys and girls toward just such a dispute? Can no one see where

such orders are leading? Are there not many lessons already taught by our perestroika times?

Listen, let's stop and take a breath and agree at least on the main thing: Let us protect the children. PIONER-SKAYA PRAVDA is now published under a new slogan: "For the Motherland, good, and justice." Wonderful! Only please let the good be without the use of fists.

Jewish Magazine To Be Published in Russian

LD0611072690 Moscow TASS in English 0708 GMT
6 Nov 90

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow November 6 TASS—"The Moscow Jewish literary magazine SOVETISCH HEIMLAND (SOVIET MOTHERLAND) will be published in Yiddish and Russian, beginning from next December," magazine executive secretary Gennadiy Eistrakh told a news conference here on Monday.

"The idea of publishing the magazine also in Russian was prompted by numerous readers' letters," he added.

"Russian-language readers will find verse and prose in the magazine, as well as articles on Jewish culture, works by literary critics, historians, art specialists, and bibliographers."

"The magazine will also publish a chronicle of Jewish cultural activities in the USSR and abroad." Readers will also receive YUNGWALD, a youth supplement to the magazine, which will be also published in Yiddish and Russian.

The magazine was launched in 1961. According to specialists, the more than 300 issues printed since that time are the fullest collection of Soviet Jewish prose, poetry, and the drama in the USSR. The magazine printed numerous works by Jewish classical authors and foreign Jewish literature.

The magazine was the first to publish works by Sholom Aleichem, Mendeleyev, Moyshe Sforim and other prominent writers. Leading poet and public figure Aron Vergelis has headed the magazine since its foundation.

It is distributed in the USSR and 20 other countries.

New Independent Newspaper in Magnitogorsk

LD0611021990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
2230 GMT 5 Nov 90

[Text] A new newspaper, PROVINTSIYA [PROVINCE], has appeared in Magnitogorsk. An address to readers stresses that this will be an independent weekly publishing truthful, objective information about economic, political, and spiritual life in society, as well as information about events abroad. The editorial staff intends to conclude agreements with various independent news agencies. Along with material on the economy and politics, the newspaper plans to publish artistic

works by authors living in the province and articles on the history of prerevolutionary Russia.

RODINA Editor Describes Main Objectives

LD0511203390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 5 November carries a two-minute report on the "Vremya" newscast in the "Journals and Newspapers 1991" slot by correspondent M. Baranova.

Baranova asks Vladimir Petrovich Dolmatov, editor in chief of the journal RODINA to describe the journal to viewers. Dolmatov says:

"Our journal is one and a half years old and it is the first, and so far the only, popular history journal."

The journal has 500,000 subscribers so far and its main objective is one of reconciliation with the past. This is reflected, he says, in its material. He outlines some of the historical topics covered by the journal, mentioning a "sensational" article in the upcoming issue on a meeting between Stalin and Hitler in the thirties. When asked which publishing house puts out RODINA, Dolmatov says:

"The journal was set up as a publication of the PRAVDA newspaper, but evidently for ideological motives we were kicked out of there and now our journal has recently become a publication of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet."

He notes that the editorial board includes well-known names: Petrakov, the writers (Mozhayev) and Vasil Bykov, and the journalist (Vasiliy Peskov). Dolmatov outlines some of the topics planned for future issues.

MOSCOW NEWS Profiles New Appointments

PM0611151290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 11-18 Nov 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "MN: New Appointments"]

[Text] Stepan Kiselev—a new deputy MN [MOSCOW NEWS] editor-in-chief. Until last week Kiselev, a psychologist by education, was a political commentator for Komsomolskaya Pravda. Before taking up journalism, Stepan worked as a sociologist, then as a manager of a rural community centre. At age 34 he is not affiliated with any party.

Tatyana Menshikova—head of our newly established political reform desk, a graduate of the foreign languages department of the Omsk Teachers' Training Institute and the journalism department of Moscow University. Before accepting this new post, she worked for the Moscow newspaper Sovetskaya Kultura, where she was head of the politics and culture department.

Vladimir Orlov—a graduate of MGIMO (the Moscow State Institute of International Relations); speaks fluent English and Spanish. His first publication in MN

resulted in his appointment as a correspondent for our political reform desk. His article on the political situation in Cuba brought him recognition among professionals.

Olga Bychkova—is now an analyst for our political reform desk. A graduate of the journalism department at Ural University. Was on staff with a factory newspaper and Moskovskiy Komsomolets, where she was nicknamed "the iron lady" while working as a political commentator.

Marina Podzorova is also a new correspondent for the political reform desk. She has never been involved in politics, and prefers general themes. She wants to combine the latter with politics. A graduate of the journalism department at Moscow University, she worked for a local newspaper in Balashikha (a city near Moscow), then for MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS.

MOSCOW NEWS on Newsprint Availability

PM0611151490 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 11-18 Nov 90 p 5

[Feature comprising Leonid Prudovskiy report and commentary by Anatoliy Lukashov, Vice Chairman of the USSR State Planning committee: "A Paper Problem"—last three paragraphs are Lukashov commentary—]

[Text] *According to information available from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of the Press, the situation with the state order for paper ensures a monopoly on glasnost for those who have always enjoyed it.*

Until recently more than 50 percent of the total paper produced in the country was distributed among public organizations, ministries and departments. Thus, the State Planning Committee supplied about 500,000 tons (at a low state price) to the Managing Department of the CPSU Central Committee, about 150,000 tons to the Defence Ministry, whereas all the newspapers of Russia (which didn't receive any newsprint from central party sources) were supplied only with about 60,000.

This situation, despite the fivefold drop in the circulation of the party press, will remain throughout 1991. At any rate, the State Planning Committee plans the paper quotas, as previously. Only 15,000 tons were added for Russia's newspapers.

The situation is nearly the same with the distribution of paper for books and magazines. Ordinary publishers receive an average of 2 percent in a five-year period for the growth of printed copies, whereas between 1980 to 1985 alone Pravda publishing house received enough paper for a nearly fourfold rise in circulation, and by 1990 its editions totalled 350 million copies, each in 10 signatures, whereas all editions in Russia make 140 million copies, mainly manuals and children's books.

All in all, all the republics of the USSR have only about a third of the paper used for printing, or 363,962,000

tons, whereas Pravda alone has 254,813,000 tons, the Managing Department of the CPSU Central Committee—18,662,000 tons, the USSR Defence Ministry—19,170,000 tons, the Managing Department of the Komsomol Central Committee—57,424,000 tons, the ministries which do not have publishing houses—60,690,000 tons, the Politizdat and Plakat publishers—32,301,000 tons. But all the publishing houses of Russia get only about 65,000 tons.

Such are the facts for 1989. At the RSFSR Ministry of the Press it is known that these figures won't undergo considerable changes. Officially the monopoly on glasnost has been stopped, but the monopoly on paper remains.

One commercial question arises: at what prices will the CPSU Central Committee sell the paper it was supplied at state prices? In fact, with the drop in circulation of party publications quite a large amount of paper will become available.

Leonid Prudovskiy *This was the view from the Ministry of Russia. But below is how Anatoliy Lukashov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, comments on the situation.*

That "the situation is nearly the same" is a very approximate statement. For example, in 1991 the Managing Department of the CPSU Central Committee will receive only 116,800 tons of newsprint. Can it be compared with those 500,000 tons mentioned in Russia's ministry? In addition, I can't understand why only those publications which are controlled by this ministry are regarded as Russia's? Isn't Pravda read in Russia? As for ministries which do not have publishing houses, or the Defence Ministry, the Centre must first take care of defence, transport and so on—that is why it has been delegated powers. Naturally, we shall supply paper from the state order in keeping with this provision. Besides, if a ministry is without a publishing house, that doesn't mean it doesn't need paper. If you buy a refrigerator, it comes with instructions, doesn't it?

So, everyone is defending their interests, but who is defending readers' interests?

Internal Affairs Ministry Seeks Budget Increase

LD0511221990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 5 Nov 90

[Summary] Soviet militia day is on 10 November. Today, a Moscow news conference was devoted to its affairs and problems. Journalists were told that for next year the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has asked the state for 20 billion rubles. The 11 billion rubles on which the army of defenders of law and order exists at the moment is clearly insufficient. If the necessary funds are provided, they will be spent on increasing the number of militiamen, on increasing the pay of rank and file members and junior commanders, and on improving technical security.

Komsomol Leader Zyukin Interviewed

PM0611150590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Vladimir Zyukin, All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League leader, by N. Anisin; place and date not given: "Protection Plus Participation"]

[Text] [Anisin] It is the birthday of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] today. How does the birthday celebrator feel in our confused times?

[Zyukin] I shall answer the question like this: The Komsomol which used to exist and to which everyone had grown accustomed does not exist at all any more. The Komsomol now is a completely different organization from before. It is too early to speak of its health, it is going through a period of establishment. But its face and its spirit are already different.

At the Komsomol congress in April we decided that the Komsomol needed a federative structure. Now each republican organization is elaborating its own charter and program. It is independent in selecting both tactics and strategy.

[Anisin] So the Komsomol now consists of separate, totally unconnected, Komsomol "principalities?"

[Zyukin] Not exactly. The different organizations are linked by one common principle. Virtually all leagues in the republics have stated that their main task is to render aid and support to young people and to protect them socially. Consolidation is proceeding on this basis.

[Anisin] If I have understood you correctly, the Komsomol has become a depoliticized and deideologized organization?

[Zyukin] It is more correct to say that the Komsomol is ceasing to be an organization with a single monolithic policy and an ideology universal for all. Until its next congress, that is until next spring, the Komsomol will remain a broad public organization which include structures with diverse political and ideological orientations.

[Anisin] The position and authority of any organization depend on its leaders. Who is who today among the Komsomol leaders?

[Zyukin] For the last three or four years the Komsomol has seen the rapid development of the applied services, so to speak—the youth housing complex, scientific and technical and cultural centers, commercial associations. Those young people who were willing and able to engage in specific affairs have been able to make themselves heard in them. These people have succeeded in winning a good reputation. And they have now been elected to leading organs of various levels. They are united by the fact that they want to do work which is of specific benefit to young people.

[Anisin] What you have said also applies to your colleagues, to Central Committee secretaries?

[Zyukin] In general, yes. We are all geared toward practical deeds. If you like you can think of us as pragmatic politicians.

[Anisin] What has the new Central Committee team succeeded in doing?

[Zyukin] Congresses have been held in eight republics. A federative Komsomol organization has begun to take shape.

A draft law on youth has been prepared with the Central Committee's participation. And at the recent plenum we adopted a package of proposals addressed to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics. They set forth the measures which in our view must be taken for young people's social protection.

We intend to combine legislative aid for young people with organizational aid. The Central Committee has reorganized the Supreme Komsomol School as the Youth Institute. Cadres for the social protection services will be trained in it.

The Central Committee has earmarked 100 million rubles from its funds for the creation of the "Social Protection" information center.

We are creating programs for young specialists' industrial training abroad. A fund of 20 million rubles has been set up for international exchanges.

[Anisin] Is there anything impeding the Central Committee's work?

[Zyukin] Almost every day we are shaken by the problems caused by national conflicts. Eruptions of these conflicts are destroying many plans.

[Anisin] Has there been a change in the Komsomol Central Committee's relations with the CPSU Central Committee? If tomorrow the party were to say "you must," would the Komsomol reply: "Yes, sir?"

[Zyukin] I do not think that the party will now start to issue an iron-hard "you must!" to us. According to its new role in society, in certain cases, it must make this demand, but only on itself. But we are prepared to examine and discuss any proposal from the party. We are forming what are in general relations of partnership with the new leadership of the party Central Committee. We cooperate where our interests coincide.

[Anisin] And what in your opinion is the CPSU's youth policy?

[Zyukin] So far only the embryonic forms of this policy can be seen in the party. It is being conducted in a spirit of indestructible routine. The 28th CPSU Congress adopted a special resolution: This must be done for young people, that stance must be adopted. Everything

indicated was correct and necessary. But three months were needed for the responsible comrades to mature to the point where they signed a draft plan for fulfilling this resolution. Then a long time was spent choosing the moment for the draft to be examined in the Secretariat. I very much fear that when the resolution begins to be implemented it will no longer be necessary to anyone. You can only have success with young people by working with them daily. Here you must have a keen sense of the circumstances of what is happening and react swiftly to everything and you must be in constant contact with the expressers of the most mass-based sentiments.

But now the party is undertaking youth actions in my view exclusively to create the semblance that it has a policy among young people.

[Anisin] What are the Komsomol Central Committee's relations with the new, recently created, parties, movements, and associations?

[Zyukin] We have a coordination committee for relations with youth organizations in operation. We are trying not only to conduct dialogue with each organization but also to launch mutually advantageous cooperation. As for the parties which have emerged, so far we have neither dialogue nor common business with them. But I think that in the long time we must cooperate with the whole spectrum of political forces.

[Anisin] You vision of the future Komsomol?

[Zyukin] I should like the Komsomol to become a multicolored, free, kindly organization and, most importantly, an organization which knows how to help young people, that is to spare them excessive burdens and support them in their self-assertion. That organization needs to take an active part in political life and steer its own line, proceeding from general human values. It is true that it is regrettable to put the same ideological blinkers on it. Before the young person entering life all "isms" should be equal. And when he has matured he will choose the correct path himself.

Editor Explains Znaniye-Paper 'Separation'

PM0611145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Nov 90 Union Edition p 6

[Interview with Vladislav Andreyevich Starkov, chief editor of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, by unnamed IZVESTIYA correspondent under "Details for IZVESTIYA" rubric: "From Whom Has ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Divorced Itself"; date and place not given]

[Text] As already announced, the popular weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY has been registered as an autonomous publication independent of the Znaniye [Knowledge] society. Not everyone has reacted unequivocally to the newspaper's "separation" from this organization. Readers of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and members of the Znaniye society have the following question:

From whom has ARGUMENTY I FAKTY divorced itself? From a humane organization with its origins in the enlightened traditions of the Russian intelligentsia or from the ruling hierarchy which has prevented the organization from developing normally over the last few years? This was the subject of our correspondent's conversation with the weekly's chief editor, V. Starkov.

[Starkov] The answer is quite obvious. No one will deny that the very nature and style of our newspaper's work accord with the spirit of objective provision of information and enlightenment characteristic of similar organizations. We want to maintain these humane traditions.

The Znaniye society has a considerable number of problems, and we are ready to take part in resolving them. For instance, the Polytechnical Museum and the lecture hall, which was, incidentally, built with money provided by the Russian intelligentsia more than 100 years ago in the very center of Moscow, is literally falling to pieces and needs major reconstruction. We would, probably, invest funds in restoring the printing base and building a new House of Knowledge... But this has not, after all, been done in practice, and the board is squandering all the money that is earned with such difficulty with unusual frivolity—and no one knows on what.

[IZVESTIYA] A great deal has been said about the poor material base, but the society's leadership cites objective difficulties and general stagnation...

[Starkov] It has never raised sensitive issues trenchantly or publicly with the government or with the public. At best we saw our chairman, in particular, decorously and submissively sitting out several convocations in succession within the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. But this did not result in an increase either in motorized transport for lecturers, paper for the requisite publications, equipment, premises, nothing... Very well, there are no stocks, no quotas, I do not know what else there is, but leaving aside material things, name just one brilliant idea from the leadership that has animated society. You can't do it.

[IZVESTIYA] There is a great deal of resentment regarding the scorn voiced, in some people's opinion, in the editorial article in No 41 of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY regarding the bureaucracy and the apparatus. With wages of 100-120 rubles people simply do not want to rank themselves among the apparatus, which holds up everything and is striving to retain its existing position.

[Starkov] I agree, we cannot divide up the apparatus and the nonapparatus, the bureaucrat and the radical on the principle of where they get their wages.

Of course, the society's staff worker who is employed in organizing a scientist's speech to an audience, finding premises, collecting people, publicity, buying railroad tickets, meeting and seeing people off, and so on can hardly be described as an apparatchik. He is an organizer, this is a manager's job—necessary and indisputable—he is an executive in the good sense of the word.

Fortunately, they are in the majority in the Znaniye society. But there are staff workers with powers of command on whom a great deal depends. By no means all of them are active people. They live off their former services, titles, and degrees. The Znaniye society represents, as it were, one badge in a row of decorations on their chest, another "insignia on the shoulder strap," a "chevron on the sleeve." This scientific bureaucracy has been generated by our system, its stagnant period. There are not that many of them but they are very active, conceited, arrogant, and elitist; they are assigned to a separate "cherished detachment" and, mark you, they will not even mentally associate themselves with the intelligentsia (medics, teachers, engineers) who form the bulk of the Znaniye society, and treat them in an arrogant and disrespectful manner.

[IZVESTIYA] What, in your view, should the society do today? After all, you, Vladislav Andreyevich, are in addition a member of its board?

[Starkov] Of course, we must first change the society's statutes at an extraordinary congress and bring them into line with the new law on public formations.

Second, in civilized societies the leadership has resigned in such crisis conditions (and Znaniye is in a sorry state). If it does not want to do this, it must be reelected. That is the only way to establish a mechanism that would enable democratic elections to be held, since the incumbent leadership will try, if not to hang onto their posts, then to keep their positions in another guise.

Last, the third condition which may also be the first: It is not only all organizations but also individuals and the intelligentsia as a whole that should be given freedom for creative activity in informational and educational work.

The Znaniye society must be a free association of people and organizations who have freely joined forces. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is also prepared to take part in this association's work. Then the newspaper's collective will be sure that our efforts and funds are really channeled into the social and cultural revival of the country.

Sociopolitical Commission's Tasks Viewed

91UN0190C Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 30 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by V. Yurlov: "The Difficult Path to Agreement—From the Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Sociopolitical Commission"]

[Text] Moscow—*The first meeting of the Sociopolitical Commission of the CPSU Central Committee has been held, at which the basic provisions of the commission and its primary tasks were discussed. Many interesting suggestions were made concerning questions of developing tactics for interaction with other social formations. A group was created to prepare recommendations for the CPSU Central Committee.*

The meeting was conducted by V. Kuptsov, chairman of the commission, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

A couple of words about the commission itself. Party veterans may know that the first commission of the CPSU Central Committee (it was called the Commission on Questions of Ideology, Culture, and International Ties) was approved by the Presidium of the Central Committee in January 1958. It lasted for eight years. It is typical that in the decree of the Politburo concerning its elimination the following formula was given: "For purposes of increasing the role and responsibility of departments of the CPSU Central Committee it is considered inexpedient to continue to have the foreign political and ideological commission of the CPSU Central Committee..."

This is a telling fact: A step was taken toward elevating the apparatus. Everyone can see where it led... But the party was aware that it had somehow been displaced from decisive positions, its sociopolitical function had slipped away, and it "did not wish" it to be the main one in the activity of party organizations, and from bottom to top at that.

The Commission of the CPSU Central Committee created in 1988 after the September plenum tried to overcome past mistakes, as V. Kuptsov reminded the group. Unfortunately, the burden of old experience had tipped the scales. They were left as essentially consultative organs and not the organizers of party work. The Central Committee did not allow past commissions to completely carry out the task of democratization of the extremely centralized leadership or show independence in decisions or freedom of thinking.

So it turned out that the party, the political organization, did not have the opportunity to delineate its main function—which was sociopolitical and which was dissolved into others that were not the main ones.

As I related the statement of the CPSU Central Committee secretary in a version close to the text, the question may have occurred to the reader: Everyone has long been accustomed to the fact that a new broom sweeps differently. But what does this have to do with the "poor peasant"?

Indeed, even if the commission that was created is approached from these positions, its meetings do not put more meat in the stores. But that is not its function. And since we are trying as hard as we can to break the party of its old habit of commanding the economy, let us take seriously the process of its searching for its place in the life of the society.

If we look at the matter this way—and the author of these notes is a proponent of precisely this approach—we will have to be sympathetic to the formulation of the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the main task of the Socioeconomic Commission. I quote: "To help the CPSU Central Committee as the

party's highest collective organ in the development and practical implementation of a scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics in the sociopolitical sphere. The commission is an organic part of the CPSU Central Committee and performs its functions within the limits of the authority granted to it in the area of interaction with sociopolitical associations and work in the soviets."

Does it turn out that what comes to the fore is the art of political maneuvering? A search for allies? Work with sociopolitical organizations, above all the soviets? Yes, precisely. The appointment of the commission, as was repeatedly emphasized during the course of the meeting, is to help the CPSU Central Committee in the development and practical implementation of a scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics in the sociopolitical sphere.

Regardless of how complicated the role of the CPSU may have been, in the anticommunist hysteria unleashed by certain groups and movements the party course toward perestroika and the consolidation of all healthy forces in society remains unchanged. To be honest, I do not very much like such clichés as "healthy forces," "destructive elements," and so forth. They are not much better than the favorite phrases of the opponents of the CPSU. But a fact is still a fact. Having declared itself at its 28th congress to be a party of civil harmony, the CPSU confirmed that it is objectively united with the majority of new forces by the idea of revitalization of our society and the idea of perestroika. And this is the question of questions.

"Our disputes with new movements and parties sometimes have to do not with essentials but with labels," says a commission member, S. Goryushkin. "When I learned about the range of movements I saw that we could support many of them and I could not understand why the leaders of certain parties say that they do not wish to cooperate with the CPSU. There are probably certain points where our positions overlap. We must find them because it is still difficult for new parties which are taken up with themselves to do this. The main thing is that we should not be in a hurry to condemn them."

"Difficult as it may be for us, we must cooperate with other parties and movements," another member of the commission, A. Anipkin, supported this idea. "Of course we cannot agree with all points of their programs; some of them are simply unacceptable. But nonetheless we must move toward one another. In Volgograd Oblast we signed an agreement with 12 associations. And it was on 10 points. One of the points is an appeal to put an end to rallies and demonstrations. Everybody is tired of them!"

And so in the country there is an unusual political situation that was unthinkable even five years ago. On the initiative of the CPSU, which has proclaimed political pluralism, there have appeared dozens of influential sociopolitical movements, hundreds of new parties, and thousands of various kinds of independent associations and organizations. A real political hodgepodge! And here

lies the most real danger of anticommunism. And here too is the unwillingness to cooperate with the CPSU even when their programs are obviously similar.

"In order to arrange relations with other parties, we must more energetically draw thinking youth to us," said a commission member, A. Volskiy. "Or else it will turn out that the people in the new parties will be smarter than we are. Take the policy statement of the congress of Democratic Russia. I recall the principles contained in it. The first is the priority of the rights and interests of the individual. When has the CPSU ever been against that? On the contrary, it itself has proclaimed the priority of human values and the interests of the individual. The second principle is the right of nations to self-determination. This is a generally known Marxist slogan. The third: While we have been babbling about how best to define the future market, they have boldly written: A social market economy. Of course it is their name that attracts people. And finally—social protection. And—ideological tolerance. What can anyone say against that? Now all we need to do is take it and include it in a decree of the CPSU Central Committee. There are our points of agreement for you."

How can one fail to recall the witty warning of Boris Oleynik here: "Communists must clearly remember that representatives of the 'new wave' have nothing against taking our ideas and, having given them a slightly different twist, passing them off as their own. Thus they have latched on to perestroika, having taken the idea from Gorbachev and other initiators of revitalization."

Many members of the commission shared this idea. But there was no unanimity at the meeting, to say nothing of good humor. Everyone had the opportunity to defend his own position.

"With whom should I join forces today?" commission member V. Tatsiy asked heatedly, "perhaps with the Ukrainian nationalists who have told me directly that they will fight us until there is not a single communist left in the Ukraine?..."

Questions, questions. Prickly, unruly thoughts, unexpected analysis of situations that are familiar to everyone... The work of the commission is not restricted to just meetings and discussions of problems; it will be work on a regular basis.

CPSU Proposes Draft Regulations on Referendums

91UN0188A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian

29 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

["Draft Regulations: On the Procedure for Holding Discussions and Referendums in the CPSU"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] These proposed draft regulations were drawn up as directed by the 28th CPSU Congress. The Secretariat of the Central Committee and Presidium of the CPSU Central Control Commission request that Communists

and anyone interested in this document send their comments and proposals directly to the Central Committee or CPSU Central Control Commission, or to another party committee.

1. In accordance with CPSU rules regarding pressing questions of social and party life in the framework of individual party organizations, Communist Parties of the Union republics, and the CPSU as a whole, discussions and referendums may take place as a means of exercising in practical fashion the authority of the party masses and effecting democratization of the party and the adoption of well-reasoned decisions supported by a majority of Communists.

Discussions and referendums are conducted on questions of principled significance dealing with the development of society, CPSU activity, CPSU internal life, and drafts of important resolutions, including alternative resolutions. A referendum can also be conducted to decide an issue of dispute arising between a higher- and lower-echelon party organ.

2. Discussions and referendums (of a general-party variety—in the CPSU as a whole or Union republic Communist Party; and local—in the republic organization of an autonomous republic, in kray, oblast, okrug, city, or rayon party organizations) take place at the initiative of the appropriate leading or executive organ, or upon the demand of party organizations which encompass at least one-third the membership of the appropriate (parent) organization. When the question of referendum arises, demands for such are considered adopted if they are supported by at least half the members of the appropriate party organizations or their leading organs.

3. In adopting a decision on the conduct of a discussion, the leading or executive organ formulates the question introduced for deliberation, presents points which elucidate its content, and establishes the time frame and procedure for examination of proposals and comments arising during the course of the discussion. To organize the work and generalize the results of a discussion, a commission is formed by party organ resolution consisting of representatives of local party organizations and various platforms.

4. The conduct of discussions is supported by party organizations. Issues presented for the discussion are deliberated at party meetings (conferences), sessions of party committees, and other forums. Party clubs, theoretical seminars, and discussion centers may be introduced in this regard and Communists have the right to unite based on the platform during discussions.

Party organizations ensure that both CPSU members and nonmembers enjoy free participation in the discussion. Each discussion participant has the right to express his opinion at a party conference, in the party press and other mass media, and to direct his proposal or commentary to any party organ. He may familiarize himself with any alternative proposals and obtain necessary consultation or explanation.

5. The party mass media publish documents under discussion, as well as the opinions, proposals, and comments of discussion participants, and materials of party organizations on these issues. They shed light on the course of the discussion and provide information on its results.

Materials on matters presented for general party discussion (in the CPSU) are published in PRAVDA and other publications of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the local party press.

6. Party committees and the party mass media generalize opinions, proposals, and comments expressed by discussion participants and submit them to a commission formed by the party organ that announced the discussion.

Based on the materials it receives, the commission produces a detailed exposition of discussion results and presents them to the party organ. These results are published in generalized form in the party press. In order to obtain a broader conception of the course and nature of the discussion, the commission may conduct a sociological study (poll).

The party organ deliberates on the results of the discussion and informs Communists as to decisions made in this regard.

Results of the general party discussion (in the CPSU) are examined by a CPSU congress, all-Union CPSU conference, or unified plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, regarding which CPSU members are informed.

7. In making the decision on appointing a referendum, the leading or executive organ indicates, in a resolution on this question, the time frame for conduct of the referendum, designation of the draft document (documents) or specific issue of social or party life submitted for referendum, and procedure for conducting the referendum and forming the appropriate commissions.

The referendum is scheduled to begin not sooner than one month and not later than two months following adoption of the resolution on its conduct.

A report on the conduct of a referendum is delivered to Communists within three days. The report states the time frame for conduct of the referendum and gives the full text of draft documents or the substance of the issue on which voting takes place.

Questions submitted for referendum are subject to preliminary discussion according to the procedure established by these regulations for discussions (points 4 and 5).

8. Commissions are formed for the preparation and conduct of a referendum:

- central commission in the CPSU for conducting the referendum;
- commission of Union republic Communist Party;

- commission of the republic organization of an autonomous republic, of kray, oblast, okrug, rayon, or city party organization;
- commission of the primary party organization.

Commissions are formed not later than one month prior to the conduct of a referendum at joint plenums of the appropriate party and control organs, as a rule. The chairman, his deputy, and the secretary are elected at the commission's session.

9. The central commission in the CPSU for conducting the referendum:

- exercises control over the course of preparations for the referendum and examines matters of its organization;
- draws up the sample ballot, forms of other documentation, and procedures for their preparation and disposition;
- examines statements and complaints of improper actions on the part of commissions in conducting the referendum, and makes final decisions on these matters;
- determines the procedure for presenting voting record results;
- ascertains the results of voting in a referendum and publishes these in the party press.

10. The commission of the Union republic Communist Party, of the republic organization of autonomous republic, and of kray, oblast, okrug, rayon, or city party organization:

- fulfills the functions of the central commission during conduct of a referendum in the Communist Party of a Union republic or other appropriate party organizations;
- ensures that ballots are prepared for voting and delivered to the commissions of the primary party organizations;
- examines proposals of party organizations on voting procedure, taking their circumstances into account, and makes decisions on such matters;
- examines statements and complaints of improper actions on the part of lower-echelon commissions and makes decisions on these matters;
- monitors the observance of time frame considerations in the conduct of voting in a referendum and the accomplishment of other requirements established upon referendum appointment;
- tallies up the results of referendum voting in the appropriate party organization and provides this information to the higher-level commission.

11. The commission of a primary party organization:

- draws up a listing of CPSU members for voting on the referendum;
- informs CPSU members as to the time and place of voting;
- ensures preparation of the voting premises;
- organizes the voting in the primary party organization;

- examines statements and complaints on matters of conducting the referendum and organizing the voting in the primary party organization, and makes decisions in this regard;
- tallies up voting results in a referendum and submits the results to the higher commission.

In party organizations consisting of up to 15 individuals, commission functions may be accomplished by the secretary of the party organization and one other Communist, at the organization's direction.

12. Commission sessions are considered valid if at least two-thirds of their composition participate in them. Decisions are made by a majority vote of the total composition of the commission, under open voting procedure. Commission members not in agreement with its decision have the right to express a special opinion, which is attached to the record in written form.

Commissions operate publicly and openly. Representatives of party organizations, the press, radio, and television have the right to attend their sessions.

13. The ballot used in voting contains the title of the draft resolution or other issue being presented for referendum. The ballot may also include separate draft resolution provisions for which the opinion of CPSU members must be ascertained. In all instances, the ballot contains two types of response: "for" and "against."

14. The referendum is conducted by secret voting procedure in the primary party organizations on dates and during hours established by the appropriate commissions.

Each CPSU member casts his personal vote. Voting on others' behalf is not permitted. Ballots are issued based on the listing, upon presentation of party card. A referendum participant completes his voting ballot by crossing out one of the responses, allowing "for" or "against" to remain, and dropping the ballot into the ballot box.

15. Ballot boxes are opened by the commission of the primary party organization after conclusion of the voting. Based on the ballots in the boxes, the commission ascertains: the total number of CPSU members participating in the voting; the number of votes "for" and "against" adoption of the draft resolution or other issue presented for referendum; the number of ballots found to be invalid.

Ballots declared invalid are those which are not of the prescribed form, and those from which it is impossible to determine the position taken by the referendum participant. In instances of doubt arising as to the validity of a ballot, the question is resolved by the commission through voting procedure.

The results of voting in the primary party organization are entered in the record, which is then delivered to the higher-level commission within 24 hours of conclusion of the voting. Statements and complaints received, as

well as the decisions made by the commission in their regard, are attached to the record.

16. Based on the records of commissions of primary party organizations, higher-level commissions tally up voting results in city, rayon, okrug, oblast, and kray party organizations, and in republic party organizations of autonomous republics and the Communist Parties of Union republics, and they finalize the official record according to established format.

Higher-level commissions may declare the voting in a party organization to be invalid due to infractions committed or allowed during the course of preparation of the referendum, during the voting, or in the tallying of votes.

17. The results of a referendum are determined by the commission under whose auspices it was conducted. A report on referendum results and text of the resolution or substance of the issue adopted by voting are published in the party press within seven days of conclusion of the referendum.

Resolutions supported by more than half the members of an organization are binding for the appropriate party organs and organizations.

18. Expenses associated with the conduct of discussions and referendums in the CPSU are attributable to the party budget of the appropriate party organs.

Draft CPSU Instructions on Dues, Spending

91UN0190A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

["Draft Instructions on Party Membership Dues and Financial Activity of CPSU Organizations"]

I. ON DUES OF CPSU MEMBERS

On the Amounts of Membership Dues

1. In keeping with Paragraph 38 of the CPSU Rules, the monthly membership dues for party members are set in the following amounts for the corresponding incomes:
up to 70 rubles [R]—10 kopecks;
from R71 to R100—20 kopecks;
from R101 to R150—30 kopecks;
from R151 to R250—one percent;
more than R250—two percent.

If they wish, communists may pay larger dues than those stipulated by the CPSU Rules.

Note: Before members enter the CPSU, during the probationary period, they do not pay party membership dues.

2. Party membership dues are paid from amounts deducted from wages, bonuses, honorariums, and other remunerations and payments related to the labor activity of communists, stipends and pensions, and also sums received in the form of dividends from shares of labor collectives and other incomes received as a result of the

distribution of the profit (income) of the enterprise, institution, organization kolkhoz [collective farm], sovkhoz [state farm], or cooperative. All kinds of in-kind payments are translated into monetary terms at state procurement prices.

Communists engaged in individual labor activity or working in labor-based undertakings pay membership dues from the full amount of income actually received as indicated in the declaration submitted to the financial organs.

Communists working under the conditions of a family contract pay membership dues from earnings determined proportionally, based on the number of family members participating in the contract.

Communists who receive part of their earnings in rubles and part in foreign currency pay membership dues in Soviet rubles and foreign currency in proportional amounts. The amount of their payment is determined from the overall sum of wages, and the hard currency part is calculated on the basis of a special exchange rate for foreign currency.

Communists working abroad pay membership dues in hard currency in the party organization of the country where they are registered. Membership dues in Soviet rubles from all kinds of earnings coming to them in the Soviet Union are accepted in the place where the party card is kept until they return from the foreign business trip on the basis of information from the organization or enterprise concerning monthly earnings, which are kept in the USSR for the given communist.

When they receive honorariums for various kinds of publications, articles, and speeches abroad, communists pay party dues from the sums they actually receive minus state taxes and commission deductions stipulated by the law.

3. The sums of increments to earnings, additional earnings, incomes, bonuses, honorariums, and other kinds of monetary remuneration and also stipends from social or cooperative insurance in the event of temporary disability, combined with the basic wage (income) of communists are taken into account when membership dues are paid for the month in which they are received. Communist pensioners who are working pay party membership dues separately from the pension and wages (income).

4. Bonuses and special payments for carrying out special assignments (exhibiting valor in performing their job or civic duty or during a fire or natural disaster, preventing an accident, and so forth), payments to people's deputies related to deputy activity, one-time bonuses to celebrate personal anniversaries, one-time stipends, severance pay when they are discharged, relocation stipends, travel grants or additions to wages to replace travel grants, other monetary compensations in exchange for contributions in goods and services, compensations for the use of private vehicles for work trips, gains from state loans and

lotteries, and also inheritances in physical goods or money are not taken into account when membership dues are assessed.

Pensions assigned because of disability or for the care of minors, stipends for mothers with many children or for mothers to care for a child until he has reached the age established by legislation, stipends for caring for invalids, and stipends paid to workers and employees as reimbursement for damages to them (injury or other harm to their health related to performing their job duties) are not taken into account for the payment of membership dues.

5. If, because of his age or health, a party member cannot fully participate in party life, the local party organization has the right to release him from paying membership dues on the basis of his personal statement.

Communists who have been released from their main jobs to do Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] work may be released from paying membership dues if they pay dues to the Komsomol organizations.

For each communist who does not have earnings, a pension, or some other form of income, the amount of the dues is determined by the local party organization, taking into account the concrete circumstances.

On the Procedure for Receiving Membership Dues

6. Each month each party member pays his membership dues to the party organization in which he is registered.

Membership dues are received, as a rule, at the beginning of the following month, when the monthly earnings and all kinds of additional payments and bonuses for communists have been determined.

Note: When a party member is restored to the ranks of the CPSU and retains his party tenure, the question of his paying membership dues for the time when the tenure was interrupted is decided by the local party organization.

7. The payment of membership dues by communists who, because of special working conditions, are at remote work sites for several months (reindeer herders, shepherds, sailors on the fishing and other fleets, machine operators working on harvesting and preparing feeds in other oblasts, krays, republics, and so forth) is done after they are paid for the period during which they are registered and given wages. During their absence, the note "Absent because of work" is made next to their names in the dues receipt registers.

At the request of party members, their dues may be withheld through the bookkeeping offices of the enterprises, institutions, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and cooperatives from the sums owing to them for their labor activity. The bookkeeper transfers the withheld sums to city or rayon branches of the savings bank to be credited to a special account for membership dues of the

obkoms [oblast committees], kraykoms [krai committees], republic party committees of autonomous republics, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union republics.

Membership dues may be received in advance when a communist goes on a regular vacation or when he travels to another location, but not more than six months.

8. Membership dues are received by the secretary of the local (shop) party organization, his deputy, or a communist authorized by the party bureau (party committee).

Membership dues are collected from communists who are new to an organization after they are registered in the local party organization.

When collecting membership dues they record the amount of income and the dues received in the record in which the communist is registered. The corresponding entry is made on the party card and it is stamped and signed by the person who collects the dues. When a working communist pensioner pays his dues, on the line in the record where his name is entered, they indicate the amount of the pension and the amount of the dues taken from it and after that on the same line—the sum of earnings and the dues taken from that, and on the party card they enter the earnings and the pension, and the sum of the dues is entered as the combined amount. The amount of the hard currency portion is determined in Soviet rubles at a special rate of exchange for foreign currencies.

In the event that the amount of dues paid is larger than the amount envisioned by the CPSU Rules, in the record and on the party card they indicate the sum actually paid.

The form of the stamp for noting the payment of membership dues is established by the party gorkom [city committee] and raykom [rayon committee].

9. The record of the payment of membership dues is opened on the first day and closed on the last day of each month. They enter in the record (in alphabetical order) the names of all party members registered in the given party organization, including those who have been released from the payment of membership dues.

10. In the event of failure to pay membership dues, the secretary must figure out the reasons and, if necessary, raise the question for the consideration of the party organization.

Transfer and Reporting of Membership Dues

11. The full amounts of membership dues are turned in as they are collected, but no less frequently than once a month, to the savings bank institutions in the place where the local or shop organizations are located so that they can be subsequently transferred to a special current account of the obkom, kraykom, republic committee of an autonomous republic, or the Central Committee of a Union Communist Party in the Gosbank [State Bank].

Membership dues that are collected in foreign currency are turned in to the branch of the USSR Foreign Economic Bank or the hard currency account of the enterprise from which the communist has received his wages in hard currency so that they can be transferred to the hard currency account of the Administration of Affairs of the CPSU Central Committee in the USSR Foreign Economic Bank.

Membership dues collected from communists must not be transferred to the party committees or higher party committees.

12. The records of payment of membership dues and documents recording the transfer of the money are turned over to the party committee or the party bureau of the local party organization no later than the fifth of the month following the report month and are kept there for five years not counting the current year.

On the basis of the records and documents for the release of party dues, secretaries of local party organizations draw up a consolidated report on membership dues that have come in during the quarter and submit it to the party gorkom or raykom.

Note: In regions of the Far North and areas where it is difficult to meet the requirements presented in points 11 and 12, and also in businesses, organizations, and enterprises that have special kinds of work (the watch method, international shipments, extended tours of circus and other collectives, and so forth) the procedure for collection and the time periods for turning in membership dues and submitting reports by local party organizations are established by the party gorkoms and raykoms.

13. The party gorkom or raykom, on the basis of reports from the local party organizations and documents for the sums collected and transferred, draws up a consolidated report on the receipt of membership dues during the quarter in the city or rayon party organization and submits it to the higher party committee.

In the party gorkoms and raykoms cards for keeping track of the payment of membership dues are filled out on the basis of the reports from the local party organizations and statements- notifications received from savings bank branches and documents for the receipt of foreign currency.

The obkoms, kraykoms, republic party committees of autonomous republics, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union republics keep accounts of the receipts of membership dues for each city and rayon party organization. The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics draw up a quarterly consolidated report for the Communist Party of the Union republic and submit it to the CPSU Central Committee.

Leadership of the Work of Collecting Membership Dues

14. Leadership in the work of collecting, accounting for, and reporting membership dues is provided by the party committees. They regularly consider the situation regarding these questions in the party organizations and the observance of the requirements in the rules for communists to pay membership dues.

15. Control (audit) commissions monitor the payment of membership dues in local party organizations.

Party gorkoms and raykoms and control (audit) commissions conduct document inspections of the payment and accounting for party membership dues in each party organization no less frequently than once a year.

II. ON THE FINANCIAL-ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF CPSU ORGANIZATIONS

1. The financial and economic activity of CPSU organizations is conducted with received membership dues, incomes from publishing and production and economic activity, voluntary contributions from communists and individual citizens, and also other revenues if they do not go against existing legislation.

2. The distribution of funds among the city and rayon party organizations is accomplished at plenums of obkoms, kraykoms, republic committees of autonomous republics, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union republics when the party budget is approved on the basis of the principle of creating the necessary financial conditions to support the activity of the local party organizations. In keeping with the CPSU Rules, up to 50 percent of the sum of incoming membership dues are used for the needs of the local party organizations.

In the city and rayon party organizations the percentage of deductions or the sum of subsidies for each local organization is determined taking into account the proposals of the financial commission under the gorkom or raykom with the participation of the secretaries of the local party organizations or the soviets of secretaries of the local party organizations, and they are approved by the plenum of the party committee. In the party gorkoms and raykoms these funds can be used to create a reserve fund for financing unforeseen expenditures of local party organizations that may arise during the year.

The amount of this fund and the procedure for spending it are also determined by the plenum of the corresponding party committee.

3. On the basis of the established percentage of deductions of membership dues, the residuals of these funds from past years, and also incomes from entrepreneurial activity, voluntary contributions, and other incomes, each local party organization annually draws up an estimate of incomes and expenditures, including expenditures on maintaining full-time workers of the given

party organization. The estimate is approved at a general party meeting or at a meeting of the party committee with the rights of a raykom.

The question of maintaining full-time workers and the amount they are paid is decided by the local party organization based on actual need, financial capabilities, and the amounts of earnings approved by the CPSU Central Committee. Here extra pay may be used for part-time secretaries of party organizations.

4. Money from membership dues for financing the activity of local party organizations is transferred by the obkoms, kraykoms, republic party committees of autonomous republics, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union republics through the party gorkoms and raykoms in the amounts set by the plenums of the party committees and based on the dues actually received.

5. In order to conduct financial operations, party committees with their own financial base may, with the permission of the corresponding obkoms, kraykoms, republic party committees of autonomous republics, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union republics, open up current (running) accounts in Gosbank branches and enjoy the rights of a corporate body in keeping with existing legislation. For other party organizations current accounts are opened in savings banks or they can use the cash fund of the corresponding party gorkom or raykom.

The right to sign monetary documents is granted to the secretary and, in his absence, the deputy secretary of the party organization, and also to the individual authorized to handle monetary operations (approved at a session of the party committee (bureau) or a meeting of communists) with whom an agreement for individual material liability is concluded.

6. The procedure for expenditure of funds among the various items of the estimate is determined by the party committee, party bureau, or general meeting of communists. Funds not spent during the current year remain at the disposal of the local party organization for its use during the next year.

Accounting for the expenditure of monetary funds in the local party organization, which has its own account in the Gosbank or savings bank, is kept in the "Book of Accounts of Monetary Funds." The vouchers for the income and expenditure of monetary funds are stored in the local party organization and when the person responsible for financial operations changes, they are turned over and signed for. The financial documents are stored for three years, and the payment and disbursement lists and payment cards (personal accounts), upon expiration of the time period, are turned over to the party gorkoms and raykoms to be sent to the archives for storage.

Accounts for the funds of the local party organizations which use the cash reserve of the party gorkom or raykom are kept in the corresponding gorkoms or

raykoms where a card is assigned to each party organization with an indication of the sums, according to the sources of revenue and the areas for expenditure of the funds.

Secretaries of party organizations regularly inform communists about the financial and economic activity of their organizations.

7. Inventory and fixed capital of local party organizations which belong to the party are kept in responsible storage by a materially responsible individual who has been approved by the local party organization, with whom an agreement on material responsibility is concluded. Books for the inventory and fixed capital are kept in the corresponding party gorkoms and raykoms.

8. If necessary the party organizations may combine their financial resources to be used for profit-making economic activity which does not run counter to the interests of the political work or the requirements of legislation that is in effect.

The higher party committees provide operational control over the financial and economic activity of the party organizations and render practical and methodological assistance in keeping with existing legislation.

9. The local party organizations submit to the party gorkom or raykom semiannual reports on the fulfillment of estimates of expenditures and incomes. The party organizations in which audit (inspection) commissions have been created submit inspection documents along with the report.

Party gorkoms and raykoms and audit (inspection) commissions of the corresponding party organizations conduct inspections of financial and economic activity of local party organizations no less frequently than once a year, as a rule, when checking on the payment of party membership dues.

Economic

Gorbachev Decree on Foreign Currency Published

PM0711101390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian

3 Nov 90 Second Edition p 1

["Decree of the USSR President on Special Procedures for the Utilization of Foreign Currency Resources in 1991"]

[Text] With a view to meeting the economy's priority requirements and the population's needs, making efficient use of foreign currency resources, and also creating the conditions for the guaranteed fulfillment of the USSR's foreign debt repayment commitments, I resolve:

1. A Union-Republic Foreign Currency Fund is to be created out of the revenue from exports of products (work, services) by enterprises, associations, and enterprises, with the exception of enterprises in which foreign capital is involved.

2. A Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee comprising the heads of government of the Union republics and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission is to be formed to administer the creation and utilization of foreign currency resources.

Leadership of this committee is to be entrusted to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

The Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee is tasked with:

the elaboration and coordination of foreign-currency and import policy, including identifying the need to attract credits from the international financial market;

the distribution of Union-Republic Foreign Currency Fund resources in priority areas taking account of Unionwide, republic, regional, and also sector interests;

supervision of ensuring the fulfillment of the USSR's foreign debt repayment commitments;

the elaboration of measures to develop the country's export base, mobilize export resources, and seek out additional sources of exports;

the stimulation of efforts by all republics to build up the country's foreign currency resources;

the resolution of other Unionwide foreign currency regulation tasks.

3. To ensure the repayment of the USSR's foreign debt, it is to be laid down that enterprises, associations, and organizations, irrespective of their form of ownership or departmental or territorial jurisdiction (with the exception of enterprises in which foreign capital is involved) will sell the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity in 1991 40 percent of the foreign currency proceeds from exports of products (works, services), with payment in rubles at the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] commercial exchange rate.

4. The foreign currency funds of enterprises, associations, and organizations are formed from the foreign currency revenue remaining after the compulsory sale of foreign currency for the repayment of the foreign debt taking account of the normatives in force in 1990 governing payments for exports of products in freely convertible currency and are utilized by them to provide for production and social needs.

5. Taking account of the fact that oil and oil-refining industry enterprises, associations, and organizations provide the bulk of the country's export revenue, it is considered necessary to establish for them special conditions for the formation of foreign currency funds in 1991.

6. After the compulsory sale of foreign currency for the repayment of the foreign debt and the formation of their own foreign currency funds in line with the prescribed

normatives, enterprises, associations, and organizations will sell 90 percent of their remaining foreign currency revenue to the Union-Republic Foreign Currency Fund and 10 percent to the foreign currency funds of union republics and local soviets of people's deputies, the payment to be in rubles at the USSR State Bank commercial rate of exchange.

The necessary changes are to be made to the procedure for conducting barter operations and coastal and border trade.

7. The issuing of export and import quotas and licenses is to be switched to a Union-republic management system as of 1991.

The Union-Republic Foreign Currency Committee is to approve a quota and licensing procedure for 1991. Here quotas for commodities of statewide significance (oil, gas, gold, diamonds and precious stones, special equipment, and certain other commodities on a list to be agreed with the Union republics) are determined by Union-level organs.

8. It is to be laid down that all settlements of foreign economic relations in 1991 will be effected through the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity or other authorized banks.

9. The USSR Council of Ministers is to adopt decisions ensuring the implementation of this decree.

(Signed) M. Gorbachev, President of the USSR.
Moscow, Kremlin, 2 November 1990.

Bank Deputy Chief Explains New Interest Rates

*PM0711093290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1*

[Article by Vyacheslav Solovov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Savings Bank Board: "New Way of Keeping Money in the Savings Bank"—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The USSR president's decree "On Boosting Citizens' Interest in Keeping Savings in USSR Savings Bank Institutions" entered into force 1 November. Vyacheslav Solovov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Savings Bank Board, provides some explanations as regards this.

[Solovov] We believe that the decree ensures the safety of the population's savings, it will strengthen trust in the state, and divert some money away from the consumer market. That is why USSR Savings Bank interest rates are being increased, primarily for fixed-term deposits, moreover. The new rates—"percentages" as our clients usually call them—are directly pegged to the duration of the deposit.

As is well known, rates for fixed-term deposits have been increased to between five and nine percent annually, as against the current three to four percent. There is reason to hope that under these conditions people will prefer

fixed-term deposits. Naturally the following question arises: Can old fixed-term and other Savings Bank deposits be converted under the new conditions? Of course they can and we recommend that this be done if the depositor is sure that he will not need the money for a year, three years, five years, or more. The new interest rates will be paid as of 1 November 1990.

If you have made a deposit for a term of more than a year, you will be able to receive the new rates as of November 1991, likewise if the term exceeds three years, no earlier than November 1993, and if it exceeds five years, no earlier than November 1995.

People are saying that even the new increased interest rates for fixed-term deposits are still low and do not match the level of inflation. We have based our figures on a different indicator—the index for price increases. According to USSR State Committee for Statistics data, it totaled 4.2 percent for the first nine months of this year, thus our rates exceed it. Admittedly, according to State Committee for Statistics data, the inflation index totals nine percent. But in world banking practice interest rates for the population's deposits are below the level of inflation. Moreover, in most countries income from deposits is subject to considerable taxation. For instance, in Italy this tax is 30 percent.

The increase in interest rates for deposits will inevitably be accompanied by increased rates for bank credit to enterprises, organizations, institutions, and the population. Hence, the prospect of price hikes for goods and services. That is why a more drastic increase in Savings Bank deposit rates, for which some economists are pressing, would accordingly cause an even more drastic soar in prices and thus all the advantages that the population derives from increased rates of interest on its deposits would be nullified.

Once more: All depositors can convert their deposits over the next six months at no loss to themselves. You will not lose the new rates. Money can be transferred into the new types of deposit in full or in part, whatever is convenient. Interest for those people who want to deposit money in the Savings Bank after 1 November—in December, say—will, of course, be paid from the day on which the account is opened and not from 1 November.

Foreign Trade Bank Chief Urges Caution

PM0611161990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Nov 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Karpukhin, deputy chairman of the board of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity: "Let Me Explain"]

[Text] Moscow—Issue 234 of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA dated 11 October 1990 published the report by Comrade I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet

on 9 October 1990 in which he said, among other things, that according to the Union government's plan, "foreign currency receipts remain in the monopoly ownership of the Vneshekonombank [USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity]." The report went on to talk about the tendency of the Union government to retain "the real levers of economic power" including the USSR Vneshekonombank.

In our opinion, readers may infer from the context of Comrade I.S. Silayev's speech that the USSR Vneshekonombank, as one of the instruments of implementing USSR government policy, has at present and will retain in the future the monopoly on the ownership of foreign currency receipts of Soviet enterprises and organizations. Consequently I think it necessary to provide certain clarifications on the nub of the question so as to preclude the possibility of erroneous interpretations.

First it should be stressed that foreign currency is owned by Soviet enterprises and organizations which export goods and services and obtain a certain amount of income in foreign currency. The owner of the currency or, on its instructions, the intermediary foreign trade organization is obliged at present to exchange part of its foreign currency income for Soviet rubles without the right to exchange rubles back into hard currency. By means of this exchange operation the state's foreign currency resources are formed and are controlled by the USSR Government. The rest of the foreign currency earnings, called "foreign currency receipts," remain in one form or another with the enterprise or organization which earned them and are used at its discretion in accordance with existing legislation.

The USSR Vneshekonombank conducts operations with these foreign currency resources on the instructions of the client who owns them, that is, an enterprise or organization or the USSR Government. Thus the USSR Vneshekonombank does not own the foreign currency revenue, as Comrade I.S. Silayev indicated in his speech, but conducts specific, partly technical (banking) operations with its client's property like a conventional commercial bank. The same point should be made, incidentally, about the foreign currency resources of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, which were received as a result of the redistribution of the USSR's resources and are kept in the corresponding account at the USSR Vneshekonombank. Following the speaker's logic, those sums of money belong to the USSR Vneshekonombank and not the Russian government. In that case it is unclear why that government is still succeeding in making use of the foreign currency resources and giving payment guarantees backed up by its own resources—as happened, for example, with the contracts with firms for the purchase of cigarettes—as you would expect the owner of the money to do.

At present, some economists unilaterally characterize the functioning of the single foreign currency-credit and

payments center, virtually the only major banking institution in the country conducting foreign currency operations, as the monopoly of the Vneshekonombank. The bank acquired its present status in conditions of the command-administration system, and this had nothing to do with whether it wanted to monopolize its sphere of activity or not. It is the job of the country's political and economic authorities to determine which of the banks will perform operations using the foreign currency resources of the USSR or the republics. If in the future, perhaps quite soon, the USSR Vneshekonombank finds that it has real competitors in the banking business with secure worldwide ties, international banking expertise, and skilled staff, it will "compete in the market," so to speak, for the right to operate on behalf of this or that client.

As is well known, the question of the USSR banks' authority to perform foreign currency operations is being decided in the draft laws on banks and banking and on the country's State Bank that are currently under discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Meanwhile, the USSR Vneshekonombank, without waiting for our parliament's decisions, has not only broadened the rights of its institutions on USSR territory but has also actually transferred a range of foreign trade payment operations to other USSR banks, thereby effectively beginning a demonopolization. In our opinion, however, even after the legislative acts have been adopted, a competitive environment will not take shape in banking immediately. In the immediate future it will be possible to talk seriously only about the existence of the newly created banks' rights to provide foreign currency services for clients, not about their actual competence in this sphere.

In our opinion, it is hardly sensible to destroy the existing system of bank foreign currency-credit and payments services solely because the USSR Vneshekonombank is a monopolist. It would be more beneficial in the period of transition to the new organization of economic ties to rely on the existing economic structures which are demonstrating their reliability in the present difficult situation. To deliberately undermine them without putting forward any serious alternatives will destroy the existing bank mechanism and damage its new, incipient elements.

Moscow Gasoline Situation Termed 'Critical'

LD0611192790 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] In Moscow the gasoline situation is now critical. Demand is only being 30-50 percent satisfied. The operation of the capital's cabs is threatened during the vacation days.

'Shadow Economy' Size, Scale Examined

914A0065A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 2 Nov 90 p 1

["The Independent Center for Socioeconomic and Criminological Research reports on the potential of the shadow economy": "Skimming Off the Fat"]

[Text]

View of a sociologist: The true scale of the shadow economy is even beyond comparison with a catastrophe.

According to the data of Western experts, a level of 15-30 percent circulation from the gross national product and approximately 40 percent of the total volume of the work force involved in illegal economic activity should be considered critical when considering how shadow economic relations burden the national economy.

According to data of the Center, the proportions in our country look like 13 and 30 percents.

The black market has been developing especially dynamically recently. The most impressive sector of our domestic black market is the "free trade" sphere. According to data of the center, about 20 million people are involved in it. And with regard to barter relations at market prices without payment of the corresponding income taxes, up to 100 million people are involved annually.

For the most part, the functioning of the black market is characterized by a high rate of economic crime. This is most apparent in an analysis of the sources supplying goods to the black market. According to estimates, approximately five-sixths of its turnover is related to sources of a criminal nature, including one-third attributable to embezzlement, almost the same amount to extortion, coercion, and the so-called "gray" economy (material wealth for return services, including those that are illegal), and the rest to speculation and contraband.

According to some estimates, the illegal work force market is comprised of up to 20 million people. Of them approximately five million are openly or secretly unemployed, and about 15 million are formally employed. It is these two contingents that feed the cadres of the country's underground entrepreneurial activity. The homeless and bums are especially profitable acquisitions for underground investors of capital—they comprise approximately 1-1.5 million of our fellow citizens.

The results of economic research show the approximate proportions of the disposal of income received by representatives of the analyzed group: Approximately one-third to one-fourth of all sums goes toward private wealth (hoarding), one-third to one-fourth goes toward excess consumption, and the rest remains in circulation.

Inflation Levels, Solutions Analyzed

PM0611113690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1

[Report by Yu. Rytov under the rubric "Statistics and Our Commentary": "Inflation, Companion of Poverty"]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Statistics report on the results of the first nine months of this year notes:

The amount of money put into circulation was 70 percent more than for the corresponding period of last year.

Thank you for the information. But, nearly double—is that a large increase, or not? And what was the total sum of emissions? And how will it affect inflation?

These are not idle questions. And let us study them one by one. But first let us clarify: What is inflation? "The Short Economic Dictionary," published by the Political Literature Publishing House last year, initially gives the reader some hope. "Inflation in the conventional sense," it says, "is a process of devaluing money under capitalism (!) which generally manifests itself in an unequal growth in prices for goods and services and leads to the redistribution of national income to the detriment of the main mass of working people, and to an increase in social differentiation."

It seems that we have been spared. If it says under capitalism, that means it does not concern us. It has certainly been drummed into us for decades: There can be no inflation under socialism! And theory was brilliantly backed by practice. When surplus money was issued, the "leader and teacher" immediately balanced it and raised "voluntary" internal loans among the population! And if he went too far, then retail prices would be slightly lowered, and again theory would be backed by practice....

However, the authors of the definition in the "Short Economic Dictionary" finally remembered something. They announced that inflation also exists in the USSR and other socialist countries. Admittedly, it has specific features. "In the USSR, for example, inflation does not manifest itself so much by an obvious rise in prices, as in a concealed rise and the appearance of shortages, the disappearance of cheap goods, and the destruction of the market." Well, that is nearer the mark!

In a word, inflation is the devaluation of money. If you paid 100 rubles [R] for a certain set of goods and services yesterday, and today it costs R120, then the level of inflation is 20 percent. Or to put it another way, we become 20 percent poorer.

For all its apparent simplicity, this process needs daily observation, analysis, and monitoring. Yes, inflation is the companion of any extended reproduction. But there is such a thing as permissible dimensions that can be regulated. Then the inflation is called "creeping." If the "braking devices" fail, beware: Galloping inflation starts, plunging ever greater masses of the population into poverty.

In 1989 the money put into circulation in our country exceeded the level of the previous year by 56 percent and amounted to over R18 billion. In the first nine months of this year, the total sum of emissions was approximately R23 billion. And by the end of the year, it will approach

R28 billion. Almost 30 billion rubles not backed by anything will sharply increase a money supply which already shows a surplus.

However, emission is only one source of inflation. A second source, which is no less striking, is price rises, both obvious rises and concealed rises. The USSR State Committee for Statistics report notes: In the first nine months, food prices rose by 2.5 percent and prices of manufactured goods by five percent. These are the official calculations. But how are we to reckon with the concealed price rises?

Let us look at the kolkhoz market: Here the situation can be determined very clearly and objectively. In the first half of this year, compared with the same period last year, prices rose by 18 percent. And in subsequent months they galloped even more significantly. July—29 percent. August—30 percent. September—34 percent....

It was no better with nonfood products. Because the immense unsatisfied demand broke all the state limits on retail prices, pushing goods onto the "black" market. Calculations made by official statistics organs have shown that overpayments by the population for nonfood goods bought at speculative prices will double or treble this year in comparison with 1989. In other words, this will mean approximately R3-4 billion. However, according to certain economists, this is about a tenth of the real figure.

In researching the size of inflation you have to deal with a large number of unknown quantities. And yet, if you compare various versions of calculations, you come to the conclusion that the most realistic indicator is the one published in IZVESTIYA (No. 299, "Favorable Prognosis"): 18 percent a year....

It can be stated with no exaggeration that restraining inflation and directing it into a regulated channel has become the main national task today. The necessary measures and formulas are expounded, with some variations, in all the programs elaborated for the stabilization of the economy and the transition to market relations, and the reader scarcely needs to be reminded both of the actual anti-inflation measures and of the differences of opinion emerging here.

But this is what I would like to draw attention to: the extreme slowness in implementing even the measures that seem unquestionable to everyone. Take, for example, the following widely publicized step: to provide garden and vegetable allotments for everyone who wants one. Whatever the conditions, many of our fellow citizens would find fertile soil (excuse the involuntary pun) in which to invest their savings. So what is the problem? Surely there is no lack of vacant land?

Another step is the privatization of apartments. How much has been said about this, and yet nothing has been done.

It would be extremely naive to suppose that inflation can be overcome at a stroke by using some kind of miraculous means. A whole complex of measures is needed, and particularly a system of social compensation that would lessen the pernicious effect of inflation. And we should not put off until tomorrow what we can do today.

Agricultural

Grain Crisis Blamed on Contract Noncompliance

PM0611162590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1

[Commentary by V. Konovalov under the rubric "Topic of the Day": "Contract Worth Less Than Grain"]

[Text] We already seem to be in a position to provide a pretty complete tally of this year's harvest, compare it against the forecasts, and clarify the situation in terms of grain stocks in the country.

Despite the considerable reduction in sown acreage in recent years, the gross grain harvest is going to turn out pretty big and total around 240 million tonnes. But as yet the state has been sold only 65.8 million tonnes—a mere 76 percent of the state order. By this time last year only 66 percent of the state order had been met, but the harvest then was much smaller.

It is not only the state order which is not being met. The stipulated volumes of contractual grain deliveries were lower than the state order. But to date they, too, have been fulfilled by only 86 percent.

At first glance the situation seems paradoxical. There is grain on the farms. The potential for fulfilling contractual commitments exists. Yet kolkhozes and sovkhoses [collective and state farms] are in no hurry to comply with the conditions. Why?

Contractual relationships must become the fundamental relationships in a market economy. But given the approach that people today take to the fulfillment of their commitments, the result could continue to be lamentable. The reason evidently lies in the fact that introducing only individual elements of market mechanisms into our ailing economy is a thankless and almost fruitless occupation. Can it be worth hoping for the fulfillment of contractual commitments given the price imbalances and lack of due economic accountability? The question is almost rhetorical.

As sanctions for the nonfulfillment of contracts our fines are almost symbolic. Things would be completely different if suppliers, in line with accepted practice throughout the world, had to compensate for lost profit. We can appeal to people's conscience and sense of duty and remind them that a contract should be more precious than money. But when this money in the form of fines is so negligible, farms hold on to and will continue to hold on to grain, taking the view that it is safer. What,

indeed, can you buy for our money given the universal shortages and the increasingly common practice of direct moneyless barter?

Maybe you can understand the considerations which guide managers. Today, the government, while increasing purchase prices for grain, has promised not to touch mixed feed prices. But tomorrow? Tomorrow mixed feed prices will invariably rise. Furthermore, grain stockpiled on their farms could help stock farmers out during the wintering period.

Nobody is worried that contracts have become worth less than grain and are seen as not worth a cent. But the lack of concern is not justified. Failing to keep promises can be a costly habit. Only people who are unfamiliar with the business world think that the market gives a free hand to crooks and tricksters. No. The market is honest. In the sense that honesty and the ability to keep your word is the basis of commercial relationships and business.

In brief, the alarming grain supply situation which has developed is, on the one hand, the absolutely logical price of timidity and hesitancy on the path to a market economy and, on the other, the price of immorality, which has become a norm of our economic life.

Scientific

Problems Seen in U.S. Scientific Cooperation

PM0611152290 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Nov 90 First Edition p 3

[By A. Yakimenko "Rejoinder": "What Lies Behind Good 'Intentions'"]

[Text] NASA Director R. Truly was in Moscow recently at the invitation of the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building and the "Interkosmos" Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Even before the meeting began it was possible to assume that the leaders of the space departments of the world's two greatest countries had something to say and show to each other and something on which to reach agreement in the sphere of concrete mutually advantageous businesslike cooperation. For not even the most fault-finding and qualified foreign specialist would be ashamed to take into account and utilize very many of our achievements. We have to our credit technical and medical-biological backup for long manned flights, powerful and reliable carrier rockets, and a developed infrastructure of scientific and production projects—a guarantee of further progress in cosmonautics.

However, in the process of the meetings which took place in the headquarters of our cosmonautics, in plants and institutes where it was possible to see the most modern space technology projects, and at the Cosmonaut

Training Center it was only the possible areas of cooperation, as your correspondent learned, that were discussed, and the meeting resulted in a protocol of intentions. But there are sometimes "huge distances" to cover from intentions, however good they may be, and generalities to practical deeds. Neither diplomatic bowing and scraping, nor expressions of gratitude for invitations, nor nostalgic memories of joint work while realizing the "Soyuz-Apollo" project have yet ensured the expansion of the barely glimmering contacts that were started up after the signing of the 1987 Soviet-U.S. agreement on cooperation in the sphere of space. Incidentally, a similar opinion is also voiced in the U.S. press, in particular in AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY magazine.

Meanwhile, both U.S. and Soviet firms and scientific organizations are very interested in the mutual utilization of the achievements of space technology and in the further development of contacts in this promising sphere.

What is the problem? It is obviously that it is impossible today to take a single step in practical space cooperation without the sanction of the highest leadership in Washington.

It seems that in specific matters these leaders fail to keep pace with their own very promising statements about new political thinking and the restructuring of the two countries' relations along democratic lines. Obviously, there is also the calculation that it is still possible to stand firm within the framework of the regulations of the notorious Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, which, as is known, prohibit the transfer of advanced Western technologies and even the Soviet side's familiarization with them and which the world public today regards not only as a means of infringing on USSR's interests but also as a means harming the United States' own economy.

Or maybe NASA is simply sounding out future partners, or maybe an in-depth familiarization with each other's possibilities is still taking place, as is always done before concluding any serious deal?

I would like to believe this.

Military

Yazov 'Order of the Day' on GOSR Anniversary

PM0611175590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Nov 90 First Edition pp 1, 2

["USSR Defense Minister's Order of the Day No 415"; in Moscow, 7 November]

[Text] Comrade Army and Navy servicemen, veterans of war, labor, and the USSR Armed Forces, and working people of the Land of the Soviets!

The Soviet people and their servicemen are celebrating the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution [GOSR] at a crucial, complex time of the transition of the country's economy to the market, the reforming of the Union of Soviet Republics, and the creation of new political structures. Society's patriotic forces and all who value our homeland's destiny are concentrating their efforts on overcoming the crisis, resolving the practical tasks of perestroika, strengthening discipline and law and order, and defending the socialist choice made in October 1917.

The fundamental changes in the contemporary situation in the world are closely linked with perestroika and the Soviet Union's renewal. The principles of new political thinking are being asserted in the practice of interstate relations. An end has been put to the "cold war." Political dialogue is gathering momentum. The disarmament talks process is developing. An historic shift has begun away from superarmament toward sufficiency for defense, which was initiated by the Soviet Union. Our new defensive military doctrine is being materialized consistently, and a profound military reform is being implemented.

Defense building and the Armed Forces are being transformed under complex conditions of large-scale troop and arms reductions, the exacerbation of social and domestic problems, and attempts to counteract the fulfillment of the constitutional military duty in a number of parts of the country. Conscious of their responsibility to the people, Armed Forces personnel are staunchly overcoming difficulties and selflessly resolving the tasks of maintaining the country's defense capability and Army and Navy combat readiness at a level adequate for the reliable defense of our homeland—the USSR.

I greet and congratulate you on the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!

I wish that Armed Forces personnel will successfully fulfill their military duty, bear aloft the honor and dignity of the socialist homeland's armed defender, and keep sacred and augment the heroic revolutionary and combat traditions.

I wish veterans of war, labor, and the Armed Forces, Soviet young people, and all working people of the Land of the Soviets weighty deeds and achievements for the good of the motherland and successes in advancing along the path of social progress and peace, along the path of October.

To mark the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution I order that:

A festive 30-gun artillery salute be fired today, 7 November 1990, at 2100 hours local time, in the capital of our motherland—the hero-city of Moscow—the Union republic capitals, the hero-cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, and Murmansk, the hero-fortress of

Brest, and in the cities of Kaliningrad, Lvov, Rostov-na-Donu, Kuybyshev, Novosibirsk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Severomorsk.

Long live the 73d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution!

Glory to the heroic Soviet people and their valiant Armed Forces!

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense.

Military Commander Views Military Reform Impact

PM0711091790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

["KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Express Questionnaire" answered by Colonel General N. Kalinin, commander of Moscow Military District, under the rubric "Military Reform: Problems, Suggestions": "Three Questions to Commander"]

[Text] [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 1. In connection with the military reform, what has changed already in the life and activity of the troops entrusted to you?

[Kalinin] A number of military units in the district have completed the switch to a new organizational-strength structure and are already mastering it in the process of intensive combat training. Proceeding from the nature of the new defensive doctrine, substantial corrections have been made to the personnel training and education programs.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 2. What, in your view, should the ultimate goal of the reform of the Armed Forces be?

[Kalinin] The proposed new approaches to manning the Armed Forces will make it possible to relieve the acuteness of many Army problems which are not only of concern to us soldiers but also arouse legitimate alarm in society. I refer to the introduction of alternative service, increasing demands on the intellectual level of the young people being drafted for service, and much else.

The military reform is also to considerably enhance the level of the professionalization of the Army and, thus, of its training. In addition, it will enable us to really resolve complex problems of the social protection of soldiers, ensigns, officers, and their families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] 3. What, in your opinion, are the chief obstacles in the way of the profound transformations in the Army and Navy which the times demand?

[Kalinin] My colleagues, the commanders of a number of military districts, have already thoroughly expressed their view on this. For my part I would like to add that we ourselves are almost the chief obstacle—our force of thinking and, I would say, to a certain degree our subconscious resistance to the new and sometimes unusual things that perestroika inevitably introduces into our life.

Problems in the legal settlement of many of the Army's problems are serious obstacles in the way of the military reform. The recently adopted laws of certain republics which directly affect the interests of the Armed Forces and run counter to the country's Fundamental Law exacerbate the situation still further. I will say frankly that they do not help to consolidate society and, what is more, artificially set the Army against the people. I hope that the fall session of the USSR Supreme Soviet will finally clarify this question.

Moiseyev Interviewed on NATO Visit

LD0611164890 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] Next an interview granted to our military observer Vadim Solovev by the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Army Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, who recently visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels, the first such visit in the record of relations between East and West:

Today, said Gen. Moiseyev, it is impossible to understand one another, to start relations and to make trust deeper between the nations without personal contact at all the levels, including the military one. This objective, the establishing of a personal contact with the NATO leadership, was reached by my recent visit to Brussels. Gen. Moiseyev stressed that the meetings he had were fruitful, although it was impossible to have a unity of views on all the problems. However, our views, said Gen. Moiseyev, were the same on the main issues of all-European security.

The NATO military leadership favors a transformation of its alliance, wants a reduction of its Armed Forces and a change in the view on using them due to the transformations on the continent. At the same time, the NATO leadership underlines again and again that NATO must be preserved as a guarantor of security of the West European nations. Gen. Moiseyev voiced concern over the intention of the NATO leadership to keep expanding the zone of the bloc's responsibility. He also noted the restraint [as heard] by NATO to start talks to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the refusal of the alliance to accept the Soviet proposals about reducing their navies. But there are also positive results of the talks. First of all, said Gen. Moiseyev, NATO does not regard the Soviet Union any longer as an adversary, although it views it as the largest military power in Europe. An accord was reached on going ahead with the disarmament talks in Geneva and in Vienna with the involvement of Britain, France, and China.

My visit, said Gen. Moiseyev, has shown that the West is interested in expanding contacts with us. We've proposed to the NATO leadership as the first step to work on the issue of setting up a direct telephone link between the central command posts of the Chief Command of the NATO Joint Armed Forces and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. As for personal impressions, I would like to note that the talks with the NATO leaders

and with the leaders of the Belgian Armed Forces were open and well wishing. We managed to reach a better understanding on many issues. I believe that this visit is just the first step on the way toward a broad dialogue on a planned basis.

Concern Voiced Over Chemical Weapons' Incineration

PM0711094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 90 Union Edition p 6

[Letter from Dr. of Chemical Sciences S. Yufit under the rubric "From the International Departments' Mailbag": "Will Chemical War Begin in the Soviet Union?"]

[Text] In a certain sense this war is already under way. Every year thousands of tonnes of poisonous substances are discharged into the atmosphere, the land and the water are poisoned by chlororganic pesticides, defoliants, and herbicides, and effluent containing heavy metals completes the picture. And now, in the near future, a new spiral, a new stage of this war could await us. As frequently happens, it could arise from a perfectly noble aim—the need to begin destroying chemical weapons.

Now that Iraq is threatening to use these weapons, it is not out of place to recall that they make no distinction between people and animals, adults or children—they kill them all. And you do not need a computer to calculate for yourself how much V-gas, for example, is needed to kill 1,000 people: A lethal dose for one person is 0.008 of a gram (the tiniest drop!), and death comes in a few seconds. In a certain sense chemical weapons are even more terrible and vile than nuclear weapons.

And now, under the agreement on the destruction and nonproduction of chemical weapons signed by the Soviet and U.S. presidents, the elimination of lethal substances is to begin no later than 31 December 1992. And we have more than 40,000 tonnes of these weapons! Now I will proceed to the reasons that prompted me to turn to your newspaper.

First, all must know that the question of the destruction of chemical weapons concerns everyone. M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the USSR 21 June 1990 stated bluntly that the destruction of chemical weapons is "proving not easier but more complex than their production." But he did not say that it could cost billions of rubles to destroy these weapons. For example, the corresponding plant on Johnston Island cost, according to some estimates, \$1-2 billion.

The present state of the problem. The United States has conducted experiments on Johnston Island to destroy missile heads containing toxins. They incinerated 15 heads, and there were three discharges of neuroparalytic gases (see IZVESTIYA No. 244 for 1 September 1990). Johnston Island is an uninhabited atoll 800 miles from the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific. But we have constructed such an enterprise in a densely populated area not far from Kuybyshev and the Volga! Fortunately, we

have not managed to commission it—there was public opposition. There are no other plants in the Union. Consequently, in two years it is necessary to create an entire new sector of industry—plants and installations to destroy chemical weapons. Which path are we to choose for this?

Precisely this question faces the USSR Supreme Soviet. Parliamentary hearings have now begun on this problem. Almost 10 projects have been submitted to parliament. They all fall into two groups: One is based on the U.S. method, i.e. incineration. The other proposes using a method developed by our specialists: first rendering chemically safe, then destroying. This would use the methods and materials that are employed according to Army instructions for degassing toxins if used under combat conditions (God forbid!).

I urge journalists and readers not to let us take the U.S. path: It is terrible to imagine what even a single discharge of neuroparalytic gas would mean under our conditions—not on a desert island but in a densely populated oblast. And it is awful to even think what would happen if there were an accident while transporting toxins. And such accidents are—alas!—frequent.

Many public organizations in the United States, including such a one as Greenpeace, which is known for its uncompromisingness, are opposed to the U.S. method of incinerating chemical weapons because it is fraught not only with possible discharges but also with the formation of dioxins. Dioxin is such a poison that it is hard to imagine anything worse. It is dioxin which is still maiming Vietnamese children, and yet how many years have now passed since the Americans used the "orange" defoliant containing this substance in Vietnam!

Now there is talk (see IZVESTIYA 26 August 1990) of possibly buying U.S. technology (the logic is this—at least they have something, while we have nothing) or of creating our own plants to incinerate chemical weapons using the same method. And emissaries from U.S. firms are already offering their services in the construction of such installations. In my opinion, such construction would be not only an ecological disaster but also a financial one.

I am speaking not only for myself but also on behalf of a "green" organization—the Social-Ecological Union, which invited me to be their expert on this problem. At the same time, I wish to support our Army chemists: I am convinced that it is not we who must buy installations for the destruction of chemical weapons from the Americans, but they from us. Our chemists have created safer projects. They are ecologically cleaner and substantially cheaper. And if we are to speak of cooperation between our countries on this problem, it must be built on the basis of Soviet projects.

The public's demands are clear and specific:

- no giant plants for the destruction of chemical weapons;
- no transporting them around the country;
- toxins to be destroyed where they are stored;
- no projects to be adopted without independent expert appraisals;
- all stages of the work on the projects and the construction of installations must be monitored by the press and public organizations.

Luckily for us, we have very little of the toxin that is the "worst" to destroy—mustard gas (the very same that was used back in World War I), and it will be easy to cope with it. At the same time, for reasons known only to the military, they have brought all the lewisite—a substance containing arsenic—together in one place, and approximately 7,000 tonnes (!) of it lie near the population center of Kombarka, on the Kama. It could be thought that a new arsenic deposit had appeared on the geological map of the Soviet Union! We propose (and Army chemists have proven methods) to begin... exploiting that deposit. And, with the help of the Americans—they will do this both faster and better—to construct a plant to obtain arsenic and very valuable and costly preparations manufactured on the basis of it. To share the proceeds fifty-fifty. Such a plant would be a good platform and a good model for cooperation between our countries in resolving the problem of destroying chemical weapons.

Tortuous Path to Arms Spending Glasnost Eyed

PM0611142190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Nov 90 Union Edition p 4

[Stanislav Kondrashov "Political Observer's Notes":
"Half a Cup of Glasnost"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney visited the Soviet Union in mid-September and went away with good impressions, hardly supposing that he was leaving a battlefield behind him. I do not know whether it is a source of consolation or even greater sorrow, but this battle is not with the Americans but among ourselves. At a time when the "cold war" has ended in the world at large, it has started and is raging in our own country. Pretty big guns have been shooting at each other—an academician and expert on the United States, and a marshal, formerly chief of the General Staff and now a presidential adviser. Both are people's deputies. Although the shells are flying over our heads, this battle also affects us at IZVESTIYA since the pages of our newspaper have been the battlefield (see: G. Arbatov "Thank You, Mr. Cheney..." in No 297 and S. Akhromyev "Why is Untruth Being Told" in No 303).

The academician deputy thanked the U.S. defense secretary for telling Soviet legislators in a Kremlin speech things they had not been told from full-time Kremlin sources. Thanks to Mr. Cheney's deliberate kindness the people's representatives learned that last year our military-industrial complex produced 140 ballistic missiles as against 12 in the United States, two submarines as

against the Americans' one, and 1,800 tanks as against 600. How long is this going to go on?! the academician inquired. How long is all this stuff going to be produced and kept secret, just like things were produced and kept secret before perestroika?

The academician deputy winged the marshal deputy when he mentioned that at hearings in the U.S. Congress in the summer of last year S.F. Akhromyev had given U.S. legislators—the first recipients!—figures relating to our military activity which remained classified as far as Soviet legislators were concerned. Foreigners are the first to get anything of real value. It's an old failing of ours. For example, where was the breakthrough decision on unilaterally cutting the Soviet Armed Forces by half a million men announced? At the United Nations in New York in December 1988. And the percentage figures for reductions in personnel, military hardware, and military expenditure? In Moscow, admittedly, but in front of the members of the international Trilateral Commission in January 1989. The total numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces, which had previously been a very strict secret known only to foreign intelligence agencies, was also disclosed for the first time abroad—during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to London in the spring of last year.

Old failings, like old habits, die hard. However, unleashing a counterstrike at his critic, Marshal Akhromyev reported in our newspaper that the information he had disclosed in Washington he also published at home when he got back (when he got back!). How long is this going to go on?! the marshal also asked. Admittedly in a more localized context: "How long is Academician G.A. Arbatov going to go on using these methods?"

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA also joined in the battle; it is an expert in the field. The academician was counterattacked in its pages by G. Khromov, head of department at the USSR Council of Ministers State Military-Industrial Commission. Admittedly he did not rebut Cheney's comparative data for missiles, but he did argue that they were one-sided. The U.S. defense secretary took only ground-launched ballistic missiles but forgot about naval ballistic missiles, of which the United States "makes at least as many as we do, as a rule," and about long-range cruise missiles, of which "the Americans manufacture many times more than we do." G. Khromov stated that articles like Arbatov's "can hardly serve the good of the cause." He hinted mysteriously: "They have a different purpose. What is it?"

I considered it essential to give this albeit condensed recapitulation of the polemic that is raging to at least to cool passions, which are so heated everywhere in our society. Especially in the vicinity of that former holy of holies, the restricted repository of military secrets. How long is this going to go on?! Halt! Who goes there? For what purpose? Just leave us to get on with it and soon—anything is possible—we'll discover the enemies of the people. Or of perestroika. I therefore wish to say: No, dear comrades, this way it will take ages to achieve

civic peace. For if you take a calmer look at things, what we see in front of us is in principle the famous cup which some people see as half-empty and others see as half-full. But the real question is: What is a full cup? And when, how soon, will it be full? The academician, with his vast knowledge of the United States and the meticulousness and authoritativeness of its congress, can see that our cup is pretty empty compared with the Americans'. But the marshal, whose experience is different, maybe considers that the cup is filling up too fast.

Three years ago we knew nothing. We did not know how many soldiers and generals, tanks, missiles, aircraft, submarines, and so on and so forth we had. Our military machine was—and still remains—the biggest and most cumbersome in the world—but it was hidden behind a single, sole official figure designed to officially mislead the people. Total spending on defense comes to 20 billion rubles [R], we were assured.

This bullshit—which fooled nobody, incidentally—ended in August 1987. Then, carrying out the instructions of the Soviet leadership, Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy admitted at a UN General Assembly session (again abroad) that the figure cited reflected only USSR Defense Ministry expenditure but did not include immeasurably bigger items—the financing of scientific research and experimental design work and also of purchases of weapons and military equipment which came under other sections of the state budget. This was a historic breakthrough which, however, the leadership was shy about trumpeting to the people. At the same time the real figure was also promised “when our projected radical pricing reform is complete.” But the reform was still not completed when in May 1989 M.S. Gorbachev disclosed what he described as the real figure for military spending—R77.3 billion—at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Many people in our country and abroad did not believe this figure. Indeed there is a great deal of axiomatic conditionality inherent in it. How can you calculate something if there are no realistic prices in the national economy? We will only really know our military expenditure when we have a market economy.

Nevertheless great efforts were made in the last three years to calculate and declassify these figures. There was another remarkable breakthrough in the field of military glasnost. But again it essentially escaped the attention of a Soviet press and Soviet public beset with domestic troubles. But it was noticed and assessed by politicians, political scientists, military men, and journalists in the West.

I have in front of me a copy, obtained from the USSR Foreign Ministry, of a brief letter which V.F. Petrovskiy sent to UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar on 12 October this year: “I have the honor to convey the text of a document for the standardized international record of the military expenditure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the fiscal year 1 January 1989-31

December 1989, as stipulated by Resolution 44/114 of the UN General Assembly. Please accept, Your Excellency, assurances of my extremely great respect.”

Among the attachments are a two-page table providing more than 300 figures, in dozens of standardized UN record entries, for actual USSR military expenditure accurate to within R1 million, including troop categories' operational expenditure (six entries) and their expenditure on equipment and construction (24 entries) and research and development. It is impossible to list everything in this table—ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK are proposing to publish it.

Providing national data for the standardized UN record is voluntary. Around three dozen states do it—mainly developed states with developed statistical services and a developed system for monitoring military expenditure. Joining this procedure in itself indicates a degree of responsibility to the world community and strengthens the element of predictability in international relations. If you add to the information that has been passed on the basic data that have been published for Soviet arms at the beginning of 1990 you can say that the Soviet Union is reaching the generally accepted level of glasnost in military matters. This denotes a serious attitude to adopted commitments and the fruit of a great deal of work. The fruit of both cooperation and struggle between the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the omnipotent military-industrial complex, which is finding it difficult to become accustomed to the new times.

This is a reason for justified satisfaction on the part of the people who participated in this work. But, it transpires, it is also a reason for them to feel aggrieved: This is because the event in practice went unnoticed, and satisfaction is incomplete unless your people share it. I was aware of a sense of grievance against our press, or at least of perplexity over its shortsightedness, when I spoke with V.F. Petrovskiy and G.K. Khromov. In the latter's view nobody else could “physically” have done so much work in such a short time to separate military and civilian output within the bowels of the military-industrial complex and to separate the expenditure of the Ministry of Defense and other ministries. If a communications satellite, for example, has several “channels”—half of them military and the others for the national economy—how do you determine the contribution of each in rubles? Or take the “Buran” project—a tremendous amount of work for civilian purposes was carried out at military test sites. What category should the spending be put into?

One more example of what has been achieved: The exchange of data on strategic forces has begun between the USSR and the United States. It is the most detailed data, but a great deal is obviously not for publication. Who can rule out the possibility that highly precise identifications of the location of superpowerful weapons could be useful to some international malefactors?..

Let us return in conclusion to our ambiguous cup. To avoid having to thank somebody else's minister of defense only one thing is required: Our defense minister or other authorized official should keep our legislators up to date on how many missiles, submarines, and tanks have been produced. How many were produced last year and how many have been requested for next year. And they, the legislators, should have the last word on the "how many."

People say that Soviet legislators are still very inexperienced and unversed in these matters. People say that if all the real experts on the market economy were brought together from all over the Soviet Union they would not fill even a medium-sized room. The same applies to real experts on military matters. A large proportion of them, it transpires, have an unbreakable umbilical link with the military-industrial complex and would rather develop than control it. Yes, we don't yet have senators of our own like America's San Nunn. But this only increases people's deputies' degree of responsibility. A few days ago the draft military budget for next year went to the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee for examination....

Chernov's Komsomolets Enquiry Questioned

PM0611154790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain Third Rank V. Kondriyenko:
"The Pain Persists..."]

[Text] The loss of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets in April 1989, to the circumstances of which IZVESTIYA, PRAVDA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, SOBESEDNIK, OGONEK, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and many other mass media devoted articles, remains to this day the focus of public attention in our country. This was confirmed yet again by a meeting of surviving crew members of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets and relatives and friends of the deceased with members of the state commission which investigated the

causes and circumstances of the submarine's loss and with representatives of the Navy Command.

Participating in the meeting were USSR People's Deputies O. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A. Yemelyanenko, deputy chief editor of the weekly SOBESEDNIK, and also representatives of local party organs and some ministries, departments, and public organizations.

When the meeting was being prepared, it was proposed that Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov, retired, would convey to its participants the results of an independent investigation conducted by him into the reasons for the loss of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets and his own version. Many people in the fleet already know from Ye. Chernov's articles in certain newspapers and from his appearance on Central Television that he essentially casts doubt on the objectivity of the investigation conducted by the state commission and maintains that "the exceptionally poorly trained second crew" of the Komsomolets was to blame for its loss.

During the meeting weighty counterarguments to the version actively promoted by SOBESEDNIK were heard. The surviving crew members of the Komsomolets and members of the state commission confirmed once again that the ship's crew displayed high professionalism and did everything to save it. In addition, the second crew included many specialists from the first crew.

At the same time, as is clear from statements by certain participants in the meeting, Vice Adm. Ye. Chernov, who headed the commission for the experimental operation of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets, knew about the ship's design faults, particularly those of its rescue equipment, but took no decisive measures to eliminate them. Moreover, the analysis which he conducted independently with regard to the actions of the ship's crew in fighting for survival contains some 20 fundamental mistakes, which in many ways helped him to "substantiate" his conclusions.

All this, in the opinion of many participants in the meeting, has nothing to do with the search for the truth and arouses doubt as to the complete objectivity of Vice Adm. Ye. Chernov, retired, and his supporters.

Baltic Republics

Coverage of Lithuanian 7 November Celebration

Landsbergis Appeals To Ignore Parade

LD0711000390 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] In his traditional Tuesday morning broadcast over Lithuanian national radio, Vytautas Landsbergis referred to yesterday's statement by the Supreme Council Presidium and the government, and also to a demand that Lithuania had made during the summer of last year. He referred to the signature collecting action demanding that the occupation be ended and the Soviet Army be withdrawn from Lithuania. At that time the petition was signed by over 1.5 million people.

Vytautas Landsbergis noted: Lithuania could exclude the preparation of such a demand if that army would behave more politely and would attempt to reach an agreement concerning its temporary presence.

Vytautas Landsbergis continued: Since it is behaving in a contrary fashion, we repeat our demand that the Soviet Army be withdrawn from Lithuania, just as they are leaving Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, as Poland has requested, they will also have to leave Lithuania. He also observed that this may be attained by maintaining calm, order, and harmony.

Lithuania is not an intemperant country, however much it is being provoked. There are no fights taking place here, the Supreme Council chairman noted, urging citizens to totally ignore the military parade planned for tomorrow in Vilnius, so that this demonstration would thunder by like an empty shot.

Vilnius Militiamen To Be Unarmed

LD0711032690 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Report by Edvians Butkus]

[Text] Vilnius City Mayor Juozas Bernatonis, in an announcement on Lithuanian television on the evening of 6 November, stated that tomorrow [7 November] unarmed militiamen will be on duty. They will not even carry the rubber truncheons that they are allowed to carry according to the existing law. This was decided by Vilnius administrators, of their own volition.

Majority Greet Parade With Whistles

LD0711150590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian
1000 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Report on 7 November Great October Socialist Revolution military parade in Vilnius by correspondents Paulius Padegimas and Valdas Kanapienis; from the "Lithuania Today" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Padegimas] Twenty five minutes past nine all the streets leading to Gediminas Avenue and Lukiskes Square were blockaded by military vehicles. The title of the military parade this year has justified itself as never before: paratroopers armed with automatic rifles and rubber truncheons made a close ring around the area of the parade. The traffic of trolleybuses and buses was stopped. Military traffic regulators were in charge on the crossings of the streets.

We have already reported what happened half an hour ago, therefore I will not return to this. I would only like to say that to my mind everything ended well, although it could have ended much worse.

There were people with flowers and traditional red carnations along Gediminas Avenue near the Conservatoire. I also saw some guests from Belorussia.

[Kanapienis] I took a walk along Gediminas Avenue in that area where, because of shortage of paratroopers, the place was not guarded and one could get access to Gediminas Avenue without a special permit. This area is further down from the Conservatoire.

A group of young people of a considerable size in a mood hostile to the parade had gathered already before the parade. They only managed to chant: Occupiers! Right before the parade armed paratroopers wearing bright blue caps were running along Gediminas Avenue clearing the people off for the parade. Before the start of the parade a tall middle aged man made attempts on several occasions to block the road with his body, he kept lying down on the road. However, he was lifted up several times and then a military vehicle simply drove past him.

A young man rushed into the group of the orchestra players. The members of the orchestra simply let him pass through. [passage omitted]

Judging by their faces, I think that the participants in the parade did not feel all that happy. Perhaps at the building of the Conservatoire they were cheered with hurrah. However, further along the Avenue they were greeted with whistles and chanted slogans: Occupiers go home!

The Russian speaking people welcomed the parade with hurrah and applause. However, the majority whistled at the parade. I did not see any significant incidents. At 1100 the sparsely-attended parade was over. [passage omitted]

Troops Clash With Students

LD0711123190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0930 GMT on 7 November broadcasts a ten-minute program presented by Darius Tarasevicius who states that his normal program on crime and car accidents will not be read because of "more important" events currently taking place in Vilnius. Tarasevicius

then holds a telephone conversation with the head of traffic control in Vilnius who says that Soviet troops have surrounded the entire area around the Gediminas Prospekt and Lukiskes [Lenin] Square. No information was given to the traffic control of the city by the soldiers as to when and where the parade would proceed, the official notes. He says that he cannot make any report on what is actually going on in the Gediminas prospekt because he was not given access to the square or the prospekt.

This is followed by a phone call from Lukiskes Square by Valdas Tylunas, Vilnius radio correspondent. The conversation is as follows:

"[Tarasevicius] Valdas, I heard you were beaten by truncheons. I share your pain in the shoulders, Valdas.

"[Tylunas] Pain is not important in our work. What is important is that we can give our listeners information without delay. The moment the military parade started at 1000 opposite Lukiskes Square on the Gediminas prospekt, when the general arrived and greeted the officers, three paratroopers climbed through the toilet windows into the building of the Conservatoire (building opposite the Lenin monument which used to be the spot where the rostrum for party leaders was placed). Immediately a conflict with the Conservatoire students took place. I do not know what was the purpose of their breaking into the building of the Conservatoire. However, the three paratroopers were very aggressive and started beating with rubber truncheons. At the moment I do not know what the situation is in the Conservatoire. It seems that the students are in a friendly way....

"[Tarasevicius, interrupting] Valdas, where are you phoning from?

"[Tylunas] I am phoning from the Conservatoire, from the rector's office. There was a commotion and I think it is over now. Several students have been beaten up by truncheons. It looks as though things have calmed down, although everybody's passions are flying high. Female staff members are especially scared to stay because at any moment the paratroopers who have surrounded all the area around the Gediminas prospekt where the military parade is taking place can all rush into the Conservatoire building."

Tarasevicius then says that somebody saw some young men drinking a bottle of wine in the toilets which would suggest that someone was organizing some action. This is denied by the correspondent who says that the staff and the students in the Conservatoire were simply watching the parade. Tylunas adds: "A women staff member just informed me that a student received head injuries and another had his arm broken: the wrist has been broken by the paratroopers." Tylunas then reports what he can see through the window in Gediminas Prospekt. He also says how shocked the Conservatoire people are. He goes on: "Here is one person... suddenly here events are taking place right now while we are talking on the phone. One of the lecturers of the Conservatoire has brought in

something that looks like a paratrooper's helmet, and the three intruders into the building are now sitting next to me about five meters from me. They are excited. Probably, esteemed listeners can hear a noise. Yes, yes, I told you that there were injured. A dialogue is taking place between the intruders and the rector of the Conservatoire."

"[Tarasevicius] Valdas, can you play the usual journalistic trick and ask one of them to come to the phone telling him that this is a military general who wants to talk to them. Tell a lie. I would like to ask one of the paratroopers what they have been doing there."

Following this a voice is heard in Russian as V.Tylunas tries to get one of the servicemen to take the receiver. He asks them if their action was carried out on orders from their officers.

"[Tylunas] Did you break in on your own initiative or on your commander's orders?

"[Paratrooper] On commander's orders."

"[Tylunas, in Lithuanian] They want to see the commander of the unit. Somebody is coming through the door with a bleeding head and the other with a broken wrist.

"[One of the injured students] When they broke in through the window we rushed to protect the Conservatoire building so that they would not break doors.

"[Tarasevicius] Can you tell your name and who you are?

"[Student] I am Jonas Girdenis from the department of the Defense of the Land.

"[Tarasevicius] Thank you. Can you tell me, perhaps you carried out some provocative actions, for example showed some banners through the windows or something like that?"

"[Student] All our people were in the corridors. Every person was inside because both the exit and the entrance was blocked by the paratroopers. There have been no provocations on the part of our people at all. This has been an unexpected break in, that is all. Nobody thought that they would break in through the windows. Because they broke the windows and went in through them.

"[Tarasevicius] Did you say they broke the windows?

"[Student] Yes, they simply broke the windows on the ground floor.

"[Tarasevicius] Did you receive any injuries?

"[Student] Yes I did. I have my arm broken and my colleague has injuries on his head. We called in the ambulance.

"[Tylunas interjects] Hello, Hello. Again they are climbing through the windows, the commotion has

started again. [voices and noise are heard in the back-ground] I have just been to the ground floor corridor of the Conservatoire. More paratroopers are smashing windows and breaking the doors down. The three paratroopers who broke in first did not want to talk at all, as you have heard, and I think that all the rest arrived here to rescue them. Now the students have barricaded the windows. All the windows are smashed, furniture broken, windows on the side of the courtyard are smashed, as well as on the side overlooking the building of the KGB and the Law Courts. The ambulance is not allowed in, although there are many people injured. Two men are walking around covered in blood. I simply do not know what to say: Red October or Bloody October. I wish to God that such October would be the last in Lithuania.

"A woman just told me that the ambulance has arrived but the paratroopers are not allowing them in to give urgent medical assistance to those who have been injured. I am not putting down the receiver, I will rush downstairs to the scene of events.

"The situation is this: the injured were allowed out of the building so that they could receive medical assistance. The soldiers who broke in have now calmed down. Their rubber truncheons and rubber helmets have been returned to them. Everything what was taken from them during the fight was returned."

Tylunas adds that he saw the injured people leaving the building through the smashed windows. He also says that on the other side of the building happy voices shouting 'Hurrah' in Russian were heard in Gedimanas Avenue.

Parade Curtailed Due to Protests

LD0711121190 Hamburg DPA in German 1104 GMT
7 Nov 90

[Text] Vilnius (DPA)—Protests of the Lithuanian people have led to an early end of the military parade on the 73d anniversary of the October Revolution in Vilnius. There were several incidents during the parade, which started in front of the Lenin monument on the main street in Vilnius against the will of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. A young man lay down on the road in order to stop the military convoy. Another jumped in front of a jeep carrying Soviet officers. Both were arrested and taken away. In order to avoid a worsening of the situation, the parade turned into a side street and returned to the barracks.

Earlier there were several incidents. Two students were hurt in a fight between students and soldiers of the Soviet Interior Ministry in the conservatory building behind the honorary rostrum. Another fight developed early in the morning when some 120 Soviet parachutists cleared the main street for the parade. Two weeks ago the city declared Gedimino Street a pedestrian precinct and put up concrete boxes for plants and flowers.

Lithuania and the other Baltic republics have declared 7 November a normal working day. According to reports from Riga and Tallinn the military parades there were largely closed to the public.

Coverage of Estonian 7 November Celebration

Controversy Over Parade Viewed

LD0611202590 Moscow TASS in English 2016 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn November 6 TASS—In connection with holding a military parade in Tallinn on November 7 to mark the 73rd anniversary of the October Revolution, the Estonia Committee board has called on the Estonian population to "remain at home."

The Estonia Committee is a permanent elective body of the Estonian National Congress favouring the restoration of the bourgeois Estonian Republic.

The Estonian Parliament has passed the law on state holidays, where November 7 is not on the list. Passions around celebrations of this date and the possibility of a military parade and a demonstration of working people unleashed after the Soviet president issued a decree on holding military parades in the capitals of Union republics.

Political forces and groups favouring Estonia's independence oppose holding a parade and a demonstration. According to the Tallinn city authorities, a parade and a demonstration would break the working rhythm of the city, as November 7 is an ordinary working day now.

In addition to an application to hold a military parade, the city council received applications from the Popular Front to hold a rock concert in the same square and from a para-military kaitseliit (defence union) organisation to hold its own parade. There were also calls on the eve of November 7 to hold a sit-in strike in the square where the parade is to be held on the night of November 6.

'At Most 5,000' Participate

LD0711130590

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1000 GMT on 7 November carries a seven-minute report from Tallinn by correspondents Neeme Brus and Ain Saarna in which they state that they are standing at Freedom Square in the town a few minutes before the scheduled beginning of the GOSR [GOSR] military parade.

The reporters note that a red flag was hoisted on a crane in the middle of the square.

In addition to the military standing in the square, a few hundred spectators were also standing with flags and balloons.

The military band is heard briefly in the background as the parade starts. One of the reporters mentions that there is no longer any need for detailed descriptions of the parade. Next, the reporters note that the parade came to an end at 1030. There were two speeches: one from Admiral Belov, and the other from Aleksandr Gusev, secretary of the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Estonia.

The two reporters say they stood in Mayor Hardo Aasmae's office on the fourth floor of the local government building during the parade and also saw the workers' parade which followed the military one. They estimated that at most 5,000 people participated. Slogans, as far as they could see, were neutral and not at all antigovernment.

The correspondents then interviewed Aasmae who said that the persons in charge of organizing the parade are known. Bills will be presented to them—if necessary court action will be taken—for having disrupted traffic.

Russian Democrats Hoist Tsarist Flag

*LD071111290 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian
1000 GMT 7 Nov 90*

[Excerpt] We, the festive demonstration, have reached the building of the Communist Party of Estonia Central Committee, near the monument to Vladimir Ulyanov. Here everything is as traditional as ever: Greetings are exchanged and one is wished a happy holiday. But also here, opposite the Lenin monument, is a small but interesting gathering. Here Russian democrats have put up a slogan demanding that the CPSU, which has scattered the homeland, be taken to court for this. They have hoisted both the Russian tsarist national flag and Aleksandr's flag—both tricolors with mourning bands on them—and now a lively debate is in progress about the fate of Russia. [passage omitted]

Anniversary Deemed Working Day

*LD0711105990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0946 GMT 7 Nov 90*

[Interview with Tallinn correspondent Heimar Lenk by unidentified studio announcer; from the "Mayak Panorama" program—live]

[Text] [Lenk] Hello. As you probably know since we have reported this on more than one occasion, the anniversary of the October revolution is no longer a state holiday in Estonia. As far as the majority of inhabitants of the republic is concerned, today was a normal working day. Brief meetings were held at a number of industrial enterprises. Modest demonstrations of the working people took place in the towns in eastern Estonia and in Tallinn. A military parade, likewise modest, took place in Tallinn. The very fact that it was staged inflamed political passions. An appeal of the republican Supreme Soviet was made public yesterday. It states that the staging of a parade in Tallinn represents a crude violation of Estonia's sovereignty. The appeal contains a call

to the city and to Estonia's inhabitants to be tolerant in their attitude toward the military parade. I have just returned from Freedom Square. One can say that there were no serious conflicts on Tallinn's streets today between military subunits and the city's inhabitants or between representatives of various political movements. So one can say that despite everything, things are calm in the city and thank God for that.

[Announcer] Heimar, pardon me for interrupting, but you said there were no serious conflicts. Were there any incidents?

[Lenk] Well you know, lively debates are of course conducted on the streets between the indigenous and the nonindigenous population. All the same, many people are displeased that the parade took place. You yourself know that most inhabitants now regard the Soviet Army as an army of occupation, as it were.

[Announcer] Yes, I understand.

[Lenk] So things like that exist, of course, but let me say that I have personally received no such reports to date—I mean reports on anything serious happening. But in general I say that the situation in the city is explosive, that is what I can say.

[Announcer] A serious situation.

[Lenk] Yes, a serious situation because no one is in a festive mood, not even Interfront which organized a short rally in Tallinn today. You yourself know what the situation is like.

[Announcer] Of course, when there is tension.

[Lenk] Of course, because no one can see a way out any more, that is the crux of the matter.

[Announcer] Thank you.

[Lenk] You know, I would like to add something if we have time. We have just received reports about a public opinion poll and it says that approximately 10 percent of the population approved the staging of a military parade in Tallinn, whilst the majority of Estonia's inhabitants is of the view that today's parade has become the last Great October Socialist Revolution military parade in Tallinn.

[Announcer] Thank you Heimar for your story. Heimar Lenk, our correspondent in Tallinn, was on the line. He described how 7 October is taking place in Estonia. Let me add to his story that 7 October is not a state holiday in other Baltic republics either.

Latvian 7 November Celebrations Reported

Interior Minister Appeals for Calm

*LD0611233990 Riga International Service
in Latvian 1830 GMT 6 Nov 90*

[Text] Aloizs Vaznis, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Latvia, has announced that in connection

with the parade of the troops planned for tomorrow that he had communicated with Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District. From the commander's answers it could be understood, Vaznis said, that the army is in a (?very) aggressive frame of mind. Kuzmin said that the parade at the Daugavmala will take place regardless, that large forces of assault landing troops have been drawn in to ensure it, and that additional units will be in helicopters in the air, Fedor Kuzmin said.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, too, has appealed for caution to be observed on this day and for self-control to be exercised (?because) there are forces which are interested in organizing disorders and even in bloodshed on 7 November, so that they can then shout about the inability of the local power to secure order, and they can demand the introduction of presidential rule and the introduction of USSR internal ministry troops into Latvia, Aloizs Vaznis emphasized yesterday in a television interview.

Interfront Leader Views Plans

LD0711014790 Riga International Service in Latvian
1830 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Excerpts] At the disposal of the Interfront organization is data that tomorrow their political opponents will be attempting to radically disturb the course of proceedings of the October revolution celebrations, traditional in the Soviet Union. This was announced today [6 November] by the press chairman of the organization, Igor Lopatin.

Here in Riga, contrary to the legislature's decision, traditional marking of the October revolution will take place. This will be organized by the Baltic Military district headquarters, the loyal-to-Moscow communist party of Latvia, and the local Interfront. [passage omitted]

In remembrance of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 a half-hour military parade is envisaged, this time without the participation of caterpillar tracks and machines. The parade will be followed by a demonstration and meeting at the Vienpadsmita Novembra Krastmala in the center of Riga. The demonstration will follow the example of the May demonstration. Columns of working people from various rayons will converge at meeting place by the former rostrum of the government, said Inter-front Chairman Igor Lopatin.

Latvian People's Front Protests

LD0611213490 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
0530 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] [Announcer] Although, I am convinced, we have resolved to ignore the former festivity of 7 November, we have received an announcement from the board of the dome of the People's Front of Latvia on its attitude toward the USSR Armed Forces in Latvia, which states: The decree of the USSR president on army parades in the capital cities of the Union republics on 7 November does not indicate the actual place where the parades will

take place. The leadership of the Baltic Military District had the opportunity to show goodwill in not making relations with the people of Latvia more acute by holding the USSR festivity parades at its bases. The arbitrary parade rehearsals at the Veinpadsmita Novembra Krastmala [11 November embankment] show that the USSR Armed Forces stationed in Latvia are continuing their confrontation with the lawful power of the Republic of Latvia.

The People's Front of Latvia believes that in organizing a demonstration of their military power in the center of Riga on 7 November, contrary to the resolutions of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia and of the Riga City Executive Committee, the USSR Armed Forces in Latvia have placed themselves outside the laws of the Republic of Latvia.

We demand that in their future relations with the occupation Armed Forces, the power establishments at all levels adopt resolutions appropriate to this status, and the Supreme Council should unhesitatingly solve the question of the withdrawal of all USSR Armed Forces from Latvia.

Controversy Over Parade Noted

LD0611193890 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Report by LETA-TASS correspondent Peter Manko]

[Text] Riga November 6 TASS—The traditional military parade to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Revolution will take place in Riga, capital of Latvia, in "any political weather," said Colonel-General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District.

Kuzmin emphasized that he would fulfil unconditionally the Soviet president's decree on holding the parade despite protests by the Latvian parliament which annulled Soviet holidays.

Kuzmin did not rule out attempts to hinder the passage of troops and military hardware on the Daugava embankment in the centre of the city. He even noted that he knew who was preparing such actions, but did not elaborate.

The commander did not directly answer the question about the nature of measures to be taken in case of provocations but firmly reiterated that these actions would be stopped.

"Democratic forces do not intend to stage any protest actions against the parade and a demonstration on November 7," Latvian Popular Front leader Romualdas Razukas said, in turn. "Conversely, our front has called upon all political movements to ignore the demonstration and parade and to continue working because November 7 in Latvia is a working day in line with the law, which was recently adopted here," Razukas said.

Any incidents, the more so those using force can serve as a pretext for "reactionary forces" to step up their activity, Razukas stressed. He thinks that the army's loud statements about its readiness to rebuff any provocations during the celebration of revolution day might serve as a pretext for speculation.

Soviet Army Guard Lenin Monument

LD0611215690 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian
1830 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] There is a variety of information at our disposal about the attitude of people toward the Great October.

In Liepaja in the fenced enclosure (?formed) around the Lenin monument four soldier with submachine guns are on duty around the clock. Gunars Kazaks, Executive Committee chairman, has at last received an official telegram signed by Admiral Ivanov, commander of the Baltic Fleet. It states that the monument is being guarded, fulfilling the USSR president's decree because the Liepaja Council of Deputies has not adopted any decisions which will guarantee the inviolability of the Ulyanov monument.

Soldiers Hoist Flag at Press House

LD0711141890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1000 GMT on 7 November broadcasts a five-minute report on an "unpleasant incident" which occurred at the Press House in Riga early on 7 November. According to the radio members of the Black Berets, who had been guarding the House parallel to the House's own guards, broke open the lock of the metal-clad door leading to the roof, hoisted the red flag, and mounted a four-man guard armed with submachineguns. The incident was related to an unidentified radio correspondent by the director of the House, Kazimirs Dundurs, who regards this as hooliganism and a criminal offense. The correspondent also interviews a Black Beret who thinks that it is appropriate for the flag to fly on the 73rd GOSR anniversary, contends that the CPSU Central Committee is the master of the House, and admits that his colleagues have put up the flag. He has not heard of any complaints until now, but does not reveal who has given the order. The program announcer comments that if this were the will of the people, the Black Berets would not have to guard the flag.

Prunskiene Discusses Negotiations With Kremlin

LD0611211590 Vilnius International Service
in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 5 Nov 90

[Interview with Kazimera Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, by correspondent Roma Pakeniene, on 3 November; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pakeniene] Madame Prime Minister, do you think that negotiations with the Kremlin could start at the end of this month as has been agreed?

[Prunskiene] Many obstacles to the start of negotiations have appeared, because people we authorized, such as Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas, several members of legislature and Doguzhiyev on the other side, find it difficult to agree on the protocol for the start of negotiations. Each side understands differently the aim of negotiations and the main prerequisites. While formulating the aim of negotiations as normalization of relations and setting up bilateral relations based on equal rights, the Soviet Government nevertheless uses its constitution as a basis, stressing that negotiations should be conducted in compliance with their constitution. Of course, they also have in mind the Congress of People's Deputies. It is obvious that they do not want to recognize our pretensions and our demands and discuss our question within the framework of the end of the World War II, as ending the occupation, as restoration of justice, which probably does not need to be explained to the world.

Therefore, approaching the most general political concepts in a different way, each side finds it difficult to agree on the contents for the protocol that could be signed.

At the same time, a great amount of work is being carried out in coordinating the positions concerning economic relations. First of all, there is the matter of next year. Two weeks ago when the second consultative meeting took place—and even during the first meeting—a statement was included in the joint communique that both sides would work further on bilateral economic relations for 1991. However, at the moment the Soviet side has clearly changed its tactics and is trying to talk to us as if we are the same as other Soviet republics that are within the composition of this state and that have expressed their wish to remain there.

They do not want to recognize that we could investigate what one side is selling or buying; that is, we could coordinate the cooperation in the economic sphere for next year purely within the framework of trade relations. They make attempts to interfere in our internal affairs, in the volume of our production, in the volume of construction, and so on. They attempt to monopolize the distribution of resources which are produced in Lithuania while transferring it to the system of centralized distribution. [words indistinct] It looks like in a week's time we will have to talk to the highest leaders of the Soviet Union. The prime ministers of the Baltic states have been invited to see Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov on 11 or 12 November to hold further discussions on our relations. If we are not firm enough it may mean that our common strategy could break down. There is reason to say this, because if Lithuania does not hand in any plans to the Soviet Union except our proposals to buy and sell according to individual groups of goods and according to the 12 republics, without

knowing what monopoly the center will retain for itself—we know some of our neighboring republics have already submitted their plans—then this gives the grounds for them to bring greater pressure on us. November is a serious testing time. This testing moment is in a very unfavorable situation.

Russia, at least the government, is obviously shifting its competence onto the government of the Soviet Union in order to fortify it and to help to maintain its intentions to hold the main strategic resources in its hands through which it exerts great economic pressure on us. The military forces in the Soviet Union evidently support Ryzhkov's government, and it is possible that pressure is also being put on the president himself, in order to preserve the central power, the structures and the territory of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, at the same time the world's interest in us has diminished considerably, and the intentions to support us have also diminished.

How things will develop, of course, depends first of all on the general context of the world, the context of world events. At the moment, the mood, of course, is not too optimistic.

[Pakeniene] Last week, you said in the legislature that while the international [word indistinct] is getting stronger, it may happen that the negotiations with the Kremlin will become only the official registration of international agreements. Could you give a wider explanation of the idea you expressed and say how things would look if the circumstances changed today.

[Prunskiene] The barometer of the world's favorable disposition is very unstable. Two weeks ago—and to some extent last week, too—there was evidence of increasing support from the Scandinavian states for the aspirations of the Republic of Lithuania and the Baltic states in general. The news which reached us from the United States and the actions which followed, including our attempt to participate independently in the sitting of the sponsor group of the Baltic declaration which took place at the beginning of November in Helsinki [passage indistinct] Looking at all the participants in this conference, one could see that sometimes this favorable attitude which is being expressed at the meetings [word indistinct] last week does not always develop into more practical actions in implementing these intentions. For this reason, I am rather disappointed today with the inconsistency in the policies of most of the states. It is difficult to tell how the barometer will change in the course of the next week or so.

I would like to stress particularly that last week the possibility for cooperation with the Soviet Union in accordance with the bilateral trade agreement was [word indistinct] great difficulty to our representatives from institutions of the economy, material resources, and some ministries. Meanwhile the meeting of numerous governmental institutions with Maslyukov, chairman of the State Planning Committee and deputy prime minister, indicated that during the past week the Soviet

Union has retreated considerably from its intentions, from its promises and agreements with Lithuania, and has made efforts to exert pressure on us through the economy, so that we would adopt tactics which suit them and behave in the same way as all the other union republics. This is absolutely unacceptable to us.

Therefore, it is evident that during the past week Soviet pressure on Lithuania has increased considerably. This is the reflection of actions and decisions taken by the United States and Western countries concerning the Soviet Union and Lithuania.

[Pakeniene] So, once again you are confirming that you still maintain the position that the negotiations are late.

[Prunskiene] Perhaps it is difficult to say today that what did not happen should have happened. However, I would find it difficult to deny that my previous position on this matter (?has changed). At the same time, when we had paid the price for independence, when the Soviet Union and its leadership was evidently interested in starting negotiations with us, the prerequisites could have been more favorable. Whether these would have lead to the negotiations [words indistinct] and whether some obstacles would have arisen during the negotiations which would have thwarted the negotiations is difficult to [words indistinct] today. At that time, however, and now looking back retrospectively, I see that the conditions for starting negotiations now in the autumn, in October and November, are by no means worse than those that existed in June and July when the Soviet Union actively encouraged us to start the negotiations.

Meanwhile our attempts have run into very serious obstacles and I have serious doubts whether these attempts are going to be successful and whether we will conclude the negotiations by the end of January next year, as planned, with results acceptable to us.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Invited to Japan To Discuss Kurils

LD0611164190 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1455 GMT 6 Nov 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Japanese Government has proposed to Yeltsin and Silayev that they visit Japan in January next year. Great significance is attached here to the fact that four Kuril Islands are under the jurisdiction of the Russian Republic, and the leadership of the Russian Federation is acquiring increasing influence over the solving of the problems of the Northern Territories. At the same time, the Japanese side proceeds from the premise that the government of the USSR is undoubtedly a partner in talks.

Silayev Meeting With Military Deputies Viewed

PM0711111090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain Second Rank V. Urban: "Who Is To Resolve Army Problems? I.S. Silayev's Meeting With Military Deputies"]

[Text] At the end of September KRASNAYA ZVEZDA informed its readers of a meeting between I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, and the command and political leadership of branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, and fleets deployed on the territory of the Russian Federation. There was another meeting on Friday—this time with military deputies of all levels. Some 570 people came along.

Like last time, I.S. Silayev stressed that the military had not been invited along because of any extraordinary circumstances; the government considers contacts with representatives of various groups and strata of the population necessary. This enables us, he went on to say, to obtain a deeper understanding of the processes of society's development and to amend our work.

The dialogue lasted a whole working day. I will therefore just try to single out the main elements, with the emphasis on questions of most concern to servicemen. The idea espoused by the meeting's organizers can be determined from the subject of the speeches delivered by members of the Russian legislative and government leadership.

The premier himself spoke in extremely specific terms, remarking that the RSFSR Council of Ministers intends to develop its policy with consideration for the interests of servicemen, regarding the Armed Forces as highly important political and economic links in Russian society. Our work has one aim—cooperation, particularly during the period of the "500 days" program.

USSR People's Deputy G.E. Burbulis, plenipotentiary representative of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman, devoted his speech to the soviets' role as centers for the consolidation of society. The Army is one force capable of stabilizing the situation. In the deputy's opinion, the paradox is that the Army itself needs protection. On entering Russian territory, any officer becomes a Russian citizen—and we are obliged to protect him. This meeting should to some extent answer the question of how this is to be done.

Does the Russian Government itself have any suggestions? USSR People's Deputy V.N. Lopatin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Social Security and Relations with the USSR Defense Ministry and the USSR KGB, voiced a number of positions on social protection for servicemen. They have been singled out in the concept for military reform formulated by V.N. Lopatin. I.S. Silayev gave assurances that the government would discuss these measures in November.

What do the invitees think about this? It is impossible to speak about all 14 speeches, even in summarized form. I will just note that it was largely a question of servicemen's unclear position in conditions of the transition to a market economy. Nothing has yet been heard about any material compensation, which has been discussed at length at various levels. Military service is declining in prestige. The Army is increasingly being drawn into politics from various sides, it has become the object of irritable attacks.

Servicemen are also very worried by the republics' proclamation of the supremacy of their laws over Union laws. Union legislation must be supreme in order to ensure that civil peace prevails in society. Many speakers think that confrontation between Russia and the center will produce nothing, and will only aggravate the destabilization process.

V.N. Lopatin's proposals also provoked many disputes. For instance, where is the money to implement them to be obtained? I.S. Silayev said that we are prepared to take on some of the care for troops deployed in the RSFSR. What is more, a draft law on social guarantees for servicemen on the territory of the Russian Federation is virtually ready for examination in the legislature.

It must be said that most of the problems raised at the Russian Council of Ministers should primarily be resolved by the Union government. It is no coincidence that many deputies pressed for a meeting with the USSR president. At the end of the day I.S. Silayev announced that he had received a report that M.S. Gorbachev is prepared to hold such a meeting.

The debate about the future of our Armed Forces was also interesting. In the opinion of both sides, our Army should be a Union army; dividing it national compartments will weaken the state. The creation of republic armies, said Colonel General D.A. Volkogonov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, will render our defense 80 percent more costly. This has been calculated by scientists. But V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, noted that the conclusion of a Union Treaty would solve many of the problems and urged the RSFSR leadership to promote its conclusion more vigorously.

The meeting adopted a message from military deputies to Russian citizens.

Polozkov Refused Residence Permit for Moscow

PM0611164790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by A. Illesh: "I. Polozkov Refused Moscow Residence Permit—Moscow City Soviet Deputies Have Adopted This Decision"]

[Text] Honestly speaking, both journalists and readers are rather tired of sensations today. But such an event

simply cannot be overlooked: For the first time in the country's history a CPSU Central Committee Politburo member has been denied the opportunity to live and work in the capital.

We turned for the details to V. Maksimov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Law and Order Subcommittee.

"On 5 November," he reported, "the Moscow City Soviet Commission for Housing Questions, Residence Permits, and the Exclusion of Citizens really did spend 90 minutes examining a petition from the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs to grant RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, an apartment and a permit to reside in it. The said Administration of Affairs is making available to him a four-room apartment for four people—Ivan Kuzmich himself, his wife, and her father and mother—with a total area of 125.2 square meters and a living area of 80.8 square meters."

Present at that session was a representative of the CPSU Central Committee who did not introduce himself, to whom, in the commission's view, a mass of material questions was put. For example: Who lived in that apartment previously? No one, so it turned out: That apartment was "in reserve." In what way was I. Polozkov granted the right to work for a long time without a residence permit? No reply followed here....

IZVESTIYA's correspondent managed to ascertain that in addition to the aforementioned questions the commission members thoroughly shed light on other legal, political, moral, and of course everyday aspects of the problem's resolution. There were stormy debates, amplifications from jurists, appeals not to yield to emotion, statements with regard to voting, and in general everything that has attended the democratic discussion of disputed issues in recent years.

Seven different solutions were suggested. They included: recommending that the CPSU Central Committee find a smaller area according to the existing norms for Muscovites; giving Comrade Polozkov and his wife alone a temporary permit; reserving an apartment in Krasnodar, but providing an official area in Moscow; and others. In short, the commission members sought to combine the spirit and letter of the law. Incidentally, this commission was set up precisely in order to investigate unusual cases. They also sought an opportunity to resolve the matter "by way of an exception." But as the vote showed, they failed. Sixteen commission members—three voted against and two abstained—voted to refuse to grant I. Polozkov an apartment and a permit.

Now a material question: What will happen now? I would very much like to be mistaken, but Maksimov for example is convinced that the decision of the deputies' commission will be ignored: "Either the leaders of Moscow City Soviet will deem it necessary to make an exclusion and reject the deputies' decision, or the CPSU

Central Committee will fix Comrade Polozkov up in "its own" area without the procedures laid down by law."

Yazov Meets With RSFSR Military Deputies

PM0611164290 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain Second Rank V. Urban: "We Are Counting on the Soviets' Help: USSR Defense Minister Meets With Military Deputies"]

[Text] A large group of military servicemen who are Russian people's deputies from soviets of all levels have visited Moscow at the invitation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] government. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, on Friday they met with I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. On Saturday they met with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council and USSR defense minister.

The defense minister dwelt briefly on problems in the Armed Forces related to recent events in the country and the world. One such problem is the withdrawal of our troops from abroad. What is the best way to make arrangements for military servicemen and members of their families? How is the combat capability of the combined and other units being withdrawn to be maintained? Military deputies must also contribute to the solution of these questions. In the opinion of D.T. Yazov and the deputies who supported him, the stabilization of the situation in the country and the Army's due legal status will largely depend on the republics' proclamation of the supremacy of Union law over their own, especially in the defense sphere.

Many deputies returned to yesterday's discussion at the RSFSR Council of Ministers. Overall, the deputies viewed it positively. But it was noted, for example, that the organizers of the meeting had prepared in advance a draft resolution which, and I quote one of the speakers, "incited the military to confrontation with the Defense Ministry leadership." Admittedly it was then decided not to examine this draft but merely to adopt an appeal to citizens of the RSFSR. In this regard D.T. Yazov said that he had not even been informed about the invitation for the military deputies to visit Moscow.

The defense minister informed the assembly about the measures being taken to improve military servicemen's material position in conditions of the country's transition to the market. The rise in the cost of living is worrying people particularly and is affecting the Army's morale. The ministers of defense and internal affairs and the chairman of the USSR KGB have sent the Union government a letter on the need to implement last year's USSR Supreme Soviet decision on the continuous indexation of military servicemen's fixed incomes. For example, it is proposed to increase the allowances of officers, warrant officers, and ensigns by approximately 90 to 150 rubles.

The cost of food has already risen significantly in the Baltic republics. What are military servicemen's families to do? A decision has been adopted to issue food rations to officers and warrant officers there. The same thing is being proposed for the Transcaucasus. But it goes without saying, the defense minister said, that the question cannot be resolved by these ad hoc decisions alone unless fundamental steps are taken. That is why the Army expects the acceleration of work on preparing the Union Treaty, which must enshrine clearly the status of troops and social guarantees for military servicemen in the republics. The Army is entitled to expect the help of soviets at all levels and even more so from deputies who are servicemen. This applies particularly to the social sphere.

Answering a question on the need to adopt a USSR Law on Defense, D.T. Yazov explained: The draft is already prepared and has been sent to the troops and the USSR Supreme Soviet. But once again, he stressed, many sections of the document will be altered substantially when the Union Treaty is concluded. Therefore the draft will need a major reworking.

The defense minister confirmed the agreement of President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR to meet with servicemen deputies. The meeting is planned for 13 November. It has also been decided that military deputies will come to Moscow from other Union republics.

Filshin Demands Union Government Resignation

AU0511144790 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL
in German 5 Nov 90 pp 191-192

[Unattributed interview with Gennadiy Filshin, deputy premier of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; place and date not given: "The Union Government Must Go"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Gennadiy Innokentevich, on Wednesday [31 October] the Russian Parliament adopted the so-called 500 days program, which is to improve the economy of the largest Soviet republic within one-and-a-half years. Meanwhile, even its authors hardly give the project any chance of success. Why?

[Filshin] The central authority has already barricaded the path outlined in this program. Of course, it would have been simpler and better to stick strictly to our program. All measures that are taken now can only be makeshift solutions.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the meantime, Mikhail Gorbachev is pursuing economic policy alone. He rules with decrees, which, for instance, reduce the foreign trade value of the ruble by two-thirds and permit the founding of companies by foreigners without Soviet participation and the transfer of profits in foreign currency. Are you not pleased with these measures?

[Filshin] These are all half-hearted things. At the Union level there is a draft law that would provide foreign

investors with high security guarantees. But this law is not adopted because the ruling structures of power are against it.

[DER SPIEGEL] The decrees by the Russian Gorbachev are bad for Russia?

[Filshin] Without a doubt. What we need is a real investment law, not inconsistent orders from above, which usually leave out the most important thing: solid incentives for foreign enterprises and the reliable protection of their property. We in Russia will pass such a law; at the Union level, on the other hand, it is further braked for ideological reasons. The president now has to decide.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does he want to cling to the central administration economy?

[Filshin] Take the half-hearted property law, which contains a lot of ideological resentments. "Property of socialist ownership" it says, and no one knows what that actually is. The numerous reservations against private ownership have to be thrown overboard as soon as possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] On the path toward capitalism?

[Filshin] On the path toward the market economy of which the central authorities are afraid. Already two years ago I was the first one to criticize Gorbachev's raising of the wholesale prices. This further destroyed the purchasing power of the ruble, even though the opposite should have been done to motivate the workers again. This also was the core of the 500 days program: creating trust and making the people feel that things get better with every step.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is this not possible anymore now?

[Filshin] No. For instance, our investment potential has almost been ruined by orders of central bodies. Just take the infamous plan for putting new production facilities into service: Eight percent of it was fulfilled within nine months. This shows the disastrous collapse and makes it more and more difficult to get out of the vicious circle of promises and disappointments.

[DER SPIEGEL] What can be done?

[Filshin] We have to become completely independent from the Union government. One of our Russian deputies recently said correctly: "Why should we get out of the Union? Let them leave us!"

[DER SPIEGEL] You want to force your course on the entire Union?

[Filshin] We are looking for possibilities of a consolidation: Through bilateral contracts with other republics on the basis of a unified currency system and unified cooperation rules.

[DER SPIEGEL] Even advocates of your concept criticize the fact that you are sticking to a unified currency of the Union. How do you want to improve the economic

situation in just one region if the starving consumers of the entire empire will immediately come down on it and buy up everything?

[Filshin] Unfortunately, such a development cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, independent currencies of individual republics or—which is even more useless—of individual regions cannot be our goal. Different currencies in the individual republics immediately give rise to customs barriers.

[DER SPIEGEL] But this is exactly what is happening already now—in Estonia, in the Ukraine, in Lithuania.

[Filshin] This we wanted to counter with our 500 days program. But the Union government is afraid of an economic union of sovereign republics. We see that efficiency has reached zero level in the central authorities and Russian resources are simply exploited. Therefore, we must go our own ways.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where does that lead?

[Filshin] Away from ideologically shrouded nonsense. For instance, the central authorities do not yet permit direct relations between our enterprises and foreign companies because then they would no longer be able to demand five-sixth of the profit. No enterprise is interested in increasing production as long as it can expect only one-sixth of the export profit. For everything one needs an export license, even for waste paper and guts.

[DER SPIEGEL] After all, the Central Foreign Trade Bank paid the liabilities, while the individual enterprises do not pay their bills. But why does crude oil production decline despite a good economic development?

[Filshin] We now want to stimulate all raw material regions with larger deliveries of consumer goods, something which the Union government has neglected. Instead, it permitted that the population cannot buy anything at all now for their hard-earned ruble. We want these regions to be permitted to sell 10 percent of their production volume independently abroad. For the Western Siberian oil field of Tyumen, this would be 40 million tonnes of oil per year, for Irkutsk 4 million cubic meters of wood. The revenue would be available for additional foodstuffs and consumer goods.

[DER SPIEGEL] How long will the Russians be able to bear the increasingly bad supply crisis?

[Filshin] If you mean the trust of the people in the central government of the Union—this is exhausted. The people will not keep quiet much longer.

[DER SPIEGEL] But at the moment the people are still more patient with the leadership of the Russian republic?

[Filshin] We still have some advance trust, even though we cannot by a long way achieve everything that the people demand of us. Perhaps we have one year, but certainly not more.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is there any danger of a famine?

[Filshin] Certainly not for lack of reserves. But certain activities which are supposed to discredit the new democratic forces could lead to that. Take Moscow and Leningrad where the democrats in the town halls are purposely blamed for the crisis.

[DER SPIEGEL] By whom?

[Filshin] This is the work of the representatives of the nomenklatura, who still have their hands on the levers of power in our country. In addition, there are speculators, for instance, who gain advantages from our difficulties and are certainly not interested in permitting a market economy in our country. Therefore, they are working hand in hand with the centralist system and try to destabilize the situation.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Russian legislature has demanded the resignation of the Soviet premier. What is your main objection to Nikolay Ryzhkov?

[Filshin] That he still wants to command the economy even though no one has been obeying orders for a long time. His government has never been able to acquaint itself with the idea of a market economy. It is only pretending so as not to stand aside from modern developments.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does this also apply to such an experienced economist as Ryzhkov's deputy Leonid Abalkin?

[Filshin] All due respect to Leonid Ivanovich: His wisdom all comes from the textbook for political economy of socialism. What can these recipes still do in our economy today? The Constitution of the Russian Federation no longer says anything about a "socialist decision" nor about a "communist future."

[DER SPIEGEL] But your political friends, the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad, also govern with emergency decrees and rationing measures.

[Filshin] They are forced to do so because the Union government is no longer able to foresee the consequences of its own actions. Whoever raises the purchasing price for fodder and grain and, in addition, announces that as of 1 January new purchasing prices for meat will be introduced, must not be surprised if no peasant wants to sell meat at the old prices if he has to pay higher prices for fodder and grain. With a third of his production he manages to get his former revenues. Why should he work more if he cannot buy anything for rubles anyway? As a result, it is no surprise that meat has now disappeared for good.

[DER SPIEGEL] Whom should the West help in the current economic and political mess?

[Filshin] Only those republic governments which have a concept for overcoming the crisis—a realistic concept and not only a fake one. We in the Russian republic want the market, we want competition, and we want private

owners. Therefore, my government is the correct address for help and support. And if one looks at Russia's performance capacity—raw materials, economic potential, labor, research facilities—then investments are here not just poured down the drain.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the struggle for economic autonomy, do you still see the chance for a compromise between Gorbachev and Russia's President Yeltsin?

[Filshin] In my view, such an alliance would be something natural: Yeltsin, who is a bit hot-tempered, knows the interests of the people better, has a more acute sense for them, and can articulate this—on the other hand, Gorbachev who tends toward the center, could avoid unnecessary social collisions, and could provide such an alliance with tactical maturity. It is only the Union government that is still standing between them—and this must go.

Abdulatipov Discusses New Federal Treaty Draft

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[Text] [Announcer] A draft federative treaty is being drawn up in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] legislature. Our correspondent Yuriy Korotkov has asked Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich Abdulatipov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, to comment on this document.

[Korotkov] Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich, on what principles do the state structure of the Russian federation rest?

[Abdulatipov] The state structure of the Russian federation rests on two groups of principles. On one hand there are ethnic and state formations in the Russian federation. They are declaring themselves sovereign republics at present. On the other hand, there are administrative-territorial and national-territorial formations. The whole argument which has begun at the first congress of RSFSR people's deputies was because of the failure to understand the existence of two types, subjects of the Russian federation itself. Deputies who spoke in favor of administrative-territorial formations being exactly the same subjects of the Russian federation as state formations... it is precisely the representatives who are advocating this point of view that you saw today in reality, and as we have seen, myself included, that can lead in general to very negative processes and consequences, perhaps even a definite division into principalities of Russia itself. We had recognized this danger and talked about it—these deputies had a different idea then. Today, when they have seen that this process is really under way, they wish to confine themselves once again to the status quo, to the situation which currently exists in the Russian federation, and to confine themselves to proclaiming a declaration.

Another process is under way alongside this one—a process of concluding the Union treaty. If we confine

ourselves to proclaiming the declaration, then the following will happen: These very RSFSR republics, as sovereign state formations, can enter the USSR while staying within the Russian federation on the basis of declaration. Who will agree to such a role? The point is that many of our deputies unfortunately do not study issues thoroughly, and they are guided by the present day's feelings. Since our feelings are both incommensurable and uncontrollable, we are overcome by new feelings every day.

Popov Interviewed Concerning Moscow Politics

91UN0154A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 15 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet and USSR people's deputy, by VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondents Yuriy Kazarin and Anatoliy Russovskiy; place and date not given: "'I Consider Myself To Be a Normal Russian Intellectual'"]

[Text]

We Could Have Done More

[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA] The stream of letters critical of the Moscow Soviet has increased abruptly in our editorial mailbag. The stores are barren, and no improvements are apparent in the operation of city, communal, and household services. People's patience is at an end. What has the Moscow Soviet succeeded in doing in the past half year?

[Popov] There is criticism of the situation, and then there is criticism of the Moscow Soviet. I believe that at present criticism is leveled against the Moscow Soviet mainly by the people who were associated with the old system to some degree. Anybody who is to any degree unprejudiced at all understands full-well that it is impossible to wreck a system within three to four months if it has been working somehow. Let us assume that the stores are barren here through the fault of the democratic Moscow Soviet; however, they are barren in all cities of the country. Meanwhile, over there the same first party secretaries are in control who have been in control for years. This means that the Moscow Soviet is not the main reason.

The entire system of administrative socialism is disintegrating. This disintegration is unavoidable. This is why the Interregional Group of Deputies demanded that perestroika be accelerated.

However, they did not pay heed and our plans were rejected one after another. In essence, a plan of radical transformations was not adopted in September either. The latest ukases of the president proceed from the government plan rather than the Gorbachev-Yeltsin program.

Therefore I repeat that the current acute situation is associated primarily with the general crisis in the country, rather than with the Moscow Soviet.

If we were to make a comparison, would you please recall the overcoat of Akakiy Akakiyevich? He mended it over and over again, but a time came when the tailor said: "I cannot do it anymore." When told to pad it here he did. When told to take it in there, he did. Finally, the tailor said that nothing could be done with this overcoat of his. The same is the case with our administrative system—nothing can be done about it. This is it! It is falling apart!

However, it would be incorrect to cite only the past. We should work and look forward to the future now that we have embarked on this endeavor.

Have we succeeded in doing a lot? I believe that we could have avoided many complications had we had real experience and real knowledge of the city. Here is an example. Those who ran Moscow before knew very well that between 27 August and 2 September the demand for bread in the city always peaks—people come back from second homes and return from leave. Theoretically we knew it too, but we did not see the size, the real magnitude of the peak. This is how inexperience and a plain lack of knowledge manifest themselves.

To be sure, as an economist I knew a lot about the problems of the city. This is why I categorically objected to any revolutionary replacement of the apparatus, whereas pressure came from virtually all quarters: Let us replace them all! If I could have had my way, I would have retained even V.T. Saykin in some kind of a role. I believe that the apparatus is an enormous and serious organism. It is easy to destroy; in this matter, the bolsheviks have accumulated unique experience. Let us assume that democrats fill every position in the apparatus. However, who among them knows what the reserves of sunflower oil are in the city, and whether three days-worth is a lot or too little for us? Nobody knows where the oil is shipped from or where it is stored either. The people from the old apparatus know. I could name dozens of subjects of the same kind. Besides, it is still the same country around the capital city.

I must say that many people in the apparatus are changing, and developing a taste for working in a new manner now that those at the top do not give assignments, lecture them, and interfere with their every step.

They are telling me that there is the mafia and theft everywhere. I also see certain things and figure other things out. However I fully realize that, if we disperse the cadres of the apparatus, three days later there will be no oil at all in our city. As far as the mafia is concerned, the very nature of our economy is such that by just formally discharging our responsibilities we may drive it into a crisis without any mafia involvement. However, some extraordinary actions, frequently violations of the law, are required in order to just keep it going.

Referring to the results on the whole, we must admit that we could have accomplished more. However, in critical situations the Moscow Soviet acted normally—energetically and with dispatch—both when panic buying flared up after the well-known speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, and in the bread and tobacco-products episodes.

Problems have always developed in the city, even before the new Moscow Soviet was elected. Shortages occurred frequently before our time; certain things altogether disappeared from the stores.

However, we are not worth anything if our qualifications boil down to our ability to combat such crises a little bit better. This was not worth coming to the Moscow Soviet for. This begs the following conclusion: We must switch to innovations in principle. The city soviet should not be responsible for how the baking plant works, but rather an economic arrangement should force it to operate properly. It is the same everywhere. All of the crises are of the same nature—there is no master, no desire of the people to behave like masters.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA published a letter by Moscow Soviet Deputies A. Lantsetti and S. Filimonov "Does Gavriil Khari-tonovich Need the Moscow Soviet?" In general, they do not like the organization of work of the city soviet and its presidium. They believe that a second session should be convened sooner. In response to this publication, V. Kryukov, chief economist of the Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, Dzerzhin-skiy Branch, sent a letter to the editorial office: "I propose to convene an emergency session of the Moscow Soviet at which, in particular, the issue of confidence in Popov and Stankevich should be raised. As I see it, they are not holding positions that are properly theirs."

Indeed, why should the second session not be moved up? At present it is scheduled for late November, is it not?

[Popov] We decided to convene a session sooner than we had planned, but not in order to give them a place to demonstrate their refined skills as polemicists, as one of the deputies put it. The first session showed that when an issue under discussion is well prepared ahead of time, its work is effective; when an issue is not prepared, endless shop-talk ensues.

After all, democrats are also different. Some of them have begun to tackle in earnest the present problems; for them, democracy is an instrument for creating a normal life. Others are of the opinion, and hold the belief, that continuous arguments are what the activity of deputies and the real life of the soviet are all about. They are the ones who insist on the immediate convocation of a session whether issues are prepared for the discussion or not, as long as there is a discussion. An unexpected concurrence of the "left" and "right" occurs with regard to this issue. The former need the session in order to talk,

and the latter in order to show to the city that all the soviets can do is talk. This means discrediting the soviets.

Nonetheless, as I have already said we resolved to convene the session sooner, proceeding from a new situation developing in our country. We thought that the USSR Supreme Soviet would adopt a program for transition to a market economy; subsequently the Supreme Soviet of Russia would make its decisions, and we would also prepare our measures on the basis of it by the end of October. However, reality has shown that the adoption of documents by the Supreme Soviet of the country has been delayed; they are hardly going to be adopted before November. The Russian Federation found itself in a difficult situation as well—what is it to do now, get into a conflict with the Union leadership?

Proceeding from this, we decided to convene the session sooner: We will discuss our own, separate Moscow program. We will open the first part of the session on 10 November and adopt decisions in principle at it. We will prepare a city budget on the basis of these decisions and adopt it in late November at the second part of the session.

Resignations Are Also a Possibility

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] What do you think about the possibility of a conflict with the Center? Will the Russian Federation be able to avoid it?

[Popov] In any event, we must make our decisions in mid-November. If the Center blocks them we should be realistic and look for some way out. However, I do not even rule out an event whereby we will resign. We have been reproached many times for being power-hungry. Meanwhile, we do not need power for its own sake. We cannot merely pretend to be leaders, but not be leaders and not be in a position to implement a program we believe in.

This question is important in principle. We did not come here for the sake of representation, in order to receive for example Margaret Thatcher, and hold other interesting and pleasant meetings. Our position is: Either we will be able to do what we have sought the victory for in the elections, or we will leave. We will not provide a screen for a program that we do not believe in and even consider dangerous for our country.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Does the example set by our Council of Ministers chairman, who does not want to leave under any circumstances, affect you?

[Popov] The example set by the government? I have a different problem: To what degree will the voters understand our actions. Naturally, all conservatives will begin to scream that we chickened out, that we did not accomplish anything, and so on and so forth; this is hardly pleasant. On the other hand, it is dishonest to give a majority of Muscovites false hopes for a better turn of events by us staying in power.

As far as the views of the people that you have cited are concerned, they do not come as a surprise to me. We won the elections by gaining approximately 60 percent of the vote. This is normal: We are dealing with a very contradictory society; there is no unanimity of any kind. In principle, it is impossible to satisfy all, for example a man who wants to become an entrepreneur and one who wants to receive special food allocations as a party veteran.

Whether the posts we hold are ours is an issue of democracy. We may be relieved whenever the deputies or the electorate believe that we are not coping, but once again only in keeping with the rules of democracy.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] A question based on yet another article in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA: In an interview given recently to a correspondent of our newspaper, A.M. Bryachikhin, a Moscow Soviet deputy and the chairman of Sevastopolskiy Rayon Soviet, noted the amateurishness of the soviets, their lack of ability and desire to tackle specific matters, and their rally-like style.

[Popov] All of this is correct; amateurishness and a rally-like style exist. However, it is also correct that the system run by Bryachikhin, among others, ruined the city. It was not us but rather the voters who gave it a vote of no confidence.

Certain Things About Power

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] In general, this is about power that needs to be used. A couple of days ago an episode was shown in the TV program "Good Evening, Moscow!" about complete ruin in one of our city rayons where mundane problems are not being solved at all. A caustic observation was made to the effect that in recent months one novelty has appeared: The number of accusatory speeches by deputies at all levels has increased substantially.

In your opinion, are changes in store for us in this matter? Will the deputies "grow up?"

[Popov] What kind of power should I use and against whom? I do not have real power. There is old power; is this to say that I have to take this old power and use it—against whom?

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Against old power itself?

[Popov] Absolutely correct. Is this a realistic task? The example of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is before my eyes; while he was first secretary of the city committee of the party, he sought to ensure changes in the existing system in this exact manner. We cannot deny his vigor, drive, and might. The power he had at the time cannot be compared with mine. Did he accomplish anything? It did not work. The system applied a "block."

Of course, by rousing the deputies you catch several petty thieves, but you will hardly catch the big fish. You will not change anything in principle in this manner. The main method of struggle is to change our entire system.

Now about the deputies "growing up." Indeed, such a process is under way. The deputies are learning about the issues. In time, many deputies will become businesslike managers. However, some of the deputies are convinced that someone else must work and they should command and give instructions. I believe that this is one of the worst legacies of bolshevism—the conviction that society needs a stratum of people who command and give instructions.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] What is the progress of work on the law on Moscow as the capital of the Union and Russia?

[Popov] Verbally, everyone is "in favor." This law is urgently needed. I talked to both Mikhail Sergeyevich and Boris Nikolayevich; they needed "to be brought together." We agreed that there will be a joint commission working out the law on the capital of the Union and the republic. A commission has been created, but it has not made any decisions to date.

Meanwhile, "shenanigans" go on. For example, several days ago L.A. Voronin, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, announced that the Exhibition of Accomplishments of the National Economy [VDNKh] was removed from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Soviet and taken over by the government. All of Moscow can be picked apart in this manner.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Once again, about power. At present rayon soviets do not recognize the Moscow Soviet. A peculiar parade of rayon sovereignties is on. It borders on the ridiculous. Soon we will be citizens of, say, Kievskiy, Krasnopresnenskiy, or Sovetskiy Rayon rather than Muscovites. Incidentally, at an extraordinary session of the Kievskiy Rayon Soviet (Chairman V. Polunin) categorically rejected proposals of the Moscow Soviet leadership regarding the reorganization of city and rayon management; supposedly, the proposals aimed at abruptly restricting the rights of rayon soviets ran counter to the policy of people's power and gave the Moscow Soviet chairman, that is you, virtually uncontrolled and unrestricted power.

[Popov] You said it right: All of this is ridiculous. To be sure, in a certain sense I understand the leaders of the rayon soviets somewhat. They are elected, they depend on voters and on the rayon soviet deputies. They want to keep their campaign promises. Meanwhile, a powerful old system prevents them from doing so. So a democratic leader thinks that the more he subordinates to himself, the more potential he will have. For example, if he declares all buildings to be the property of his rayon, he will resolve the housing issue sooner. However, gas and electricity supply, water supply, heating, and even garbage collection cannot be resolved at a rayon level.

How are rayon budgets drawn up? There are rayons that generate little revenue, and their funds are obtained by

redistribution due to other rayons that have an opportunity to generate revenues. In this case, what will inter-rayon "boundaries" bring about? After all, a city is a single organism.

However, there are also other reasons for this phenomenon. In most rayons, former party secretaries are leaders. For some of them, the concept of rayon independence is a form of resisting the Moscow Soviet; they understand full-well the absurdity of the concept.

On the whole, as I see it, all of us here fell victim to the Leninist Soviet system. It is based on several ideas that contradict all ideas of democracy. Throughout the world, democracy means three branches of power that are independent of each other: representative, executive, and judicial. The Leninist slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" brings about something completely different, totalitarianism. The second idea of Lenin: The best soviet is the one on which the workers and peasants sit, and the "higher" soviets should receive some powers from the "lower" ones. This is absurd; throughout the world the people, the nation are the original community, the will of which is expressed in general terms by the legislature. There also are local authorities, but they are organs of local self-government that resolve a quite limited scope of issues.

In our case, everything is emerging the other way around. Incidentally, several days ago the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted a law whereby both the lower-echelon soviet and executive committee are subordinated to the higher-echelon ones, and may be punished for their lack of discipline with a fine of up to 10,000 rubles imposed on the violator personally. Therefore, authority will be finally reasserted both in our city and throughout Russia.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Letters come to the editorial office in which people admit that they do not understand why the city and rayon soviets need two chairmen—those of the soviet and of the executive committee. It is not clear how their powers are delineated. At the current Leningrad Soviet session, it was explicitly proposed to combine the two posts, to hand the executive authority over to the chairman of the soviet also. A majority of the Leningrad deputies did not support this idea. What is your attitude toward this?

[Popov] I am categorically against the combination of powers. How is a soviet going to be different from a rayon committee? An omnipotent soviet is in itself a path toward a dictatorship.

The powers need to be divided. We should have an elected mayor who is independent of the soviet—an executive authority, an elected soviet independent of the mayor, and a court independent of them. This is going to be a democracy.

Incidentally, about a dictatorship. So VECHERNAYA MOSKVA published an article by two of our deputies—"Does Gavriil Kharitonovich Need the Moscow

Soviet?" This is a strange question. After all I am a democrat, and there can be no democracy in the absence of an elected soviet. However, there can be no democracy without an elected mayor independent of the soviet or without an elected court independent of both the soviet and the mayor either, therefore the concern about the Moscow Soviet only, which disturbs these deputies would bring about a dictatorship. In turn, the delimitation of powers brings about democracy.

Optimism Is Not the Issue

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] As an economist, do you view our market-based future with optimism? In your opinion, is there an acceptable plan for making a transition to it?

[Popov] I am not optimistic at all. A very difficult period lies ahead. I categorically refuse to believe any promises of complete social guarantees.

It is another matter that everything that can be done should be done. However, we also need to realize clearly that we will have to pay dearly for 70 years of our past. It will be very difficult.

So far, I am not aware of an acceptable plan for switching to a market economy. Even the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan contains a number of provisions that I, as an economist, cannot agree with.

However, whether I look at all of this with optimism is not the issue. We do not have any way out apart from a market economy. A market, as Ostap Bender would have put it, is no Rio de Janeiro. However, in the 20th century an economy can only be a market-based one.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] You and B.N. Yeltsin have both voiced the concept of creating a joint capital city region Moscow-Moscow Oblast. In response, the oblast newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA carried an article with categorical objections to this merger. The article is modestly signed "V. Konotop." Several days ago, one of the leaders of the oblast soviet came out against your concept in the new newspaper PODMOSKOVYE. The essence of their objections is: Moscow needs the annexation (!) of the oblast only in order to solve the problems of the city; the Moscow Soviet does not care about the citizens of the oblast.

Has this idea advanced beyond an exchange of opinions? Is its practical implementation being worked on?

[Popov] Indeed, Moscow needs the oblast. On the other hand, the oblast needs Moscow. In no country of the world are such large cities confined within the city limit. Given a market economy, we could purchase land from the oblast and solve other problems as well. For now there is no land market, and we are left with administrative solutions.

As far as those who maintain that the city is indifferent about the citizens of the oblast, they deliberately distort our position. Here is one example: When forced to

introduce restrictions in the city—sales by invitation cards—we equated Muscovites with the citizens of the oblast. If we introduce ration cards, we will strive to have joint cards. Residence permits are joint. We believe that the citizens of the oblast will only win by virtue of the merger. Leaders of the oblast rayons and cities will likewise win. Who will lose? Some of the successors of Comrade Konotop in the posts of party leaders of the oblast. The Moscow Soviet is no longer under CPSU control; understandably, merging with the oblast would mean the end of such control in the oblast, as well. If they doubt what the will of the citizens of the oblast is, let the RSFSR Presidium hold a referendum.

Personally, I insist on the merger. Let us look at, for example, the following detail. In 1988, a decision was made to allocate to Muscovites 400,000 gardening parcels. Had they been already allocated to the Muscovites, there would be no potato problem: Under our current circumstances, the people would have grown potatoes for themselves on their parcels, and nobody would have left them in the ground.

We now see a second force that is protesting. They are the managers of weak collective and state farms. They understand full-well that farmers will immediately be given as gardening parcels the exact land of the unprofitable farms that survive due to the labor of city dwellers sent there.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Gavriil Kharitonovich, are you prepared to head such a unified soviet?

Is the Chairman's Seat Lucrative?

[Popov] The current positions of soviet chairmen are a transient thing. Honestly, given my character and knowledge, I do not "delight" in chairing the soviet. Therefore I do not want to head a soviet. However, if there were direct elections of the mayor I would most likely run.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] In this regard, what issues do you consider to be the main issues, imminent, and in need of a speedy resolution?

[Popov] Primarily there is the issue of Central Russia. Recently, we had a conference of the leaders of oblasts surrounding Moscow. It was not simple. However, we are finding a common language. The formation of a Central Russian market is not ruled out. There are results: Our delegation has visited Tver Oblast and arranged for several rayons of this oblast to be "open" to Muscovites; it will be possible to purchase vacant houses and parcels for gardening. We will help to build roads, provide allocations, and so on. At issue is an extensive economic union with 10 oblasts.

The issue of structural changes in the industry of Moscow, and primarily conversion, is very important. We cannot allow the ruin of military enterprises. At present, they see a dead end ahead, the fate of "producers of saucepans."

Of course we need to accelerate a transition to a market economy. A market economy means free prices. I envision this in combination with the simultaneous introduction of a ration-card system with a view to guaranteeing for the citizens a certain minimum at current fixed prices. I proposed this as long as a year ago, at the second congress.

The privatization of housing is a most acute problem. This is quite a burden, but we must shoulder it. There is the reconstruction of municipal services.... Issues of culture.... Considerable funds are necessary for this; they are not available. However, we must find them.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Do you ever succumb to the feeling of hopelessness?

[Popov] I succumbed to it previously when I understood that the country was going downhill and absolutely nothing was being done to avoid the decline. Now, after the beginning of perestroika, I do not have such a feeling. Now I have become hopeful.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] You are a person with varied interests: science, teaching, journalism, books, theater, tourism.... You have had to give up a lot lately. Do you regret coming to the Moscow Soviet?

[Popov] I do not regret it. To be sure, when democratization processes began in the country, I did not think that I was going to participate in this endeavor in this particular manner. Given my previous occupation, I was perhaps most useful in developing laws. However, it so happened that democrats could hardly count on anything realistic in the Supreme Soviet of the country. Besides, many of us were not elected to it. This meant that either we had to go on working in the Supreme Soviet, proposing amendments and making remarks and rejoinders, or try to do something greater; I was not the only one facing this choice.

Under the circumstances, the Interregional Group of Deputies resolved that a sizable group of USSR people's deputies should go to republic and local soviets. We believe that we acted properly. Having won elections at a local level, we made M.S. Gorbachev agree to negotiations on an alliance with us. Until then he believed that only the conservatives were a real force.

As far as work is concerned, I believe that I am the right man for the period when a new economic system, a system of government is being formed in the city. When regular government gets under way, a different administrator will be needed. Therefore I consider my current job to be temporary, and I do not associate far-reaching career goals with it. From the very beginning, we in the Interregional Group of Deputies believed that a young man, one who will be able to replace me, should be next to me.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Does a fight bring you satisfaction?

[Popov] Fighting for its own sake does not. Fighting irritates me. The result is what I am concerned about. Moments happen in the life of a country when you have to abandon everything in the name of the country's interests; otherwise all of your previous life loses meaning. As I see it, this is exactly how I should act now.

Could They Make It Into a "Sub-Stratum" Again?

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Gavriil Kharitonovich, you, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, and some other colleagues of yours have set high intellectual standards for the work and endeavors that you have embarked on. In this manner you assumed responsibility for the intelligentsia. If the endeavor fails and does not work out, will this not cause a new wave of persecution of the intelligentsia?

[Popov] As I see it, the Russian intelligentsia have an historic guilt before their people. They were the ones to mount criticism on a scale that destabilized the old society. They were precisely the ones to elevate the issues of the lack of freedom for them, negligibly small compared to what hit later—after October—to the level of a national problem that brought about the subsequent development of events. Later they were impertinently pushed aside by people such as Stalin and his entourage who had nothing to do with the intelligentsia.

This guilt needs to be expiated by the deeds of today. I was privileged to study at the Moscow State University at the same time that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev did, when many old professors who had miraculously survived the catastrophic vicissitudes of our history still taught. My work today is my duty. It does not matter to me what I am going to say if I "flunk." I would consider it a crime if I failed to apply myself now, given all that my professors taught me and all that I know, the same as Russian teachers, physicians, or economist-statisticians who went "to the zemstvo." In this sense I believe myself to be a regular Russian intellectual. In general, I am convinced that an intellectual who does not get involved in the struggle at present is a somewhat strange character. Besides, there are no intellectuals who would say that they care for nothing except "the physics of their own."

The scenario that you have mentioned, a new anti-intellectual explosion, is possible. So I met with city and rayon deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses and got a note: Supposedly, why build another building for the Malyy Theater, spend funds for this, and so on. Indeed, this is the cultural standard, and this is how we are paying for the policy that was implemented for decades. However, can there be a Moscow without the Malyy Theater? What will our children and grandchildren grow to be in a city like that? We had to go hungry, but there was the Malyy Theater. This may be the reason why we survived as citizens.

For 40 years, gifted people have been banished from the city directly or indirectly. As a rule, talented individuals fostered by the colleges of Moscow could not remain in

Moscow due to the absence of residence permits, except perhaps if they married Muscovites. A majority left. Instead people came on restricted residence permits, worked under inhuman conditions, languished in dormitories, and were finally given apartments in the outskirts of the city....

They have not seen this theater, they do not know it. Why then build anything for it? This is a sizable segment of the Muscovites and even of the deputies.... This is one of the crimes of administrative socialism against Moscow.

I still think that it will not come to an offensive against the intelligentsia. We will have time to restructure the life of the people and provide realistic prospects for them. We must have time. Otherwise....

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Several questions "of current interest." Will we succeed in somehow alleviating the situation with the provision of potatoes, vegetables, and foodstuffs in general for Moscow? It was said at a session of the Leningrad Soviet that the situation in the city was difficult, but not at all catastrophic. What is the situation here, in Moscow?

[Popov] I do not believe that our situation is all that critical either. I stress once again that such things have repeatedly happened in previous years. A difficult winter lies ahead, but I do not think that there will be anything out of the ordinary.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Polls by sociologists indicate that the ratings of Moscow Soviet leaders and your personal rating are high. There are also many people whose attitude toward you is profoundly negative. Our editorial office receives many outspoken, angry letters. For example, V. Uvarovskiy writes: "Popov's hand is an iron hand in a velvet glove." V. Fedin observes: "As far as Popov is concerned, I have become convinced yet again that he is an instigator and an adventurer." The development of this attitude may have been influenced by publications in some periodicals. Why did you not somehow refute the clearly slanderous articles?

[Popov] As far as I am concerned, this is a matter of principle. I am indifferent to personal insults. I never waste time for refutations. Dozens of truth-seekers with briefcases stuffed with the proof of their being right are waiting in line to be received by me. On occasion, they are indeed right. However, their entire lives have been dedicated to proving this. Frequently they perished as personalities; bitterness is all that remains.

Honest people from the editorial offices report to me as the soviet chairman about the articles being prepared, their true authors, and how "formal" authors are sought. Therefore, I could take measures.

If we had a different system, if we had independent courts, genuine incarceration penalties for the authors of slander, and fines for newspapers going into millions, I would take LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA to court.

As a matter of principle I do not want to engage in polemics with SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, for example, or any other organs reporting to the same CPSU Central Committee that in the years passed "pinned" transgressions on me. Besides, why would I need apologies from former aides of the leaders of the Brezhnev era who have now become editors?

Besides, there is one more aspect of this matter. I am not one of the fortunate individuals who have always known that this system is bad and have always fought it. I do not consider myself to be an angel; I lived in this world. I did not do time behind bars that would have safeguarded me against all the peculiarities of that life. I conformed to its rules; I believed in many things, and believed sincerely. Indeed there were faults. However, much more important to me than the charges from the party reprimands of these years being repeated in the newspapers is that, when I was a Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] secretary, I expelled some people from the Komsomol, and at a different time deprived those emigrating to Israel of their candidate degrees. These facts from the past concern me. I began to fight when I came to think differently. This is exactly when the accounting for my "crimes" began.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] One more question along these lines, though we do not feel good ourselves asking it. At a meeting with VECHERNAYA MOSKVA readers at the VDNKh, we got this note: "Why does your newspaper fail to report on the resolution of the apartment issue (out of turn) for Popov's team, and on outlays for the apparatus of the Moscow Soviet (increased from 1.8 to 12 million rubles?)" The editorial office received a letter: "Please publish the incomes of Comrades Rocharov, Popov, Sobchak, and Poltoranin. I fail to understand how they have the kind of money it takes to become the cofounders of the Fund for the Economic Reform of Russia. P. Varfolomeyev."

[Popov] Personally, I have not resolved any apartment allocation issues out of turn for either the Moscow deputies or for myself. I have made no personal contributions to the reform fund.

As far as the apparatus and the outlays for it, previously the apparatus of the Moscow Soviet did not exist at all. Outlays for the apparatus of the executive committee have been reduced. Therefore everything we are now spending for the Moscow Soviet is due to cutbacks in the main administrations, to the funds released.

I do not conceal my income. Until recently, it was indicated by means of my party membership card. However, I believe that there should be a general system: Either all citizens of the Soviet Union should release their income data, or none. Why should only the incomes of Popov, Sobchak, and so on be publicly divulged? Because somebody does not like us? Incidentally, what is the estimated income of the former nomenclatura due to decades of treatment at the polyclinic of the former Fourth Administration?

"Am I Afraid of Bureaucracy? I Am."

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Gavriil Kharitonovich, our life at present is saturated with confrontation, combating everything, and notions of overthrowing and shattering. Even public organizations frequently develop uniting people AGAINST some plank rather than IN FAVOR of it. How does the Moscow Soviet expect to overcome such attitudes and rally the citizens? After all, we cannot go on like this.

[Popov] I agree with you entirely on this point. I was also persistently pushed into all kinds of confrontation measures—for example, beginning an investigation. If we begin digging in our past we will find many curious things. Incidentally, the year 1937 abounded in such digging. However, only the building of a new system may bring genuine success. This system will put everyone in his place. To be sure, criminals must be unmasked and tried right now.

I believe that a turning point should come for all of perestroika; a coordinated program of actions IN FAVOR should appear. However, some group will still smash and break things. All they care about is AGAINST. These are the strata that are scared by the future.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Is this not the time to distance ourselves from such people?

[Popov] There is this overall contradiction of perestroika: We must create a system under which, ultimately, there will be a certain inequality, but even the person with the lowest standard of living will live better than you and I now do. However, certain degrees of inequality will be the price for improvements in living conditions. This is what some of the people still cannot agree with. A majority want to destroy the past, but an approach to what it is to be replaced with is not unequivocal. Understandably, stratification is inevitable sometime during the next stage of the movement.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] What is your relationship with the CPSU City Committee? Has it been influenced by your quitting the party?

[Popov] The relationship is normal. Of course the city committee has lost the right to give me orders, but conditions have appeared for regular cooperation. We are continuously in touch with Yuriy Anatolyevich Prokofyev.

When I left the party, I realized that it would play an important role in society for a long time to come and that we would have to interact in resolving city issues in the future as well.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Gavriil Kharitonovich, tell us about your family in brief.

[Popov] A good, normal family. My wife and I have two sons. They have served in the Army and are now in college. The younger one has been harvesting potatoes

for a month and a half now, the elder son is gone too. My wife is a department dean. There have been times when she made more money than I did.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Is she a party member?

[Popov] More than that, a party bureau member. This is one subject of our discussions at home. Our family is like the entire country.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] By yesterday's standards you are the chief bureaucrat of Moscow. Are you not afraid of getting really mired in bureaucracy?

[Popov] I am a specialist on management, and I see nothing denigrating in the word bureaucrat. I am a theoretician of bureaucracy, manageability, and so on. A bureaucrat is a normal link in the system of management. As far as a bureaucratic attitude is concerned, it is an apparatus disease. Am I afraid of this disease? I am. It is built into our system.

People resent the fact that they cannot get an appointment with me. However, they have no idea that I receive several thousand letters a day. It is impossible to respond to them all, or even to read them all. Why is all of this happening? Because we live under a system where issues are not resolved at a different level, where everything issues from some benefactor. People appeal to me in the hope that I may secure or do something for them, circumventing some provision. Once again, we come to the fact that the system should be broken down.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Are you a self-critical person?

[Popov] Everyone is inclined to consider himself self-critical.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] What is your greatest human shortcoming?

[Popov] I believe a degree of hot temper to be such a shortcoming.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] However, you make the impression of a gentle person.

[Popov] This means that I have to control myself all the time.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Is hot temper your only shortcoming?

[Popov] You flatter me. They are many, and I would not undertake to enumerate them. As the Moscow Soviet chairman they are insufficient flexibility and weaknesses in tactics. I also believe that this is related to age. A certain amount of resourcefulness and flexibility develops if you are in politics continuously from your young years.

When you enter late, and on top of that from scientific pursuits, a different experience of life is behind you. In science, I stood my ground and did not concede anything

if I were sure. I was satisfied, even if it only came out three years later that I had been right. In politics, everything changes so much in three to four years that your being right is no good to anyone if acknowledgement is delayed.

For example, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is a real tactician: Unfortunately, I lack qualities such as an ability to retreat, go on the offensive, maneuver, compromise, and give up compromises.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Are you satisfied with how the press as a whole reflects your activities and those of your team?

[Popov] On the whole I am. They are attentive to us. They are indulgent with regard to our mistakes and failures. We do not perceive a bias. To be sure, there are publications with a position alien to me. However, their position is clear-cut and we know what is to be expected from that side.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] What is your perception of our VECHERNAYA MOSKVA?

[Popov] Yours has become an independent people's newspaper. I believe that this is the right course. It is very good that the collective itself is the founding organ of the publication. I congratulate you cordially. I hope that our cooperation will be fruitful.

[VECHERNAYA MOSKVA] Thank you.

Moscow Street Name Changes Further Detailed

PM0611153390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Ilinka, Varvarka, and Others"]

[Text] The Moscow City Soviet Presidium has approved the first package of name changes. The list features 27 squares, streets, and side streets which are regaining their former names.

It will be recalled that one of the first harbingers in the rehabilitation of history was the new Moscow City Soviet's decision on changing to Tverskaya Street the name of Gorkiy Street from the center to the Sadovoye Beltway. The section beyond the Sadovoye Beltway—up to the Belorussia Station—which until recently retained the writer's name, will now become 1st Tverskaya-Yamskaya Street. The name of the Belorussia Station square is also changing—as in the old days it will be Tver Gate [Tverskaya zastava].

The square named for the 50th anniversary of October will again become Manezhnaya Square, and Sverdlov and Dzerzhinskiy Squares will become Teatralnaya and Lubyanskaya Squares. Marx Boulevard will be divided into Okhotnyy Row, Teatralnyy Passage, and Mokhovaya Street. Kalinin Boulevard will change its name to Novyy Arbat. Ilinka, Varvarka, Vozdvizhenka, Znamenka, and Prechistenka—these and other streets

will come back to life for people of the older generation, reminding them of the past. Incidentally, visitors to Moscow should not be surprised to see unfamiliar subway stations: Many of them have also had their names changed.

The social commission which presented this question was instructed to submit the remaining package of name changes so that the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee can do everything necessary in the first months of 1991 to restore the former names to old Moscow. A question arose at the session: What is to become of Chaykovskiy and Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Streets, which are now to become Novinskiy Boulevard and Maroseyka Street respectively? Will we not thereby be degrading the memory of those whose names they bore? The presidium advocated that new streets in other rayons of the city be given these names.

At the proposal of the same commission, the square outside the "Belyayevo" subway station has been given the name of Martin Luther King in view of the outstanding services of the American clergyman and public figure in defending human rights and achieving mutual understanding among the peoples. In connection with the centennial of the birth of Charles de Gaulle, who made a considerable contribution to the struggle against fascism and to the development of Soviet-French relations, the square outside the "Kosmos" Hotel on Mir Boulevard has been named for him.

Autonomous Republic's Rights Proposed for Moscow

91UN0195B Moscow VECHERNAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 22 Oct 90 p 1

[Article by B. Konov: "Moscow—A Union republic? Now It Is a Matter for a Presidential Edict"]

[Text] As we have already reported, G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, requested that USSR President M. Gorbachev immediately define the status of Moscow as the capital of Russia and the USSR. By direction of the president, a commission was created headed by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of the Operations of Soviets of People's Deputies and of the Development of Administration and Self-Government. Representatives of the leadership of the city, oblast, and republic belonged to it.

The conclusion, which was prepared by the commission after more than a month of hard work, stipulates the creation of a capital okrug with the rights of a Union or autonomous republic. It stipulates a strengthening of the executive power, and the leaders of several present key chief directorates and committees will even become ministers.

The commission considers the integration of Moscow with Moscow Oblast inevitable.

However, everything depends on what kind of Presidential Edict is adopted and to what degree it will reflect the proposals of the commission.

Journalist Examines Coup Rumors in Leningrad

LD0611154990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Summary] Kiryl Aleksandrov, an independent journalist from Leningrad and a correspondent of the POSIEV magazine and the newspaper SODEYSTVIYA published in Vilnius, has provided a more detailed account of current events in Leningrad.

He says that on the eve of the 7 November celebrations there is a certain level of tension in Leningrad. Rumors of a possible military coup are circulating in the city.

[Begin Aleksandrov recording] Yesterday a report by the Organization Shchit [Shield] was published by the CHASS PYK [Rush Hour], one of the most authoritative and popular newspapers of Leningrad, about a possible military coup due to take place in the period of 10-20 November. Concerning sources of information, reference is made to the KGB and to the informers of the Organization Shchit. According to them, the state of emergency on the territory of the USSR would be introduced according to the time zones, starting in the Far East and moving further westward. In case any unforeseen circumstances arise then the state of emergency would be cancelled and it would be announced that this was only a training exercise. [end recording]

K. Aleksandrov said that there will be two demonstrations in Leningrad tomorrow: one organized by the Leningrad Communist Party City Committee, and the other immediately after the first and organized by the democratic forces of Leningrad.

Chelyabinsk Demonstration Opposes Nationalism

LD0711102590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] A demonstration of working people was held today in Chelyabinsk. The ceremony passed off generally according to tradition, but there were deviations. For example, the leaders of the oblast and city laid flowers at the Lenin monument and then took up their places not on the central platform as previously but on the platform for guests, next to representatives of labor collectives and public organizations.

Here are typical slogans in the columns: Civil accord is the path to the future. No to nationalism, no to vandalism. Hands off Lenin. We are against the denigration of our whole history. Yes to the market, no to profiteering.

How often is accord, the concept of accord, encountered? In my view this is the leitmotif of today's celebrations.

Komi Wants MVD Troops' Return From Azerbaijan

PM0611170390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Nov 90 First Edition p 1

[Item in roundup of PRAVDA, TASS, and USSR KGB reports prepared by B. Pipiya under general headline: "Telephone, Teletype, Telefax"]

[Text] Syktyvkar—The Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet recently adopted a resolution on MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] troops stationed on the republic's territory but used in other parts of the country. It is a question, in particular, of Syktyvkar's specialized militia battalion which has been in Azerbaijan for a long time, fulfilling its "international duty." The republic Supreme Soviet has asked the USSR MVD to send the guardians of order home not only for ethical reasons, but also above all because the crime situation on Komi territory has recently deteriorated noticeably.

Vladimir Obkom Elects New First Secretary

LD0311105190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0900 GMT 3 Nov 90

[Text] The Vladimir oblast party reporting and election conference finished its work.

From a choice of candidates, Zakharov, working as head of a section of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Central Committee, was elected first secretary of the party oblast committee.

Yanayev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary, spoke at the conference.

Rayon Party Chief Dismissed in Penza Oblast

PM0711113190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Oct 90 Union Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent V. Nikolayeva: "Paid for It With His Job"]

[Text] Penza—A visit to the local department store by the wife of A. Lunyakov, leader of the Kondolskiy Rayon party organization and chairman of the rayon soviet, resulted in the dismissal of the CPSU rayon committee [raykom] first secretary and bureau member.

An officer of the Internal Affairs Administration took a statement from rayon "first lady" V. Lunyakova. Here is what she wrote: "...I was called at home by the rayon consumer association chairman. She told me to go to the department store. I gathered that something nice had come in.... I chose a Polish-made man's suit, tracksuits—a blue and red one (Switzerland) and a gray one ("Montana")—two women's suits (Netherlands), two pairs of women's boots (Yugoslavia), two vacuum cleaners (Japan), three boxes of powder (France), three umbrellas.... I bought goods worth 2,280 [currency not specified], including surcharge...." V. Lunyakov went to the warehouse with domestic staff.

PENZENSKAYA PRAVDA reported that the rayon leader's family had accounted for exactly one-half of the rayon consumer organization's stocks. On this occasion imported goods worth a little over 4,000 rubles had arrived.

At an extraordinary raykom plenum, A. Lunyakov was dismissed from the rayon party organization leadership for exploiting his official position, and for lack of principle and connivance as manifested in the acquisition of scarce goods by close relatives. The circumstances of the acquisition of scarce goods are being investigated by administrative organs and the CPSU oblast organization control commission.

Western Republics

Crisis Situation in Dnestr Republic Continues

Left Bank Remains 'Tense'

LD0611172790 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Text] Kishinev November 6 MOLDOVA-PRES-TASS—A trend for stabilisation has emerged in Moldavia.

The Moldavian parliament's conciliation commission, led by Moldavian Communist Party leader Petr Luchinsky, met a Gagauz conciliation commission in the city of Komrat in southern Moldavia today.

The Gagauz parliament, declared illegal by the Moldavian parliament, formed the conciliation commission for talks with Moldavian authorities.

Lyudmila Skalnaya, chairman of the Republican Women's Council, issued an appeal to Moldavian women. "We must do our best to end ethnic confrontation," she said.

"We women have lost three sons, and six children were left without fathers in nonsensical clashes in the area of Dubossary. We should learn from this bitter lesson, heed the voice of reason and prevent new bloodshed."

Skalnaya called on women who went on a hunger strike in Dubossary to end this action, since it leads to further confrontation under the present conditions.

The situation remains tense on the Dniester's left bank, where a Dnestr republic was proclaimed on September 2, which was ruled unconstitutional by the Moldavian parliament.

In defiance of the Moldavian parliament resolution, workers' self-defence detachments have not disbanded and a moratorium on the November 25 elections to unconstitutional power bodies has not been set there.

Speaking over Tiraspol radio, Igor Smirnov, chairman of the Provisional Supreme Council of the Dniester Republic, pointed out that "it is not a question of

violating Moldavia's borders. It is a question of the political and economic independence of the region".

He urged residents of Tiraspol and other populated areas on the Dnester's left bank to defend the republic to the end and to prevent Moldavian Interior Ministry troops from arriving in these areas under any circumstances. "We must uphold our rights," Smirnov emphasised.

Kishinev's policy, he said, "is aimed at changing socialism itself as a sociopolitical formation. Such a policy should not be allowed in the Dnestr area".

A meeting between Russian lawmakers and councillors from Tiraspol began here today. The meeting is also being attended by Moldavian First Deputy Prime Minister Konstantin Oborok and chairman of the Moldavian parliamentary Commission on Ethnic Relations Aleksandr Arseni.

Members of the Russian parliament, who came to Moldavia at the invitation of the Russian-speaking population in the Dnestr left-bank area, will also visit industrial enterprises and organisations.

Leader of the delegation Sergey Krasavchenko stressed that the aim of the mission is to find out if "the demands put forth by citizens living in the Dnestr left-bank area are just".

According to Krasavchenko, "under Article Eight of the Treaty of Cooperation signed by the Russian Federation and Moldavia, the sides should monitor the observance of rights and interests of national minorities in the republics".

"Our findings will help form a clear-cut position for the Russian parliament concerning events in Moldavia," he noted.

The session was also attended by leaders of the Provisional Supreme Council of the Dnestr republic.

Dnestr Leader Comments

LD0611214290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1900 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Report by correspondent Ivan Petkov from Tiraspol]

[Text] Barricades and obstacles made of concrete blocks can be found on the bridge over the Dnestr leading to Tiraspol. There is a narrow passageway for vehicles. You will certainly be stopped and people will check who you are, why you are traveling, and what you are carrying. These posts are right at the entrance to the town where I am going to interview Igor Nikolayevich Smirnov, chairman of the Dnestr republic provisional supreme council, about the situation. Together with Moldova President Mircha Snegur and Gagauz leaders, he met with USSR President Gorbachev a few days ago when measures were worked out to stabilize the situation in Moldova.

[Begin recording] [Petkov] So Igor Nikolayevich, how are the inhabitants of the Dnestr area reacting to the latest decisions of the Moldovan legislature?

[Smirnov] The latest decisions of the legislature cannot satisfy the inhabitants of the Dnestr area. This is why, after announcing that all volunteer formations or volunteers are to disband, they decided simultaneously to found a republican army. I think every inhabitant of the Dnestr area realizes that it is really a matter of legalizing the same formations under government auspices. Well, to see what they can do and how they do it, it is sufficient to recall the events in Dubossary, Kagul, and the Gagauz republic, and everything becomes clear. Judge for yourself.

[Petkov] Can they satisfy people? Can they instill the conviction that everything will be calm?

[Smirnov] I do not think so. [end recording]

Snegur Issues Appeal to Gagauz Citizens

LD0611185390 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 23 Oct 90 p 1

["Appeal by the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova president to Gagauz citizens"—SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA headline]

[Text] Esteemed fellow citizens!

I am appealing to you at a difficult time for the republic. The aggravation of the sociopolitical situation has reached a crisis point. This has been caused to a considerable extent by the unconstitutional formation of the so-called Gagauz and Dnestr republics.

This means nothing other than the breakup of our republic, violation of its state integrity, and its current territorial borders.

The trumped-up elections to the legislative bodies of these regions aroused immense moral and psychological tension and have brought us to the brink of civil war. Our peaceful life on Moldovan [Moldavian] soil is endangered. **Like all the other Union republics, we do not yet have sufficient regular forces to defend either our internal or our external sovereignty. This is what those who like playing political games at the expense of ordinary people are counting upon. But there is another, higher force able to defend its own destiny—the people.**

The president of the republic, the legislature, and the government have for three months now been receiving a flood of letters, telegrams, calls, and open appeals in which people of various nationalities anxiously ask one and the same question: Surely we did not elect you, entrust to you the running of the republic, for there to be yet another division of the territory before our very eyes? Is this really going to be allowed?

These are not simple words. The majority of the population of the republic are thoroughly concerned for the

integrity of its territory. **It has to be stated bluntly: if the elections planned for 28 October are not renounced, the situation could go out of control.** Once that has happened, we would be unable to return to the state of mutual understanding and good relations which had existed between Moldovans and Gagauz until quite recently.

Events in separate regions of the Soviet Union show clearly to what all this leads. The whipping up of the situation in our republic could push us into the abyss, ending in human casualties, sorrow, and suffering for the people.

As president of the republic, I am obliged to and will make use of all legislative and preventative powers to prevent tragedy and to preserve the republic's territorial integrity. However, today this depends to a considerable extent upon you. First and foremost you must demand that the leaders who are leading you into deadlock call a halt to the anti-constitutional election campaign and continue the constructive dialogue with the specially created commission of deputies of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova Supreme Soviet Presidium and continue to seek peaceful means of resolving the problems of Gagauz ethnicity.

God can see that we are doing all we can to stop events developing into conflict.

I appeal to the sense of the Gagauz people. Good people, stop! Today is not too late. All your economic, socio-cultural, and political problems can and will be solved. However for this we need peace, calm in our common home, and mutual understanding. It should not be forgotten that the Gagauz have preserved their own distinguishing features and culture and acquired their own written language only here, on Moldovan soil, among the peaceful and benevolent people after whom our sovereign republic is named. This must be always cherished.

It is not difficult to imagine the situation in which the Gagauz would be today if the Moldovan people had not had these qualities. So let us follow wise counsel and not destroy instantly everything that has been built up over decades and left to us as an inheritance from our forebears.

I hope that my appeal will meet with the understanding and support of the Gagauz. Our common destiny is in our hands. The time has come when all of us, regardless of our national and social background, have to show that we are the true patriots of this land.

No 7 November Celebrations Held in Kishinev

LD0711135290 Moscow TASS in English 1331 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Report by MOLDOVA-PRESS—TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golia and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev November 7 TASS—In the current tense socio-political atmosphere, the people of Moldavia,

marked the 73rd anniversary of the Great October Revolution in different ways.

Contrary to decades-long tradition, there is no festive merry-making in Kishinev today.

It is for the first time that the city approaches the revolution anniversary under conditions of a multi-party system, with each party marking the anniversary in its own way. Some political parties ignored the holiday, while others issued anti-October-revolution, anti-communist leaflets.

The Kishinev city committee of the Moldavian Communist Party held a celebration meeting in the National Palace on Tuesday. This morning, deputations of Communists of the republic and the city laid flowers at the monument to Lenin.

At the same time advocates of "anti-October-revolution sentiments"—those who would like to organize an alternative demonstration—began to gather near the monument to Moldavian Hospodar (governor) Stefan the Great.

However, members of the Moldavian Popular Front convinced those people of the inadvisability of such function that could aggravate the already strained situation. Thereby the resolution of the Kishinev City Council of People's Deputies about the inadvisability of arranging any mass demonstrations or a military parade was observed.

Unlike the Moldavian capital, the streets and squares of Tiraspol, the second largest city of the republic, are decked out with red bunting. A festive demonstration on the occasion of the revolution anniversary took place here today. Tens of thousands of industrial and office workers from major enterprises under Union jurisdiction in Tiraspol marched through the central street of the city. To them, today's holiday became a manifestation of cohesion and unity.

Festive demonstrations to mark the revolution anniversary also took place in the city of Beltsi, Bendery and some other districts and towns of Moldavia.

Situation Throughout Moldavia Detailed

LD0611180490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1642 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli and Valeri Demidetskiy]

[Text] Kishinev, 6 Nov (TASS)—Unlike previous years, today, on the eve of the October anniversary, the inhabitants of Kishinev do not feel like celebrating. In an effort to reduce tension, the municipal authorities have cancelled the military parade and demonstration by working people and also other meetings and events, and moreover not only those "for" October but also those "against." The city soviet has promised to do everything so that people can have a good rest during these days.

But the tragic events in Dubossary and the continuing interethnic confrontation have made their lives, already far from easy, still more difficult.

As a result of the blockade and the diversion of thousands of people into "volunteer units," industrial enterprises are experiencing a shortage of raw materials and component materials. They are not working at full capacity and the shop shelves, already meager, have emptied. The situation has not been greatly improved by the coupons introduced the previous day for butter, eggs, and other products. Prices have shot up sharply in the market.

People's faces bear the imprint of anxiety as they gather in the city park every day to discuss the events of recent days. There have been heated arguments here today over the Moldovan legislature's decision to abandon the settlement of interethnic conflicts by force. Some regard it as wise while others see it as a consequence of intrigues by "Moscow's underlings." The central newspaper and television, allegedly "providing unobjective coverage" of the course of events in Moldova [Moldavia], are anathema. There is fervent support for the address in the legislature by Grigoriy Vieru, poet and USSR people's deputy, who reproached the republican Minister of Internal Affairs Ion Kostash for trying to "wash dirty linen in public" because he had given an account from the legislature's rostrum of the categorical manner in which Prime Minister Mircha Druk had issued him an order to use force in Dubossary.

In Dubossary, the whole town gathered today for a meeting of mourning. Delegations from all of the towns, rayons, and villages of the left bank, and also the town of Bendery, the rayons inhabited by Gagauz and a number of towns in the Ukraine and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, came to Victory Square to commit to the soil the bodies of the three sons of Moldova who died on 2 November. The natives of Dubossary who had been killed were buried beside the mass grave of servicemen who liberated their city from the fascists during the years of World War II. Many thousands of people filed through the pioneers' palace in doleful silence taking their leave of the victims of violence.

In Dubossary the political hunger strike by a group of women which began on Friday continues. They stated that they would fast until the government of Moldova, headed by Mircha Druk, resigns and the culprits for the Dubossary tragedy are punished.

Moldavia Makes Move Toward 'Reconciliation'

PM0711114590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Nov 90 Union Edition p 1

[Undated report by correspondent E. Kondratov from Kishinev; under the "Events, Facts, Opinions" rubric: "Moldova: Conciliation Commission Created"]

[Text] The legislature of Moldova [Moldavia] is revising its attitude to ethnic minorities and resolutely tilting toward dialogue with the Gagauz and the Dnestr region.

The entire republic listened to Moldova President M. Snegur's description of his meeting with M. Gorbachev, N. Ryzhkov, and other leaders of the country which he made Sunday after returning from Moscow. The participants in the meeting also included I. Smirnov and S. Topal, the heads of the Dnestr and Gagauz republics declared illegal by the Moldova legislature.

M. Snegur spelled out his position in precise terms: Moldova must unconditionally remain indivisible, but its legislature must rectify its mistakes. A moratorium should therefore be imposed on all its decisions which infringe in any way the interests of the population of the left bank of the Dnestr and the steppelands of Budzhak. Discussion of the problems which gave rise to confrontation and led to the tragedy in Dubossary must start from scratch.

I. Khadyrke, first deputy chairman of the Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, who also participated in the Moscow meeting, spelled out measures that could extricate Moldova from the present crisis. The priorities include disbanding the volunteer detachments on both sides of the Dnestr, revising the period of operation of the articles of the language laws, ensuring a more correct attitude toward the Soviet Army, and reinstating the Gagauz deputies. The Dnestr region and likewise Budzhak must declare all their decisions on the creation of new republics to be null and void.

The Supreme Soviet worked most intensively the entire day, and it must definitely be said that the Moldova president's sober and peacemaking stance won the unconditional support of the legislature which hitherto has not been too self-critical in its legislative work. Deputies made a sharp assessment of their colleagues who earn prestige by exploiting national sentiments and fueling dangerous passions. Incidentally, speakers who voiced their implacability toward any compromise on the people's behalf also made their way to the microphone on this occasion too, but the heated and belligerent speeches sounded odd, to put it mildly, against the background of the common sense which completely dominated the chamber this time. By adopting a resolution at the end of the day, the Moldova legislators convincingly proved that seeking scapegoats for old grievances is the way to disaster.

The session's election of a legislative conciliation commission, which will be headed by deputy P. Luchinskiy, was a long and painstaking process. Representatives of the Gagauz and the Dnestr region have been invited to join it on an equal footing. A commission to establish who was mainly to blame for the Dubossary disaster was also elected.

The Moldova legislature has taken a difficult but very important step toward general reconciliation in Moldova. Realizing that it is unattainable without the other side's participation, the Supreme Soviet urged Gagauz and Dnestr region deputies to participate in the dialogue.

Will they respond? Unfortunately the already blood-stained conflict has gone too far. But abandoning the search for a peaceful solution at this time would mean running the risk that millions of inhabitants throughout Moldova will again be plunged into the abyss of intensifying interethnic dissension.

A totally practical step was also taken: There are no longer any obstructions on the roads to Budzhak and on the right-hand half of the bridge near Dubossary—they have been removed. But the inhabitants of the left bank are still continuing the blockade. Their lack of trust can hardly be condemned.

Snegur Proposes Better Moldavian-Romanian Ties *AU0611214990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English* 2159 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 6/11/1990—In an interview granted for the ROMPRES news agency and the Romanian Television, the president of the Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Mirchas Snegur, appreciated that the current confrontations led to a hardly bearable state of things. "These confrontations make many damages, create difficulties in settling other problems, the economic ones especially. That is why during our meeting in Moscow we decided that an end to be put to this situation. We should discuss about what is happening here and which are the problems, we should find out why the separatist leaders on the left of the Dnestr and in the south of the republic are behaving like that. I think that generally speaking the situation has settled out."

President Snegur rejected the accusations of certain circles and groups which consider as discriminatory the law "on the official language and the return to the Latin writing." We are accused—the collocutor went on—that we have returned to the national symbols, to the tricolour, that we have renounced the red flag with the hammer and the sickle. I want to be understood that I am not referring to the people, or to the 13 percent Ukrainians or the 12 percent Russians because they are working together with Moldovans in enterprises and in the fields and they are speaking as they have spoken until now. I am referring to the managers of large enterprises of unional subordination who are required by the law to know the language so that they could speak both with Russians and with Moldovans.

President Snegur showed that "we are also accused that we do not explain what we mean by the sovereignty we declared. Does it mean to get out of the Union or not? When we speak about sovereignty we are referring to our wish to become real masters of all goods in our republic. We wish to develop our ties with the other republics.

with the whole country, as well as with other European countries or with countries on other continents."

As far as the prospects of the relations between Romania and the Moldovan Republic are concerned, the president declared for their development, appreciating that a fruitful beginning had been made, especially in culture and education. "We could only refer to the 3,000 Moldovans studying in Romania. We are also discussing the setting up of joint enterprises. The government proposes 100 such enterprises. And we have concrete proposals from the Romanian side, too. They are in the field of processing the agricultural raw material especially."

"Let the rebirth of the Moldovans' conscience contribute to the strengthening of our friendship," President Snegur also said.

Anti-Army Campaign in Moldavia Condemned

PM0711120590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by USSR Defense Ministry Press Center under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Those Who Stand To Gain From the Anti-Army Campaign"]

[Text] There have been a number of occasions in recent years when an anti-army campaign was mounted during the aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in one region or another, and each time it is with the same aim—to hide those really to blame for destabilizing the situation and pin the blame on the Army. It is already obvious now that this situation is being repeated in Moldova [Moldavia]. Equally obvious is the unseemly role of some of the republic's mass media.

In the past few days, for example, TV news broadcasts have repeatedly discussed alleged cases of central interference in the events in the south of the republic and "support for separatists" from the Soviet Army. As part of this, video films were used "revealing" Armed Forces officers in the Komrat-Chimishliya region. In fact, these were military servicemen performing a routine official mission there and were totally unconnected with the "separatist" actions. Representatives of the military command have repeatedly given exhaustive explanations on these questions. Despite the obvious facts, however, the anti-army fabrications continue.

Television has also shown numerous interviews with representatives of the creative intelligentsia, workers, peasants, students, and schoolchildren protesting at "interference by the center and the Soviet Army in Moldova's internal affairs" and indignation at the "unobjective coverage in the central imperial press of events in Moldova." There have been particularly keen attacks on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which has published a series of reports on the reasons for the aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in the republic.

But who is actually responsible for the lack of objectivity and for the bias? On 2 November a report in

VECHERNIY KISHINEV considered the idea of military interference in the republic's internal affairs. As "evidence" it said that five hunting rifles had been discovered in the trunk of a Soviet Army colonel's car, and that another soldier had hidden three explosives. The serious reader will wonder why the reports do not mention surnames, as he will also wonder about other "facts" plucked out of the air. He may even "accuse" the author of this publication of hiding three nuclear bombs somewhere. That is roughly the degree of "reliability" involved."

The truth is that the facts cited in the publication are nothing more than the author's imagination and a far from harmless imagination at that. The military command is making representations to the relevant organs about the dissemination of false information. But they clearly have an understanding of glasnost in which it is not considered wrong to lie, slander, juggle the facts, or hush them up.

The "revelatory" tone designed to undermine the population's confidence in the Army and the fuelling of suspicion are typical of articles in a number of press publications.

A false account is being circulated which claims that several people in Dubossary died when sentries opened fire during an attempt to seize the army weapons depot. Whereas these attempts did not take place, the garrison's military servicemen did not fire a single shot, and the circumstances in which the people died were completely different and many citizens, primarily women and children, found refuge in the garrison's military encampment during those alarming days.

However, you would be wasting your time if you looked in the mass media for reports condemning the actions of those who have been trying to blockade entrances to military camps and take control of bases and weapons dumps on the pretext of "ensuring the Soviet Army's noninterference in the processes taking place in the republic."

For several hours the military camp at Kotovsk was blockaded. The crowd demanded that weapons be given to them. Similar incidents have occurred in other population centers.

Who stands to gain from all this? Obviously it is those destructive forces who, contrary to the people's true interests, are fuelling an atmosphere of hysteria in the republic, kindling nationalist sentiments, inflaming hostility among people, and trying to drive a wedge between the republic's population and the military servicemen.

Anti-Semitism in Moldavia Examined

91UN0186A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 16 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by E. Zamura under the rubric "What Is Happening to Us": "Is There Anti-Semitism in Moldova?"]

[Text] A Jewish woman came to our office. For her entire life she has been teaching the Russian language and literature in a Moldavian school. She told us that her family has been abused for years by an anti-Semitic neighbor. She appealed to the procuracy once. Finally, the head of the family got tired of it. During one more confrontation he grabbed a stick and hit the abuser. The latter started legal proceedings against him.

And here is another story. A journalist friend of mine, with a Jewish name, took a prescription to a pharmacy. They did not sell him the medicine because "we are not under any obligation to treat you with our medicine." He had to seek help from the pharmaceutical administration to get his medicine.

Such stories bother us. But there are other stories also, the ones quoted in newspaper articles, that claim an absence of anti-Semitism in Moldova [Moldavia]. A society of Jewish culture was established in the republic that has offices in various cities and rayons. There is the NASH GOLOS newspaper, a number of copies of which are published in Hebrew. Jews attend synagogues freely, as well as their native language courses. Nobody prevents them from leaving for Israel, their historic native land.

So, do we have any anti-Semitism? It evidently does not exist any more at the level of state politics. And this is very fortunate for our land where this black flower of evil was fertilized and nurtured for ages by those in power. First the tsarist regime did it *de jure*, later the Stalin-Brezhnev regime did it *de facto*. Any Jew-hating government at present would have no chances of establishing any business contacts in the civilized world. It is both obscene and unprofitable to be an "official" anti-Semite.

But the decades of spiritual and physical slaughter have unfortunately left their trace. Jews were forced to betray themselves in things minor and major. The government doomed these people to be ashamed of themselves from the day they were born to their last day. The weak would give up and try to blend in. Very often, however, Jews were borne to the other bank by something other than fear or violence or a desire to profit, as common opinion has it. It was a great spiritual impulse to ascend from a petty ethnic feeling to the general human one. But these lessons in assimilation were bitter too! The people whose embrace Jews trustingly sought were cold and ruthless towards the aliens.

In 1894 in Kishinev about 20 percent of the population was Jewish, more than the Russians or Ukrainians among them. There were 32 Jewish houses of prayer there. In 1979, before the exodus, there were only 8.5 percent Jews left in the capital. How many Jews will remain in Kishinev after the emigration rush stops? According to all the data—very few.

Our compatriots who wanted to preserve their ethnic image made themselves known in Europe, America, and Israel. I would not be able to name all the talented poets, writers, doctors, or scientists. Let me mention just one. A Jewish poet left Kishinev for Paris in 1918. His real

name was Fiksmán but he called himself Dovid Knout, spelling his first name with an "o" in accordance with the national tradition. Knout's poem "Funeral in Kishinev", full of nostalgia for Bessarabia, was published in many anthologies of European poetry. When in France, he married Ariadna Scryabina, daughter of the famous Russian composer. As a protest against the persecution of Jews she converted to Judaism, adopted a different name and became known as Ariadna-Sarah Scryabina-Fiksmán-Knout. During the war this woman was assassinated by the Nazi. There is a monument to her, a heroine of the Resistance, in Toulouse. The poet himself died in Tel Aviv in 1955.

G. Struve, Khodasevich, Nina Berberova, and recently the Latvian magazine VEK—all wrote about Knout. We, his compatriots, did not write a single line about him. And not only about him. How many years have we been silent about the people killed in the war? In 1944 the Fascists air-bombed a Jewish ghetto in downtown Kishinev; they also shot many people. There is a maternity hospital standing on the place where thousands of people died (Molodezh avenue). It is a symbol of a kind. However, the promised monument is not there, not even a memorial plaque is there.

Kishinev must have a monument to commemorate the victimized Jews. The book of 1903 pogrom descriptions could become a monument of this kind. They were collected by the famous Jewish poet Byalik, but he never published the manuscript. Maybe he felt it was too terrifying to tell people about Christians driving nails through the eyes of Jewish babies. The Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians of Kishinev are not responsible for events that were instigated by the tsarist secret police department. But they should know what might happen as mutual feuding is being stirred up, the feuding that also hides selfish political schemes.

The decades of government anti-Semitism gave strong roots to the ordinary anti-Semitism in people's conscience. Among the responses to the SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA article "Go Forth From Thy Land..." were some messages similar to the 10-page letter of a woman from Anneniy Noy. She put a lot of her energy, which could have been better applied elsewhere, into trying to persuade the editor of the existence of the infamous "Jewish mafia." She even tried to prove that the Jews leaving the USSR carry with them the tsar's treasures that they had stolen before.

"Too much unity," is the usual reproach addressed to Jews. Shalom Aleichem said once: "Have you ever seen two Jews of the same opinion? Two Jews have three opinions: If one says this is so and so, the other answers that this is really so but in fact it is quite different..." But this unity, so upsetting and frightening for many people, does exist. You may envy it or not but it is the "unity of people who crowded together under blows coming from all sides, people who are clutching something sacred with their trembling hands. It is a 20-century long self-defense; it is incessant, silent and quite ordinary and it is

the greatest of ethnic feats in the world...." Vladimir Zhabotinskiy, a Saint Petersburg journalist, wrote these words under the impression of the Kishinev pogrom that made him dedicate his life to the national revival of Jews.

Of the people leaving Moldova forever, 86.5 percent defined the interethnic crisis as the major reason for the exodus. Anti-Semitism was referred to as one concrete sign of the crisis by 79 percent, 44 percent spoke of local nationalism as another one, and 17.5 percent named great-power chauvinism as still another one. Seventy-seven and a half percent said that they or their relatives were persecuted or had their rights infringed upon because of their ethnic origin. Most of the people were not influenced by price or crime increases, or by our ecological crisis. Of the people polled, 10 percent would want to live in the USSR; 70 percent wanted to keep their USSR citizenship. This information collected by the journalist Mikhail Dreizler is upsetting and it is the best answer to the question that serves as the headline for this article.

Their bitter experience taught Jews to distrust the favors of the government that had given them shelter. It happened in the 18th-19th centuries in Germany, during the so-called "enlightenment" era. Having rushed to shake the offered hand, Jews started to give up their language en masse, they reformed synagogues to make them similar to Kirchen. The German culture gained Heine, Marx, and Bernstein from it; the Jews received the horror of the Holocaust.

Popular conscience and "government" conscience are communicating vessels in a way. Who can guarantee that one would not flow into the other? As the tide of mutual hatred is rising in our republic, Jews are afraid to believe in their being "chosen" as the only ones who will escape violence. They are leaving and it is a humiliation for us non-Jews. As the Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev said, anti-Semitism is built out of mediocrity. He told those who claimed that Jews were "too" prominent in science, philosophy, or education: "You, yourselves make great discoveries, become great scientists and philosophers. You can fight the predominance of Jews in culture only by creating your own culture. This is the level of freedom. Freedom is a testing of strength. It is humiliating to think that freedom always favors Jews and disfavors non-Jews."

Military Parade, Alternative Meeting in Kiev

LD0711151390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] Today nearly all reports are of course connected with the 73d anniversary of the October Revolution, and reports about how the holiday was celebrated are coming into the studio from many towns around the country.

Kiev: For the first time in history a military parade was held as well as a festive demonstration [manifestatsiya], but they were held in different places. The military

parade took place on Victory Square, and the demonstration on the city's main highway, the Kreshchatik. Representatives of many industrial enterprises, the intelligentsia, war and labor veterans marched in the columns. The slogans appealed for consolidation of all the healthy forces in society and for a strengthening of order and discipline.

At the same time, on Bogdan Khmelnytskyi Square in front of St. Sofia's cathedral, Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] and other movements and parties organized an alternative meeting and procession. The participants in this expressed their opposition to the Union treaty.

'Mass Participation' in Nikolayev Celebration

LD0711142190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1200 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] Nikolayev—The working people of the town went to the festive demonstration carrying slogans in support of perestroika. A feeling of cohesion has become a noteworthy feature of the current festivities in this town of shipwrights and machine-builders. It is this feeling that gave rise to such mass participation of Nikolayev people in the demonstration. Even though the customary words of reports were not heard over the columns, the town is proud that powerful trawlers have been launched and that more than 40 million rubles worth of above-plan consumer goods were produced and that the oblast's land cultivators achieved an excellent harvest, having gathered in excess of 40 quintals of wheat per hectare.

Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast Elects First Secretary

PM0611160890 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Nov 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent B. Drozd under "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" rubric: "In Opposition?"]

[Text] Ivano-Frankovsk—An interesting conversation about perfecting the forms and methods of Communists' work while in opposition took place at the oblast report and election party conference. In a secret ballot, the delegates again elected Z.V. Kuravskiy first secretary of the oblast party committee. V.Ye. Ostrozhinskiy, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the conference.

Belorussia Schedules Supreme Soviet Session

LD0611194290 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian
0515 GMT 3 Nov 90

[Text] The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet presidium resolves to convene the third session of the 12th Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on 5 December 1990. The presidium announces that it is intended that the session will review all draft bills connected with the switchover of the Belorussian SSR to market economy.

Caucasus

New Site Chosen for Tbilisi Military Parade

LD0511123490 Moscow TASS in English 1200 GMT
5 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi November 5 TASS—Soviet military chiefs in the Transcaucasian Military District have decided to hold a military parade marking the 73rd anniversary of the 1917 October revolution on the drill ground of a Tbilisi garrison unit, and not on Tbilisi's central thoroughfare—the traditional site for such functions.

"This step was prompted by the difficult socio-political situation in the republic and by our desire not to aggravate it," Lieutenant-General A. Skoriy, member of the District Military Council and the head of the District Political Department, told TASS.

"Members of the general public, war veterans, veteran workers and families of servicemen have been invited to watch the parade," Skoriy said.

Residents Reject Parade

LD0611234790 Moscow Television Service in Russian
2136 GMT 6 Nov 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The streets and squares of Tbilisi are not decorated with the customary red calico as they used to be, nor are slogans to be seen. The townspeople have decided not to hold a demonstration, but to work at their jobs. As far as the representatives of political parties are concerned, they are prepared to obstruct the holding of militarized celebrations and even to block the parade part.

[K.I. Cherepanov, deputy head of the Political Directorate of the Transcaucasian Military District] Some people associate this with an army of occupation on the territory of the republic, which was stated even by Georgia's Supreme Soviet. This has naturally left its impression on the decision of the ranks of the party as well. We shall conduct ceremonial measures devoted to the Great October Socialist Revolution in one of the formations of our Tbilisi garrison.

No Celebration Reported

LD0711145490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1400 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] There was no demonstration in honor of the October anniversary in Tbilisi today. A statement published just beforehand by the board of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia acknowledged the inexpediency of holding one. Labor collectives backed this statement, and many of them turned out for work. The town has a markedly everyday look about it;

not a single local newspaper arrived at the kiosks; and Georgian television refused to relay the military parade from Moscow.

Georgia Supreme Soviet Election Results Examined

LD0611185290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] As we have already informed you in our bulletins, elections to the republican Supreme Soviet have taken place in Georgia. Our correspondent Nana Gongadze reports from Tbilisi:

[Gongadze] Today there is hardly anyone who is surprised by the queues. But to see them forming outside the polling stations, it seems this is the first time this has happened here. It is also the first time that the representatives of 11 political blocs and parties are struggling for the deputies' mandates. A total of 2,406,742 inhabitants of Georgia have participated in the elections, 70 percent of its population. Experts, specialists, and political scientists from 10 countries were monitoring the course of the campaign. According to their opinion, the elections in the republic proceeded normally in keeping with all the existing norms and rules, and no serious violations were registered.

The verified results to date are as follows: 54 percent of the electorate voted for the Roundtable-Free Georgia and 29.6 percent for the republic's communist party, in a proportional contest. No other party or bloc has gathered even the minimum of votes to allow it to send its representative to the legislature. In the majority seats, 33 mandates are with the Roundtable-Free Georgia bloc and 17 with the Communists. A total of 181 deputies have been elected. Iraklii Sergeyevich Jordania, chairman of the central electoral commission, is speaking:

[Begin Jordania recording] In 57 electoral districts, runoff elections will be held, and in seven districts we shall be holding fresh elections because less than half the electorate took part. This is a perfectly normal situation, and can even be seen as a demonstration of democratic principles. We think that this undertaking will be carried to its end by 11 November. All the seats in the future legislature will be distributed. [end recording]

Gamsakhurdia Discusses Soviet Army, KGB

PM0611153690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Nov 90 Union Edition p 3

[INTERFAX report: "After Elections in Georgia"]

[Excerpt] Speaking on national television in a broadcast to the Russian-speaking population, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leader of the victorious "Roundtable-Free Georgia" bloc, stated that mutual relations between the Soviet Army and the Georgian people will not be artificially inflamed and that the question of the presence of Soviet Army units in Georgia must be resolved using the example of the East European countries on the basis of

international law. He confirmed the bloc's determination to follow the path of creating a national army. Replying to questions about the future of the KGB in Georgia, Z. Gamsakhurdia said that the republic needs its own security system and that the USSR KGB is "redundant on Georgian territory." [passage omitted]

Georgian Party Views 'Anti-Constitutional' Acts

LD0611191490 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA
in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 1

["In the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] Givi Gumbaridze, Georgian Supreme Presidium chairman Soviet and Georgian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, and Nodar Chitanava, republic's Council of Ministers chairman, met secretaries and heads of organizational departments of South Osetia Oblast, rayon, and town committees of the Georgian Communist Party. The meeting paid particular attention to the question of preparing for the Supreme Soviet elections. [passage omitted]

Those taking part in the meeting condemned the anti-constitutional and anti-Georgian activity of the so-called "Temporary Executive Committee of the South Osetia Soviet Democratic Republic" and expressed confidence that to counterbalance the forces of alienation the Osetian population would take part without fail in the Georgian Supreme Soviet elections.

South Osetia representatives were told that the USSR Supreme Soviet had sent its conclusion signed by R. Nishanov, USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities chairman. The conclusion notes: "By a decision of the 14th session of the 20th convocation of the South Osetia Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies on 20 September 1990, the autonomous oblast of South Osetia was transformed into the Soviet Democratic Republic of South Osetia. The soviet of people's deputies of the autonomous oblast asked the USSR Supreme Soviet to include the Soviet Democratic Republic of South Osetia in the USSR as an independent subject of the federation.

"This is unconstitutional. An oblast soviet does not have the power to transform an autonomous oblast into a republic or to appeal directly to the USSR Supreme Soviet in this way. [passage omitted]

"This decision of the South Osetia Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies was invalid the moment it was adopted and entails no consequences in law."

Armenia Not Celebrating 7 November Anniversary

NC0711112090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0600 GMT 7 Nov 90

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] The victory day of the October coup d'etat, 7 November, known as the Great October Socialist Revolution, is not being marked either in our capital or throughout the republic. This is only natural. It would have been totally inexplicable and incomprehensible if a nation and a republic set on the course of political independence had continued to (?adhere to the principles of old thinking which has formed the foundation for the totalitarian state ideology). National independence also requires the complete renunciation of foreign symbols. In this connection an article by Shiraz Martirosyan has been published under the title "November 7 is No More."

Armenia Supreme Soviet Depoliticizes State Bodies

LD0611160990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] At a routine sitting of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, a decision was adopted today to depoliticize state bodies, enterprises, institutions, organizations, educational institutions, and military subunits of the republic, ending the activity of the party and socio-political organizations of these bodies.

Yeltsin Sends Message to Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan

NC0711131690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
0600 GMT 7 Nov 90

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, has sent a cable of greetings to Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet, on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. The cable says:

Esteemed Levon Akobovich, allow me to convey my greetings on the occasion of the 73d anniversary of the October Revolution. I am confident that relations between Russia and Armenia will continue to advance in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit, good-neighborliness, and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs.

I wish health and happiness to the people of the republic and to you and your relatives.

Armenia Abolishes People's Control Committee

NC0711140690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian
1730 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Excerpts] The first session of the first convocation of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet continued its deliberations today.

Gagik Arutyunyan, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, chaired the morning session and stated that before debating items on the agenda the session should first make decisions on a few issues. As the deputies are aware, Ktrich Sardaryan was transferred from the post of

chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for the Establishment of Independent Statehood and National Policy to the Council of Ministers. It was proposed that Ashot Voskanyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Credentials and Ethics Commission, fill the vacancy created by Sardaryan's transfer. The deputies endorsed this proposal in principle, but suggested that a decision on this issue should be reached through a closed and secret ballot in line with the standing orders.

The session then began debating the following issues on the agenda: the law of the Armenian Republic on the abolition of the Committee of People's Control and the completion of the list of members of the Supreme Soviet's standing and special commissions.

The deputy chairman of the Commission for the Establishment of Independent Statehood and National Policy presented the bill on the abolition of the Committee of People's Control. A two-thirds majority was necessary to pass this bill as it requires a constitutional amendment, and so the bill was not approved in its original form. The deputies reformulated the bill and the session eventually passed a decision to abolish the Committee of People's Control and to implement this decision as of 1 December 1990. The Constitutional Commission was instructed to prepare the relevant amendments to the Constitution. The session also deemed it necessary to create a new structure of state control.

The session also confirmed the credentials of newly elected People's Deputies Gagik Ovanesyan and Garnik Isakulyan.

The deputies then began the debate on membership in the standing and special commissions. [passage omitted] The deputies gave a final shape to the standing and special commissions. However, the election of the chairmen of these commissions was postponed.

The first session of the first convocation of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet will continue its deliberations next Monday.

Case Against Armenian KGB Officer Detailed

91UF0106A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian
No 8, 11 Oct 90 pp 3-5

[Article by G. Karapetyan, special TRUD correspondent and EPOKHA correspondent, under the rubric "Politics": "An Armenian Kalugin?: The Unfinished Story of an Officer of the Republic's KGB"]

[Text]

A Reporter Conducts an Investigation

The author's first remark.

Moscow-Yerevan—I suspect that a few of the quicker readers have noticed the main innovation of this weekly. I wish to remind you that on the second page of each issue there is a statement that I constantly keep in mind:

"The authors of the articles that are published bear responsibility for the choice and accuracy of the facts and quotes that are cited.... The editorial board may publish articles for purposes of discussion without sharing the point of view of the author." The story that you are now being presented probably pertains to this category.

From the letter of V. Armaganyan to G. Starovoytova, USSR people's deputy:

"Dear Galina Vasilyevna! I write to you in your role as a wife and a mother! Our family has suffered a terrible misfortune. My husband Robert Grigoryevich Dzhangiryan, Armenian KGB major, was supposedly ordered to Moscow and arrested there on 9 October 1989 by the investigative group of the USSR KGB. I am not a lawyer, and it is not for me to judge in regard to illegal actions of the KGB investigative organs. I am only trying to explain to you all that has happened to our family.... On the day after the arrest, the investigative group from Moscow carried out a search of our apartment. The approval for the search and arrest were given by I. Abramov, deputy general procurator of the USSR...."

The author's second remark.

Yes indeed! You are not mistaken—this is that same notorious general who for many years headed the Fifth, so-called "ideological" Directorate of the USSR KGB and who is responsible for numerous "inventions" in order to deliver us from objectionable residents of our country and republic, particularly Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov and Paruyr Ayrikyan. Now our respected general, having traveled from the Lubyanka to Pushkin Street, occupies the post of deputy general procurator of the USSR and oversees the activities—you guessed it!—of the investigative department of the USSR KGB. If only we had our "own" Orwell able to memorialize our "free enterprise" theater of the absurd in the so-called epoch of perestroika! It has been underway for five years now, but I still do not understand: Who, what, how, and in the name of what are we conducting perestroika? The story that I am about to tell you will help to enlighten some unshakable optimists.

Artashes Sarumov, retired legal colonel, lawyer, and member of the Moscow City Board.

[Karapetyan] Could you tell us the grounds for the arrest of Dzhangiryan?

[Sarumov] I am presently unable to answer your question clearly. I have not yet seen the materials serving as the legal and valid basis for his arrest. However, by law I may be kept ignorant of this information: There are provisions for investigative secrecy; the secrecy will be lifted somewhat at the end of the preliminary investigation.

[Karapetyan] Granted. However, why is the investigative department of the country's KGB specifically involved in the "Dzhangiryan case"?

[Sarumov] Apparently everything took place at the initiative of the central or local KGB. Perhaps they proceeded from professional considerations. But there is one law that must be acknowledged: If a member of the KGB commits a common crime— theft, murder, bribery—he is not to be investigated by departmental organs. It is clear to me that if the military procurator of Armenia or the Caucasus district is not involved in the "case," then it should be conducted by the investigative directorate of the Main Military Procuracy (GVP) which has the right to interrogate any general or private. This is why the "case" of former KGB Major General Kalugin, currently a USSR people's deputy, is being conducted there.

[Karapetyan] What is happening? An officer of the republic's KGB represents a great danger to the country and his "case" is handled by the investigative department of the USSR KGB rather than the GVP?

[Sarumov] I, a lawyer with 44 years of experience, have another question: So far as I know, Dzhangiryan is accused of revealing state secrets, but Dzhangiryan has already spent a year in a cell at Lefortovo accused of a common crime. The GVP has still not been involved in his "case."

This past spring I talked with Chistyakov, a procurator of the USSR Procuracy, and I expressed my firm conviction to him that the legal bodies that should address the "Dzhangiryan case" are the organs of military justice. Chistyakov agreed, but a GVP plenipotentiary only appeared in June. There was another blunder—jurisdiction was entrusted not to the investigative directorate of the GVP but to the department overseeing the organs of security.

[Karapetyan] How did you react?

[Sarumov] Both Dzhangiryan and I almost simultaneously submitted oral and then written petitions setting out the aforementioned causes. We still have not received a response.

[Karapetyan] I have had doubts concerning the professional handling of this "case." Incidentally, how many investigators are involved?

[Sarumov] Beginning with the arrest, the number has reached five or six. Except for the head "director," that is to say the boss of the "case," the rest are assistants. I do not have any complaints against them: I am judging by the facts, not by subjective evaluations of their professional activities over the 10 months of our acquaintance.

[Karapetyan] What has changed in the interpretation of the "Dzhangiryan case" over the time that has passed?

[Sarumov] It is a paradox, but absolutely nothing has changed! The initial accusation has not been changed to either worsen or improve Dzhangiryan's position. It sounds banal, but the investigation is continuing. Why

has this sad story been dragged out so long? Unfortunately by law I can only touch upon what Dzhangiryan says and the investigative actions in which he has participated.

[Karapetyan] Has he been allowed to confront his accusers?

[Sarumov] No. I am not allowed to, and an explanation of evidence given against him has not been offered. But time is raising questions. I remember that during our first meeting Dzhangiryan sincerely admitted that he had been arrested because he spoke out actively against the interpretation of events in Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh offered by the leadership of the republic KGB at that time. On 31 August the first interrogation on the theme of Nagorny Karabakh took place. As a participant, I will tell you that Dzhangiryan brought up serious grounds for his indirect participation in the Karabakh movement. Such dissent by an officer of the KGB will hardly remain unnoticed. It is for the investigation to verify how truthful Dzhangiryan is.

[Karapetyan] Are there "accomplices" who are now testifying against him?

[Sarumov] The question is not correct. By law I do not have the right to concern myself with this. I only know that several others were arrested along with Dzhangiryan in this "case."

[Karapetyan] Were any attempts made to hinder your activities as an advocate?

[Sarumov] The law on access to a person under investigation from the moment of arrest was adopted on 1 December of last year. But our first meeting was postponed without grounds. But I am not one of those who remain silent when the law is violated. Approximately a month after a protest by our legal advice office, I was telephoned by one of the leaders of the investigative department of the KGB who finally permitted me to take part in the "Dzhangiryan case."

[Karapetyan] How many times have you been able to meet with your client?

[Sarumov] In this instance there were no obstructions. Once I talked with him alone and face to face—the new law permits such a thing—and altogether we were in communication approximately 10 times. Incidentally, I never saw a single serious interrogation concerning the supposed accusation.

[Karapetyan] Artashes Aleksandrovich! Please share your impressions of Dzhangiryan's physical and psychological condition today.

[Sarumov] He has gradually regained his composure, but in the first months of confinement he looked excited, worried, and even talked incoherently.... It often happens that a person is terrified by the crime he has committed, but a person who is not a criminal is even

more nervous. Of course, it is quite difficult to last a whole year under conditions of confinement.

...I sincerely hope that the torment of waiting will end soon for Dzhangiryan's family. It is time for the investigators to determine whether he is guilty or innocent, although after the interrogation on the Karabakh issue the "case" has taken on an unexpected form. If a mistake has occurred, and I have such instances in my archives, even one stipulated by law, I do not see anything terrible in that. A surgeon as a rule is not condemned for a fatal outcome on the operating table. The main thing is for the investigators, like the doctors, not to make a mistake with the final diagnosis.

"On 14 May 1990 you sent a telegram to the investigative department of the USSR KGB requesting the return of a 'Zhiguli' automobile, a television, and a video recorder. Having examined your petition, we report that it will not be satisfied because of the following circumstances. Your husband... is accused of committing a crime mentioned in Part 2, Article 185 of the Criminal Code of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The sanctions of the aforementioned article stipulate confiscation of property, which is carried out by decision of a court. In connection with this the automobile VAZ-2109, a color television, and a video recorder were impounded. You are informed that you may appeal this decision with the main military procurator of the USSR.

[Signed] "4 June 1990, No. 6/2097, A.G. Nikiforov, assistant chief of the USSR KGB investigative department."

From the letter of V. Armaganyan to G. Starovoytova, USSR people's deputy:

"...I have been presented an accusation of R.G. Dzhangiryan for receipt of bribes as well as a warrant 'to search for money and valuables existing in our home in large quantities and for documents having significance for the case.' But it seemed as though Sirenko, the investigator from the USSR KGB, was stubbornly searching for a whole cache of weapons?! Not finding any of the above-listed items, the investigators confiscated a television and a foreign-made video recorder. Yes, and also a 'very important document having significance for the case'—a rhyme which, as Sirenko wrote in the record, begins with the words 'Grandfather writes to Fedot...' and ends with the words 'a kiss.' That rhyme has lain in a folder with the rest of the poems for 25 years—we had even forgotten about it.

"I would like to dwell on the video equipment in more detail. The problem is that I have two sick children. My older son has congenital heart disease. The younger son, 14 years old, has been an invalid since childhood and cannot walk on his own. Their late grandfather—the father of my husband died several months before the arrest—was very attached to the younger child and to our family in general, inasmuch as Robert was his only son. Both the television and the video recorder were purchased for the ill grandson by the grandfather, which

both I and our Robert indicated during examination. The child does not have the opportunity to go outside to play with the other children. His only comfort in life is the television and recorder. The child used to sit at home for days on end and watch his favorite children's films and recordings of educational programs—my son is in the eighth class, and he can only get an education through persistent studying. The arrest of his father and then the confiscation of his favorite things have severely affected the health of the boy, who can only move about now on crutches...."

The author's third remark. If you could manage to find the 29 May 1990 IZVESTIYA, an article under the title "Nikita's Computer: How a Court Case Turned Into Cruel Punishment for an Innocent Child," you would save me from extensive arguments on the theme of the humanity of our law enforcement organs.

Incidentally, among those who took away "material evidence" in Yerevan, there were also fellow countrymen of ours. But even if I were to name them, I doubt that they would lose any sleep.

"To A.F. Katusev, chief military procurator of the USSR and state legal counselor first class:

"I am forwarding for your examination this statement of V.A. Armaganyan concerning the biased way a search was conducted by the investigative organ of the USSR KGB as a consequence of the accusation of her husband... the ungrounded institution of criminal proceedings for taking bribes, the arrest, and other questions. The statement was sent to me from the secretariat of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia.

[Signed and dated] "G.M. Khachatryan, first deputy procurator of Armenia and senior justice counselor, 20 August 1990, No. 13/347-90."

[Karapetyan] Genrikh Mkrtychevich! Do you see a somewhat strange tendency becoming apparent? During recent years the criminal cases of our fellow countrymen are ending up more and more frequently being conducted by the investigative departments of the KGB of the republic and the country.

[Khachatryan] Article 117 of the criminal procedural code of Armenia clearly designates what kind of "indicators" govern appropriate assignment of an extraordinary incident to the associates of the procuracy, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], or KGB for investigation. Although I have been working for two months at my present post, and at the instigation of the procurator of the republic, we have been conducting a careful "inventory" of last year's cases that were handled—and are being handled—by investigators of the republic KGB. As I have explained, according to that same Criminal Code, more often than not they should have been conducted not by the KGB but by their colleagues in the MVD or the procuracy. I dare propose that the identical "practice" has taken place—and is taking place—at the all-Union level as well.

[Karapetyan] Do you not believe that many "exported" criminal cases that began here in Armenia should be examined by the law enforcement organs of our republic with regard to the recently proclaimed Declaration of Independence?

[Khachatryan] You are right, of course. Apparently after the conclusion of a new Union treaty the territorial principle of the judicial system will finally exist and not just exist on paper. Sovereignty is a concrete concept.

[Karapetyan] That is to say that the "Dzhangiryan case" should be examined in Yerevan, not in Moscow as has been the case since the day of his arrest. For that, so far as I know, an inquiry from your procuracy is needed. I can imagine the horror of the Soviet taxpayers when they learn how many thousands were spent on the travels of the investigators of the USSR KGB who drove and flew to Armenia from all the ends of the country in connection with this "case!"

[Khachatryan] I share your concern. As for the Armenian citizens of our republic, and Dzhangiryan among them, we do not have the right to permit others to make any decisions on their fate behind the back of the sufficiently competent specialists of Armenia. Nonetheless, from time to time—depending on the development of the political situation—we are assaulted by detachments of investigators, lawyers, and procurators.... Do they really not trust us? What about our sovereignty?

[Karapetyan] The investigative department of the USSR KGB has been working on the "Dzhangiryan case" for more than a year. What in your opinion is the justification for such a long period of time?

[Khachatryan] If the plot of the case is not complicated—there are not many episodes; hundreds of people did not take part; numerous tests, examinations, and confrontations are not required—but the length of the preliminary investigation is extended time and time again under the cover of vague grounds, then the investigation does not have any serious materials against the indicated person. Despite my own wishes, I cannot and do not have the right to say anything more concerning the "Dzhangiryan case." Anyway, for now I have a minimum of information concerning it. But judging by everything, comprehensive instructions from the Center concerning the presumption of guilt with regard to our long-suffering republic and its citizens are still in force. We learned about them five years ago from a speech by Gorbachev at one of the CPSU Central Committee plenums; we studied it well in our republic.

From the letter of V. Armaganyan to G. Starovoytova, USSR people's deputy:

... "A week later the 'Zhiguli' car, also bought by my husband's father and given to Robert for his sick son—we have the appropriate documents on the sale—was taken from the garage by fraudulent means and was confiscated by the investigative group of Colonel V.I. Demtsov. It is written in the record that the car was

handed over in the presence of and with the voluntary agreement of V.A. Armaganyan." I was also forced to put my signature at the bottom of the record through the use of fraud! As a result of the cruel actions of the investigative group, during the whole school year my youngest son did not have the opportunity to go to school in a normal manner. Over three months our apartment was searched, our things were described and recorded, and Robert's relatives and I were interrogated. I work as a physics teacher in a secondary school. Galina Vasilyevna, you understand how these experiences have affected my work...."

KGB Lieutenant General (Ret.) Marius Yuzbashyan, former chairman of the Armenian KGB (1978-1989), bearer of six Soviet and three foreign orders as well as the "Honorary State Security Employee" Badge.

[Karapetyan] Please characterize Dzhangiryan who worked more than 20 years in the republic's KGB, both professionally and as a person.

[Yuzbashyan] I saw him as he rose from a rank-and-file employee to chief of a subunit. Professionally, I value him highly. Because of the nature of our work we saw one another rather often. As I remember, in the past we gave Robert two reprimands—he had never had any in his career. But they were not for abuse of his official position or deriving personal profit. As for his personal qualities, I always noted Dzhangiryan's honesty, goodness, intelligence, and mildness.

[Karapetyan] Having been the leader of members of the Armenian KGB, you and they endured some very difficult years recently, including the period of the birth and self-assertion of the Karabakh movement. How did you and your subordinates feel at that time?

[Yuzbashyan] Not any better than the rest of our countrymen. We introduced the following procedure: One or two times a month all the personnel were assembled—except those standing guard—and everyone without exception was granted the opportunity to express himself and ask the leadership timely questions. Robert, like his colleagues, actively spoke out in favor of a quick solution of the Karabakh problem through constitutional means and without bloodshed.

[Karapetyan] Marius Aramovich! When you learned about the arrest of Dzhangiryan, what did you feel?

[Yuzbashyan] Such extraordinary events are always unexpected. I immediately thought that it was a question of arresting him for the sake of clearing up some circumstances. Back then as well as today, it was difficult for me to believe that Robert could be a criminal. In my eyes that does not in any way accord with his personality.

The author's fourth remark.

On the morning of 21 September U. Arutyunyan, chairman of the republic KGB and just recently confirmed as a member of the new government of Armenia,

despite a busy schedule allotted approximately 30 minutes to V. Armaganyan. As a passive observer of this highly confidential conversation—because of a consistently favorable disposition toward the press, above and beyond what is required by his position, I did not ask Usik Surenovich a single question—I testify that without any guarantees for a positive ruling on the issue, a promise was made to the wife of R. Dzhangiryan to request that the “case” be transferred from the jurisdiction of the investigative department of the USSR KGB to the Main Military Procuracy.

Vladimir Avetyan, chief of the second department of the Armenian State Agro-industrial Committee, retired KGB colonel, and up to spring of 1989 leader of the subunit to which the department of R. Dzhangiryan was subordinate.

[Karapetyan] What did you think when you found out about his arrest?

[Avetyan] At first I was very surprised, and I doubted that Robert had committed any crimes at all. When he worked under my supervision I never could begin to suspect that Dzhangiryan was involved in shady dealings or was executing his duties improperly. Later the usual thinking took effect: If they have seized him, it means that he was guilty of something—and although I too was compelled to quit the Armenian KGB, my faith in our organization has remained forever. Finally, I am still puzzled that not one investigator on this case has found time to converse with me. Moreover, I do not know what our experienced associate is specifically accused of. I refuse to have anything to do with rumors.

[Karapetyan] Your retirement took place soon after the approval of a new chairman of the republic KGB who was commanded from Moscow, as far as I can guess by his actions, to “neutralize” the Karabakh movement which had become excessively large, according to the “diagnosis” of the center. But his first task was probably to take care of a “fifth column” composed of those who sympathized with and perhaps even sided with the people who raised their fists on Freedom Square. Personally, I cannot rule out the thought that behind the walls of this awesome institution, daring spirits were at work, among them Dzhangiryan, who thought very differently from the master of the biggest office on the fourth floor of that gloomy building on Nalbandyan Street.

[Avetyan] I flatly deny that. If we are talking about the specific information that was passed to high offices in Moscow and Yerevan, it was legitimate and legal, believe me. As for evaluations, recommendations, and predictions regarding those agitated days, that is a completely different question. In fact, Dzhangiryan and others of his colleagues actively attended the Karabakh movement. They constantly and openly railed at the fact that those in a neighboring republic were blatantly violating the constitutional rights of our countrymen while we were sitting with folded hands reading the central presses, which was irresponsibly distorting almost everything taking place in Armenia and Artsakh. In addition to all

that, Robert had some close relatives living in Stepanakert—they called one another frequently....

[Karapetyan] In my opinion, various ways of resolving the Karabakh impasse were discussed at the republic KGB, just as they were in the society surrounding it. Do you know which position Robert defended?

[Avetyan] On one hand we were overwhelmed with patriotism, and on the other hand we understood that the primary responsibility of the KGB is to answer for order around the country. I remember how one of the leaders of the local members of the KGB suggested that the word “Dashnak” [member of the Armenian bourgeois nationalist counterrevolutionary party Dashnaksutyun], when spoken by an Armenian, was a synonym for “fascist”....

Those of our colleagues who were born in Azerbaijan and Artsakh, or who had relatives there—I remember that Robert was one of those—were radically-minded, trying to resolve the Karabakh problem a little more quickly. The locals—including myself—believed that the issue of uniting the Armenian people had been raised prematurely and without the necessary propaganda and psychological preparation of the population of the neighboring republics that would have helped avoid the tragic bloodbaths, groundless accusations, and arrests of leaders and activists of the Karabakh movement.

From the letter of V. Armaganyan to G. Starovoytova, USSR people's deputy:

“...I would especially like to mention the cruelty of A.G. Nikiforov who heads the investigative group for my husband's case. During the first three months I did not get any information about Robert. Was he alive, was he healthy? Only in January of this year did I receive the first letter from my husband, which was full of despair. My own letters simply disappeared. I was permitted my first meeting with him six months after the arrest. Now, despite my entreaties, Nikiforov does not permit a meeting with my husband under any pretext. Because of their health, my children cannot travel to Moscow—their grief for their father has become unbearable....”

Genrikh Igityan, USSR people's deputy and member of the country's Supreme Soviet.

[Karapetyan] I realize the differences in scale and content between the “cases” as well as the differences in their repercussions; but in terms of the similarity of their beginnings and initial causes I would rank together the members of the “Karabakh” and “Krunn” committees and others of our well-known countrymen who are dissidents and defenders of rights, many of whom today sit on the republic's legislature. This long list could also include those comrades-in-arms such as Marat Isakhanian, former procurator of Razdan who was wrongly incarcerated in Lefortovo for six months at the whim of the investigative department of the USSR—today he is an official of the republic procuracy—and Robert Dzhangiryan who, following that very same “scenario,”

has spent more than a year without judgment in that very same prison.... I learned that you are following the "case" of the major of the Armenian KGB.

[Igityan] First of all, I agree with your thoughts. Second, I have talked at some length in Moscow with his defense lawyer. Third, as I understand it the investigators do not have any clear evidence confirming the accusation that has been made. Fourth, the "Dzhangiryan case" was fabricated using the old methods of the Stalinist KGB: Ascribe any odd crime to a man with regard to the fact that officially there is not a single political prisoner in our country.

[Karapetyan] Genrikh Surenovich! Certainly your activities concerning the "Dzhangiryan case" will not be limited to this conversation.

[Igityan] Without doubt this drawn-out story deserves a deputy's immediate inquiry—I believe that Starovoytova will also be joining me—by competent persons. A parallel with former KGB Major General Kalugin may be drawn in the sense that when a man who has supported the "establishment" suddenly begins to speak about his problems, the very next day he becomes an enemy of the existing authorities. Finally, the appearance of the "Dzhangiryan case" testifies to the unscrupulous, or even worse, surroundings where he has led half of his life.

From the letter of V. Armaganyan to G. Starovoytova, USSR people's deputy:

"...My numerous complaints to the higher offices of the USSR have not yielded any results. The responses to them are always the same. Like boomerangs they are passed to the investigative department of the USSR KGB and to A.G. Nikiforov through the following chain: From the session of the country's Supreme Soviet to the Main Military Procuracy to the investigative department of the USSR KGB.... Respected Galina Vasilyevna! I beg you to look into this very questionable case, and then the picture of this illegality will appear fully.... I come to you as a last resort. Being of poor health myself, I am unable to raise my two sick sons myself. Save our family from the illegality and tyranny of the investigative organs of the USSR KGB!"

The author's fifth and final remark.

More than five years ago the picture of a giant network of mafia clans, almost in the manner of Italian "octopuses," began to be discerned by those in large Moscow offices. A similar image, it seems to me, was presented in the form of numerous "cases" after the notorious television interview with M. Gorbachev at the Yerevan airport after the terrible earthquake. Before and after the natural disaster, our republic was shaken from time to time by all types of explosions that were ideological (for instance the event with the participation of Yu. Arakelyan, special PRAVDA correspondent and a victim of falsification), judicial, and economic (the blockade) in nature.... Since then the presumption of guilt with regard to

Armenia began to operate at full "speed." Now there is a new "echo"—the story of an officer of the republic's KGB.

Soon the board of the USSR Procuracy with the "information" of the investigative department of the country's KGB must decide whether or not to extend R. Dzhangiryan's visit at Lefortovo. Before you decide, remember dear lawyers, the "Arkadiy Manucharov case" that was so notorious for you. And one more thing. Just imagine for a second the existence of the mother of Robert Grigoryevich. After the death of her husband, before the tears had even dried, there was a new grief—the arrest of her son whom she cannot even see in prison because of her poor health.

The results of my preliminary journalistic investigation are addressed primarily to G. Starovoytova and G. Igityan, USSR people's deputies from Armenia, the Committee and Commission on Human Rights of the supreme soviets of RSFSR and Armenia respectively, the board of the Union Society for the Social Defense of Servicemen, "Shchit," and all good people....

As you have noticed, this list does not include the "traditional" high offices and bodies such as the Presidential Council and M. Gorbachev personally, the CPSU Central Committee, the KGB, the Procuracy, the Main Military Procuracy of the country, and employees of offices that have the means to play a masterful game of "bureaucratic shuffle."

As a commentator for the weekly EPOKHA and a member of the USSR Union of Journalists, I reserve the right to further conduct the investigation that I have begun if I receive new information, comments, and materials connected with the "Dzhangiryan case."

Yerevan Reports Flight Restrictions to NKAO

NC0711135490 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] Stepanakert, 6 Nov (ARMENPRES)—The Azerbaijani authorities first decided that return flights between Yerevan and Stepanakert should be restricted to five. However, even this was not enough for them and they have now decided to close the airport at 1530. This means that it is not even certain that the five scheduled flights will be able to take off in view of the unpredictability of the weather during the winter. Moreover, according to information received, flights which are cancelled because of bad weather cannot be rescheduled.

What then will happen to those passengers who bought their tickets a month ago [words indistinct]?

At present, flights from Stepanakert to Mineralniye Vodi, Tbilisi, and Stavropol have been cancelled. The ostensible reason for these cancellations is safety concerns.

We cannot understand how someone could bring himself to make such a decision. One thing, however, is all too

understandable: If someone one is determined to destabilize the situation in the region, he would want to completely blockade the sole transport route which links the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh with the outside world. Such people are not bothered by the fact that there are sick and elderly Armenians as well as women and children, and that most of them have relatives who have dispersed to all corners of the country after becoming refugees from Azerbaijan. Nor are they bothered by the fact that students from the oblast study not only in Armenia but also in other institutions throughout the Union and must be there on time. The "philanthropists" from Baku are not bothered by the fact that five flights by 30-seat planes is tantamount to the imprisonment of the oblast's Armenian majority which is deprived of the elementary right of access to rail and road transportation. What is also all too understandable is the fate of the 23 October 1990 decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That decision stipulated the enforcement of the law "On Criminal Responsibility in Cases of the Blockade of Transportation Routes and Other Illegal Infringements of the Safe and Normal Operation of Transportation." It will be interesting to see how the military behaves under these conditions. Will they (?defend) the laws of the USSR or the leadership of Azerbaijan [words indistinct]?

Central Asia

Turkmenistan Signs Economic Protocol With Turkey

TA0711130690 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
1100 GMT 7 Nov 90

[Text] Turkey and the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic have signed an economic cooperation protocol. A report by ANATOLIA says that the protocol, which was signed in Ashkhabad, the republic's capital, envisages joint investment ventures as well as a wide range of trade cooperation.

Kazakhstan Restricts Commercial Goods Movements

LD0611144190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0500 GMT 6 Nov 90

[Text] The Kazakhstan Council of Ministers has introduced a number of restrictive measures on removing goods from the republic. It has been proposed that the Ministry of Communications put a temporary stop to sending parcels out of Kazakhstan. Exceptions are made only for those being sent to troop units, educational establishments, and homes for the handicapped.

Civil Accord Council Established in Kazakhstan

LD0611173190 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT
6 Nov 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Gennadiy Isakov]

[Text] Alma-Ata November 6 TASS—A civil Accord Council was set up at the Municipal Council of Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan's capital, after the situation in the city deteriorated.

The new public body is comprised of representatives of political parties and organisations, public and civil movements, national cultural centres and young people's groups.

The council's policy statement, published here today, says that a number of "unsanctioned rallies have been recently held in Alma-Ata. Militants provoked the seizure by citizens of suburban lands and flats in new houses or those under repair. The wave of disobedience to existing laws is growing."

The statement denounces those who "are trying to fan up political passions and exert pressure on the republican parliament and local bodies of power".

The Council calls for searching for ways to "overcome conflicts and achieve mutual understanding and civil peace".

Kazakh Soldiers' Mothers Found Congress

91US0075A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 31 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by P. Verdin: "A Congress of Mothers of Soldiers"]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 30 October—A constituent congress of mothers of Kazakhstan soldiers has been held here. A new public organization was created at the congress and its main tasks were determined.

Many people in the republic had awaited this event with concern. The Army is going through a hard time at present. The Afghan syndrome still lingers; servicemen keep risking their lives in the course of interethnic strife, suffer from nonregulation mutual relations, and are subjected to daily inconveniences.

There is a great temptation to accuse the Army of every sin, to take advantage of the occasion, and to demand that their sons no longer be sent far away from the family hearth or be exempt from the draft altogether.

However, common sense prevailed over emotions at the constituent congress of mothers of soldiers. A teacher from the station of Sagiz in Guryev Oblast, K. Zhalgaspayeva, expressed the opinion of a majority of participants in the women's meeting:

"We are against pulling the Army apart into ethnic quarters. We are against the principle 'You serve where you live' since it brings about a weakening of the defensive might of our country. We are in favor of our children serving in international collectives—this enriches their experience. We are in favor of strict military discipline built on rigorous compliance with laws and manuals."

Having formed their committee, the mothers of soldiers declared that they would vigorously foster the process of ethical and physical conditioning of young people of predraft age and servicemen, take care of their everyday life and leisure, seek to eradicate nonregulation relations in the units together with the women's councils of the units, and defend those who have been wronged. Therefore the committee of Kazakhstan mothers of soldiers should become a reliable assistant to the Army rather than an outside critic of it.

Tajikistan Schedules Supreme Soviet Session

LD0611190190 *Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik*
1700 GMT 5 Nov 90

[Text] Here is the decree of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on convening the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR decrees to hold the fourth session of the 12th Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR in Dushanbe on 5 December.

The following issues will probably be put forward for examination at the session: the establishment of presidential administration in the Tajik SSR; amendments and additions to the republic's constitution; making the administration of the national economy more effective in the republic; the main directions for stabilizing the republic's national economy; the transfer to market economy; and others.

Kirghizia's Akayev Forms Economic Reform Body

PM0611170790 *Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*
4 Nov 90 *Union Edition p 1*

[Report by correspondent Gennadiy Shipitko under the "Direct Link" rubric: "First Decree"]

[Text] Frunze—In his first decree President A. Akayev of Kirghizia has formed a Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform.

T. Koychuyev, former vice president of the republic Academy of Sciences, has been appointed commission chairman.

The president links this decision with the need for a more profound scientific elaboration of the concept for the transition to market relations and also for the revision of a number of fundamental provisions of the government program already approved by the extraordinary session.

In his speech immediately after being elected president, A. Akayev stated: "I will devote all my spiritual energy to establishing a democratic mechanism of government in the republic." Along this path he will first have to overcome the entrenched resistance of existing power structures.

Since his election the disposition of political forces in the republic has changed. On the one hand there are the party organs headed by A. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, who lost the presidential election but has kept the post of Supreme Soviet chairman. On the other hand there are demands for A. Masaliyev's resignation from radically disposed deputies and democratic associations.

Given these conditions it is still too early to judge whether the president will succeed in finding a solution to suit everybody or choose a different way to stabilize the situation in an economy weakened by the virus of interethnic conflict. But it is perfectly obvious that the president's stock of trust is high.